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Abstract
In Chapter 1 I explain my motivation for the topic and review some literature on Fiscal Policy Co-
ordination in Currency Unions, in particular in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The EMU is a perfect case study for this key issue, which has been covered more and more by the recent
literature. Fiscal Policy Coordination was initially discussed by the seminal article of Mundell (1961),
where one of the successful criteria of an Optimum Currency Area (OCA) was shown to be a risk-sharing
system like fiscal transfers that redistribute money to areas adversely affected by shocks. This motivates
the creation of a Fiscal Union inside a Currency Union like the EMU, and can be seen as an extreme
case of Fiscal Policy Coordination. I also suggest some questions and avenues of research, which guide
my work.
In Chapter 2 we build a Two-Country Open-Economy New-Keynesian DSGE model of a Currency
Union to study the effects of fiscal policy coordination, by evaluating the stabilization properties of differ-
ent degrees of fiscal policy coordination, in a setting where the union-wide monetary policy affects fiscal
policies and viceversa, because of price rigidities and distortionary taxation. We calibrate the model to
represent two groups of countries in the European Economic and Monetary Union and run numerical
simulations of the model under a range of alternative shocks and under alternative scenarios for fiscal
policy. We also compare welfare under the different scenarios, bringing to policy conclusions for the
proper macroeconomic management of a Currency Union. We find that: a) coordinating fiscal policy, by
targeting net exports rather than output, produces more stable dynamics, b) consolidating government
budget constraints across countries and moving tax rates jointly provides greater stabilization, c) taxes
on labour income are exponentially more distortionary than taxes on firm sales. Our policy prescrip-
tions for the Eurozone are then to use fiscal policy to reduce international demand imbalances, either by
stabilizing trade flows across countries or by creating some form of fiscal union or both, while avoiding
the excessive use of labour taxes, in favour of sales taxes.
In Chapter 3 we build a Two-Country Open-Economy New-Keynesian DSGE model of a Currency
Union with a debt-elastic government bond spread in an incomplete market setting, to study the effects
of government debt deleveraging, by evaluating the stabilization properties of different deleveraging rules,
in a setting where the union-wide monetary policy affects fiscal policies and viceversa, because of price
rigidities and distortionary taxation. We calibrate the model to represent two groups of countries in the
European Monetary Union and run numerical simulations under a range of alternative shocks and under
alternative scenarios for government debt deleveraging. We also compare welfare under the different
scenarios, bringing to policy conclusions for the proper government debt management in a Currency
Union. We find that: a) backloading deleveraging or reducing its speed provides more stabilization to
the economy, b) taxes are the instrument for deleveraging which stabilizes the economy the most, c)
coordinating fiscal policy by targeting the net exports gap, instead of the output gap, increases volatil-
ity with incomplete markets, d) the joint movements of the fiscal instruments increases volatility with
incomplete markets, although consolidating budget constraints might otherwise smooth distortions. Our
policy prescriptions for the Eurozone are then to reduce the speed of deleveraging and to use taxes to
achieve it, while reducing domestic demand imbalances and avoiding to form a fiscal union like the one
we describe. Once financial markets are completely integrated though, these results are overturned.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction & Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
European economic integration started in 1957 with free trade agreements and has brought now to
about 19 countries sharing the same currency (the EURO) with a single monetary policy enacted by the
European Central Bank (ECB). This means that each country in the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) has lost its monetary authority, leaving it in the hands of the ECB which can only enact
ONE monetary policy for all countries. In other words the ECB can only target Euro-wide inflation
and output, but cannot target any country-level variables (if not, which country should it target?). On
the other hand, fiscal policy can and should target country-level aggregates. As a matter of fact, now
each country can only manage its own fiscal policy, because there is still no fiscal authority at the EMU
level. Since the two main macroeconomic stabilizers are one at the EMU level and the other at country
level, many questions can arise regarding the possible interactions between the two. Would it be better
to coordinate fiscal policies inside the monetary union? Would this create a scope for a central fiscal
authority? Would that be an extreme example of fiscal policy coordination? I see it that way.
Although a single monetary policy cannot balance asymmetric shocks to different countries, a single
fiscal policy can and should. Not only is it important, for the literature and for real life, to understand
how monetary and fiscal policies interact, in a general open economy and specifically in a Currency
Union, but it is very interesting and useful to study the creation of the Euro as the most modern and
largest-scale case study of the engineering of an Optimum Currency Area, an area in which it would
maximize economic efficiency to have the region share a single currency, as pioneered in the seminal
work of Mundell (1961). The optimal management of a Currency Union has to do with many issues.
I will focus on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies and on the stabilization properties
of different fiscal policy scenarios, following mainly Ferrero (2009) and Hjortsø (2012), while ignoring
political issues, which in reality are also very important, if not necessary, for the proper functioning of a
Currency Union.
The main interest in studying the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policies in the
Eurozone is to follow the ever increasing economic integration taking place in Europe, which started in
1957 and has gone a long way, but still has many unfinished tasks and unsolved problems. How should
economic integration evolve in Europe? What are the main problems that can be addressed and how?
On one hand this is a real-life problem with real-life consequences. On the other hand this topic has
to do with the Optimum Currency Area literature and with the history of fixed exchange rate regimes,
from Bretton Woods (1945-1971), where 44 countries decided to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar,
allowing them to fluctuate within bands, and where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created
2to manage temporary imbalances in the Balance of Payments, to the European Monetary System (1978-
1992), the forerunner of the Euro, where many countries decided to peg their currencies to avoid exchange
rate variability and achieve monetary stability. Both of these experiments failed miserably, but then the
Euro was born in 1998 giving new hopes to the proper functioning of a Currency Union. Unfortunately,
the recent global financial crisis and european sovereign debt crisis have showed many weaknesses of the
EMU and the point is to understand why things went so bad and how things could have gone better and
could go better in the future.
Fiscal and monetary policy are the two main macroeconomic stabilization tools that countries can
use in the presence of adverse shocks to stabilize aggregate output and inflation. With the birth of the
Euro, european countries have lost their monetary independence, because one currency for all countries
implies one monetary policy for all countries, and have very constrained fiscal independence, because of
the laws passed at EMU level limiting discretion in fiscal policy implementation (balanced budget rule,
for example). There are different interaction mechanisms because of one union-wide monetary policy
and different country-level fiscal policies. What are the effects of such economic integration and how can
it be modified in the future to increase wealth and stability? Since the single monetary policy affects
member countries in different ways, fiscal policy should be used to balance these asymmetric effects on
different countries. As found in Beetsma and Jensen (2005), while monetary policy is concerned with
stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy in a currency union should mainly aim at stabilizing
inflation differences and the terms of trade (which is naturally a role for floating exchange rates), implying
a greater role for fiscal policy the higher the difference in inflation and price rigidity between countries,
which is the case for Europe. In 2009 many economists and the IMF recommended that Europe establish a
fiscal union with a bailout fund, a banking union, a mechanism for countries to pursue the same economic
and fiscal policies, and a common issuance of Eurobonds. Little has been done and many questions are
still open.
My research is part of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) literature, which started with Mundell
(1961). Robert Mundell pioneered the theory of an OCA as an area in which it would maximize economic
efficiency to have the region share a single currency. The successful criteria for an OCA pointed out by
Mundell are: labour mobility, openness with capital mobility and price and wage flexibility, participant
countries with similar business cycles, and a risk-sharing system like fiscal transfers to redistribute money
to areas adversely affected by shocks. This last concept is in fact the equivalent of a fiscal union with a
centralized fiscal authority that addresses country-level shocks with union-wide resources, as if it were
transferring resources from other countries to the country hit by the shock.
My research is also part of the Open-Economy New-Keynesian DSGE literature, mainly adopted for
the analysis of monetary policy, but lately adopted more and more for the analysis of fiscal policy and its
interaction with monetary policy. A useful introduction to the analysis of New-Keynesian DSGE models
is given in Gal´ı (2009), and specifically in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) regarding the Open Economy,
although in a setting with a continuum of countries, which is not very realistic or tractable, and with a
direct approach to log-linear approximation, often skipping non-linear analysis.
1.2 Literature Review
Several papers have analyzed the interactions between monetary policy and fiscal policies in a Currency
Union, with differing consensus over the need for fiscal policy coordination or for a Fiscal Union inside
a Currency Union.
My main reference is Ferrero (2009), which uses a two-country model with Calvo price-setting, mo-
nopolistic competition, distortionary taxation on income and sales, and nominal debt to study centralized
3monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies and their effects in the union, from the viewpoint of a
benevolent central planner maximizing a welfare criterion for the union as a whole. The paper mainly
investigates the design of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies. Its main finding regards the sub-
stantial welfare gains from flexible fiscal policy, defined as flexible debt targeting, compared to balanced
budget rules. This shows the great importance of the role of fiscal policy and its limitations induced
by the Maastricht Treaty and Fiscal Compact. The paper studies optimal monetary and fiscal policies
from the viewpoint of a benevolent central planner, while not considering strategic interactions between
policymakers, home bias, incomplete markets or the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
Ferrero (2009) finds that the optimal equilibrium prescribes that monetary policy should achieve price
stability at the union level through flexible inflation targeting, while fiscal policy should avoid creating
inflationary expectations at the union level, and should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for per-
manent variations of government debt, through relative tax rates that track the evolution of the terms
of trade.
Hjortsø (2012) uses a two-country model of a currency union with incomplete financial markets, so
that full private insurance against country-specific shocks is not possible, to study optimal coordinated
fiscal policy in a monetary union without fiscal transfers. The paper finds that, if internationally traded
goods are complements, fiscal policy should optimally reduce intra-union current account imbalances
at the expense of larger domestic output gaps. The model has home bias in private consumption and
households that gain utility also from government consumption. It models financial intermediaries that
can borrow at the nominal interest rate set by the central bank, but charge a rate which depends also
on the aggregate debt of the borrowing country. This allows for yields on government bonds, which are
increasing in the level of debt, to produce yield differences across countries. The paper does not consider
fiscal transfers or distortionary taxation, abstracting from these fiscal policy considerations.
Ferrero (2009) also builds on Benigno and Woodford (2004), which applies the study of optimal policy
in a closed economy to a framework with sticky prices and both monetary and fiscal policy, where the only
source of government revenue is distortionary taxation, which breaks Ricardian equivalence, and allows
for non-trivial interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. It analyzes the optimal policy, through a
linear-quadratic approach, from the viewpoint of a benevolent central planner in a closed economy, and
then derives policy rules with which the authorities can implement the optimal plan. The paper shows
optimal policy and the rules to implement it in a closed economy with complete financial markets, while
not considering the role of incomplete markets or open economy dynamics, nor the strategic interactions
between the different policy authorities.
Benigno (2004) studies optimal monetary policy in a two country model with different price rigidi-
ties, but with money in the utility function and without fiscal policy. It assumes unitary elasticity of
substitution across countries and no home bias in consumption. Financial markets are complete within
a country and incomplete across countries, implying agents can only trade a risk-free bond across coun-
tries. The paper takes the optimal monetary policy approach and finds that an inflation targeting rule
where a higher weight is given to the inflation of the country with a higher degree of nominal rigidity is
nearly optimal. This could imply a greater role for fiscal policy in stabilizing the effects of different price
rigidities.
Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) studies the interactions between the centralized monetary policy and the
decentralized fiscal policies which have a country-specific stabilization role. It uses Calvo staggered price-
setting, fiscal policy with country-specific levels of public expenditure which yields utility to domestic
households and a currency union made up of a continuum of small open economies, subject to different
productivity shocks. While it finds the usual union-wide inflation-targeting role for monetary policy,
it argues that every country must simultaneously implement its fiscal policy part of the optimal plan,
4implying a need for fiscal policy coordination. The paper finds that fiscal policies have a stabilization
role for the union as a whole and increasing importance with greater nominal rigidities, implying that
external constraints on fiscal policy might not be desirable. It doesn’t include distortionary taxation or
government debt in the model, abstracting from their effects on policy interactions.
Farhi and Werning (2012b) studies the role of fiscal policy, in a currency union made of a continuum
of small open economies, as a cross-country insurance tool in the presence of nominal price and wage
rigidities. It finds that, in the presence of incomplete financial markets, there is a greater gain from
macro insurance for countries inside a currency union. At the same time, even with complete markets,
private insurance is inefficiently low, implying a role for macro insurance by governments. These findings
motivate the creation of a fiscal union inside a currency union. It shows there is a larger role for macro
insurance the larger the asymmetric shocks on member countries, the more persistent the shocks and the
less open the member economies. The paper abstracts from banks and sovereign financing issues and
finds no need for coordination of fiscal policy at the union level.
The structure of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) and Farhi and Werning (2012b) with a continuum of
countries means that more variables will be exogenous, compared to a two-country model, and that a
single country, being one of an infinite continuum, as specified in Gal´ı (2009), does not influence any
world variable. This means that all world variables must be exogenous and that it is harder to see the
interaction among countries, so that international trade has no role because any expenditure on goods
from any one country has a value of zero, being one of infinitely many composing the integral, as written
in Gal´ı (2009) that an integral of any variable over all countries is the same as an integral of the same
variable over all countries except one. This poses questions on the validity of such a model and pushes
me to prefer a two-country model instead, where the interactions among the two countries (or two groups
of countries) are more evident and the dynamics are thus clearer. I choose to follow an approach similar
to that of Silveira (2006), where the structure of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) is adapted to a two-country
model setting, rather than a setting with a continuum of countries. At the same time, I focus on a
currency union setting, following Ferrero (2009), where there is no nominal exchange rate to act as an
automatic stabilizer, because both countries share the same currency.
1.3 Further Research
An incredible number of questions can be addressed in this field of research, following the above mentioned
papers and trying to answer some of these questions with different models of a Currency Union:
• Is there a better way to target monetary policy in a Currency Union to favour equally all countries,
rather than favoring the high inflation countries at the expense of the high unemployment countries?
• What should fiscal policies target at a country-level and how should they interact with each other
and with the central monetary policy?
• Other than evaluating union-wide gains and losses from different policies, which are the countries
that gain or lose more and why?
• What are the effects of high government debt and external fiscal policy limitations on the interaction
between monetary policy and fiscal policies in a Currency Union?
• What are the effects of the only use of distortionary taxation to finance fiscal policy in a Currency
Union and should countries harmonize them?
• Is there a scope for a central fiscal capacity in the EMU and if so how should fiscal policy be
managed at the union level?
5• Are there strategic motives that might bring national governments to deviate from the optimal
fiscal policy at the union level?
• Must there be coordination between centralized monetary policy and country-level fiscal policies?
I will try to answer some of these questions using different Two-Country Open-Economy New-
Keynesian DSGE models. The two countries have different sizes, so they can be used to model a currency
union in different ways: two groups of countries in the EMU, one country and the rest of the EMU, or
the EMU and the rest of the world. This allows to study the dynamics of the Eurozone economy from
different points of view. I will focus on the first option, following Ferrero (2009), and so considering the
two countries as two groups of countries in the EMU.
I will evaluate some of the following effects of the Fiscal Compact Rules:
• Government Budget Deficit/GDP ratio no higher than 3%.
• Government Debt/GDP ratio no higher than 60%.
• Debt Brake Rule: if Debt/GDP is more than 60% it should decrease by 5% of the excess per year.
• Current Account Balance/GDP ratio between −4% and +6%.
• Countries must adopt a balanced budget law into national legislation.
The analysis will be carried out evaluating how the ECB conducts its monetary policy:
• Its primary objective of price stability is formulated as a situation in which the one-year increase
in the CPI for the Eurozone is less than, but close to, 2%.
• Other goals, like a high level of employment and sustainable growth, are formulated vaguely and
can only be pursued if compatible with price stability.
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Chapter 2
One EMU Fiscal Policy for the
EURO1
2.1 Introduction
Are there gains from fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union subject to alternative shocks? Does
this create a scope for a centralized fiscal capacity in the EMU?
Given a single monetary policy in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), country-
specific shocks cannot be addressed through monetary policy, but must be balanced by country-specific
fiscal policies. Whether this calls for coordination or not is a much debated issue, and has been typically
investigated by looking at fiscal multipliers, as Farhi and Werning (2012a) finds a greater output multi-
plier if government spending is financed by a foreign country rather than the home country. This would
create a scope for a central EMU budget, as centrally financed government spending has larger effects
than nationally financed government spending, but this is in a model without distortionary taxation,
which is far from reality.
We focus on fiscal policy coordination with complete international financial markets and study the
stabilization properties and the welfare implications of different fiscal policy scenarios. We study the
effects of supply (productivity) and demand (preference) shocks hitting a single country under alterna-
tive fiscal policy specifications and compare uncoordinated fiscal policy (Pure Currency Union scenario),
where each country chooses its government consumption, transfers and taxation, with fully coordinated
fiscal policy (Full Fiscal Union scenario), where government consumption, transfers and taxation are
chosen for each country by the union as a whole, with a consolidated budget. An intermediate case (Co-
ordinated Currency Union scenario) shows the effects of coordinating fiscal policy without consolidating
the budget.
We analyze the welfare gains from stabilization through variations in government consumption in the
country hit by the shock, financed by the union as a whole, considering whether there is a scope for a
fiscal capacity in the EMU to address asymmetric shocks to member countries, as a shock-absorption
mechanism, as addressed in Van Rompuy et al. (2012). This was mentioned also in the more recent
Juncker et al. (2015), where a Fiscal Union is seen as a Euro area-wide macroeconomic stabilization tool,
over and above national fiscal policies needed to cushion country-specific shocks, which is thought to be
key in avoiding procyclical fiscal policies at all times. We define two welfare criteria and evaluate the
welfare gains from a common macroeconomic stabilization function which can better deal with shocks
1This chapter is co-authored with Chiara Guerello, LUISS Guido Carli, and Guido Traficante, Universita` Europea di
Roma.
7that cannot be managed at the national level alone. We compare welfare under the Full Fiscal Union,
the Coordinated Currency Union and the Pure Currency Union scenarios, bringing to policy conclusions
for the proper macroeconomic management of a Currency Union. A future Fiscal Union will need a
Eurozone treasury for collective decision-making on fiscal policy, which will also need to be accountable
and legitimated democratically, but this is out of the scope of the present paper.
We follow the open economy approach of Gal´ı (2009), in a two-country setting like in Silveira (2006),
but without taking the limit case of a small open economy. Our model follows the specifications of
Ferrero (2009), which adapts the optimal approach of Benigno and Woodford (2004) to monetary and
fiscal policy in a cashless closed economy without capital, where there are only distortionary taxes as
sources of government revenue, to a two-country open-economy Currency Union setting. We follow also
the Currency Union model of Benigno (2004), by adding a fiscal authority and including a government
budget constraint, but without money in the utility function and concentrating on the cashless limit
case. Our model adds home bias in consumption (or a degree of openness to international trade) and
government transfers to households to the model in Ferrero (2009). The former allows for deviations
from Purchasing Power Parity, while the latter is an additional instrument for fiscal policy.
As in Ferrero (2009), this model is structured to allow for spillovers from monetary to fiscal policy and
viceversa, and from one country to another through country-specific fiscal policies. Nominal rigidities,
in the form of staggered prices, generate real effects of monetary policy, while distortionary taxation
generates non-Ricardian effects of fiscal policy. Monetary policy influences fiscal policy through its effect
on the real value of debt, which depends on the interest rate and inflation. Fiscal policy influences
monetary policy through its effect on prices and wages, which depend on the tax rates. This framework
allows to study the interaction between country-specific fiscal policies, where in the absence of the
nominal exchange rate as an automatic stabilizer, fiscal policies influence each other through their effects
on output and the terms of trade.
The EMU is represented by two countries of different size forming a Currency Union. Each country
has an independent Fiscal Authority, while the Currency Union shares a common Monetary Authority.
The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate for the whole Currency Union following an Inflation
Targeting regime, where the target is on union-wide CPI inflation. This assumption reflects the current
functioning of the ECB, whose primary objective of price stability is formulated as a situation in which
the one-year increase in the CPI for the Eurozone is less than, but close to, 2%. Fiscal policy is designed
following the Fiscal Compact Rules, by imposing that the Government Debt-to-GDP ratio is about 60%
and that countries must adopt a balanced budget law in their national legislation. Following Hjortsø
(2012), we add a stabilization rule for government consumption or alternatively for government transfers,
but in a setting where distortionary taxes and government debt add the financing dimension to the fiscal
policy problem. Governments choose the level of government consumption and transfers, which are
financed by distortionary taxes on labour income and firm sales and by short-term government bonds.
In particular:
• In a Pure Currency Union scenario governments choose the level of government consumption or
transfers for domestic stabilization purposes by setting them alternatively to target the output gap,
while following in part an exogenous process, financed by a mix of distortionary tax rates, while
balancing the budget.
• In a Coordinated Currency Union scenario governments choose the level of local government con-
sumption or transfers for international stabilization purposes by setting them to target the net
exports gap, while following in part an exogenous process, financed by a mix of distortionary tax
rates, while balancing the budget.
8• A Full Fiscal Union scenario uses a consolidated budget constraint to finance local government
consumption or transfers for international stabilization purposes by setting them to target the net
exports gap, while following in part an exogenous process, financed by a mix of distortionary tax
rates, while balancing the consolidated budget, just like in the Currency Union case, but varying
equally the tax rates across countries, so as to use union-wide resources to finance the government
expenditure.
Our main results show that coordinating fiscal policy by targeting net exports, rather than output,
produces more stable dynamics, and that consolidating government budget constraints across countries
and moving tax rates jointly provides greater stabilization, while taxes on labour income are exponentially
more distortionary than taxes on firm sales. Our policy prescriptions for the Eurozone are then to use
fiscal policy to reduce international demand imbalances, either by stabilizing trade flows across countries
or by creating some form of fiscal union or both, while avoiding the excessive use of labour taxes, in
favour of sales taxes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general model and
the fiscal policy scenarios of a Pure Currency Union, a Coordinated Currency Union and a Full Fiscal
Union. Section 3 presents the calibration of the parameters and steady state stances of the model
to two groups of countries in the EMU. Section 4 describes two welfare criteria and provides welfare
rankings of the different fiscal policy scenarios. Section 5 provides numerical simulations under different
scenarios, comparing different degrees of fiscal policy coordination, alternative fiscal policy instruments
for stabilization and alternative government financing schemes. Section 6 shows the effects of fiscal
shocks and describes fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers. Section 7 shows numerical simulations and
welfare evaluations of the case for international goods as complements, rather than substitutes. Section
8 collects the main conclusions and provides possible extensions. The Mathematical Appendix provides
all derivations, collects all equilibrium conditions of the model used for the simulations, and describes
the steady state on which the model is calibrated.
2.2 A Two-Country Currency Union Model
The world economy is composed of two countries, which form a Currency Union. Both economies are
assumed to share identical preferences, technology and market structure, but may be subject to different
shocks, price rigidities, initial conditions and fiscal stances. The two countries are indexed by H and
F for Home and Foreign. The world is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households of
measure one, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each household owns a monopolistically competitive firm producing
a differentiated good, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The population on the segment [0, h) belongs to country H
while the population on the segment [h, 1] belongs to country F . This means that the relative size of
country H is h ∈ [0, 1], while the relative size of country F is 1 − h. This is true for both households
and firms.
Firms set prices in a staggered fashion following Calvo (1983) and use only labour for production.
There is no capital and no investment. Labour markets are competitive and internationally segmented,
so that labour supply is country-wide and not firm-specific. All goods are tradable and the Law of One
Price (LOP) holds for all single goods j. At the same time deviations from Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) may arise because of home bias in consumption. Financial markets are complete internationally,
allowing households to trade a full set of one-period state-contingent claims across borders, other than
purchase one-period risk-free bonds issued by the two countries’ governments.
The world economy comprises also two Governments or Fiscal Authorities (one for each country), each
one choosing government consumption and transfers to stabilize the economy, financed by distortionary
9taxes on labour income and firm sales and by short-term government bonds, and a Central Bank or
Monetary Authority (one for the whole EMU), which sets the nominal interest rate targeting union-wide
inflation.
We denote variables referred to the Foreign country with a star (∗).
2.2.1 Households
In each country there is a continuum of households, which gain utility from private consumption and
disutility from labour, consume goods produced in both countries with home bias, supply labour to
domestic firms and collect profits from those firms. Households can trade a complete set of one-period
state-contingent claims across borders and purchase one-period risk-free bonds issued by the two coun-
tries’ governments, subject to their budget constraint.
Each household in country H, indexed by i ∈ [0, h), and each household in country F , indexed by
i ∈ [h, 1], seeks to maximize respectively the present-value utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξt U(C
i
t , N
i
t ) E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξ∗t U(C
∗i
t , N
∗i
t ) (2.1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the common discount factor, which households use to discount future utility, ξt is
a preference shock to Home households and ξ∗t is a preference shock to Foreign households. These
preference shocks are assumed to follow the AR(1) processes in logs:
ξt = (ξt−1)ρξeεt and ξ∗t = (ξ
∗
t−1)
ρ∗ξeεt (2.2)
where ρξ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ∗ξ ∈ [0, 1] are measures of persistence of the shocks and εt is a zero mean white
noise process. N it denotes hours of labour supplied by households in country H, N
∗i
t denotes hours of
labour supplied by households in country F . Cit is a composite index for private consumption defined
by2:
Cit ≡
[
(1− α) 1η (CiH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CiF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2.3)
for households in country H, while the analogous index for households in country F , C∗it , is defined by:
C∗it ≡
[
(1− α∗) 1η (C∗iH,t)
η−1
η + α∗
1
η (C∗iF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2.4)
where CiH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods for households in country H, given by the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function (also known as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator
function):
CiH,t ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
CiH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.5)
whereas, for households in country F the same index of consumption of domestic goods, C∗iH,t, is given
by:
C∗iH,t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
C∗iH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.6)
2In the special case in which η = 1, the consumption index is given by Cit =
(
CiH,t
1−α
)1−α (
CiF,t
α
)α
. For a derivation
see Appendix A.1. The same applies to the respective index for country F , which in the special case in which η = 1 is
given by C∗it =
(
C∗iH,t
1−α∗
)1−α∗ (
C∗iF,t
α∗
)α∗
.
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where j ∈ [0, 1] denotes a single good variety of the continuum of differentiated goods produced in the
world economy. CiF,t is an index of imported goods for households in country H, given by the analogous
CES function:
CiF,t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
CiF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.7)
while the same index for imported goods for households in country F , C∗iF,t, is given by:
C∗iF,t ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
C∗iF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.8)
The parameter ε > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within a
given country. The parameter η > 0 measures the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods
(international trade elasticity). The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of openness of the Home economy
to international trade. Equivalently (1 − α) is a measure of the degree of home bias in consumption
in country H. When α tends to zero the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption vanishes and
the country ends up in autarky, consuming only domestic goods. If 1 − α > h there is home bias in
consumption in country H, because the share of consumption of domestic goods is greater than the share
of production of domestic goods. The same applies to the Foreign parameter of openness to international
trade α∗ ∈ [0, 1] for country F , except for the fact that if 1−α∗ > 1−h there is home bias in consumption
in country F , because the share of consumption of domestic goods in country F is greater than the share
of production of domestic goods in country F .
We choose to specify additively separable period utility of the type with Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA), so with constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and with constant elasticity
of labour supply, which take the following form3:
U(Cit , N
i
t ) ≡
(Cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
U(C∗it , N
∗i
t ) ≡
(C∗it )
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N∗it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(2.9)
for countries H and F respectively, where σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution4
(it is also the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)), and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply5.
Households in country H maximize their present-value utility, equation 2.1, subject to the following
sequence of budget constraints:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)C
i
H,t(j) dj+
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)C
i
F,t(j) dj+D
i
t+B
i
t ≤
Dit−1
Qt−1,t +B
i
t−1(1+it−1)+(1−τwt )WtN it +T it +Γit
(2.10)
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where PH,t(j) is the price of domestic variety j, PF,t(j) is the price of variety j
imported from country F , Dit−1 is the portfolio of state-contingent claims purchased by the household in
period t− 1, Qt−1,t is the stochastic discount factor, which is the same for households in both countries
and represents the price of state-contingent claims or equivalently the inverse of the gross return on
state-contingent claims, Bit are risk-free government bonds (of either or both governments) purchased
3In the special case in which σ = 1, utility from private consumption is given by U(Cit) = lnC
i
t in country H and
U(C∗it ) = lnC∗it in country F . For a derivation see Appendix A.2.
4The elasticity of intertemporal substitution measures the responsiveness of consumption growth to changes in the real
interest rate, which is the relative price of consumption between different dates, and is defined as the percent change in
consumption growth divided by the percent change in the gross real interest rate. For a derivation see Appendix A.3.
5The Frisch elasticity of labour supply measures the extent to which labour supply responds to a change in the nominal
wage, given a constant marginal utility of wealth, and is defined as the percent change in the supply of labour divided by
the percent change in the nominal wage. For a derivation see Appendix A.4.
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by the household in period t, it−1 is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank in period t − 1,
which is also the net return on government bonds, Wt is the nominal wage for households in country H,
T it denotes lump-sum transfers from the government to households, Γ
i
t denotes the share of profits net
of taxes to households from ownership of firms and τwt ∈ [0, 1] is a marginal tax rate on labour income
paid by households to the government.
Households in country F analogously maximize their present-value utility, equation 2.1, subject to
the following sequence of budget constraints:∫ h
0
P ∗H,t(j)C
∗i
H,t(j) dj+
∫ 1
h
P ∗F,t(j)C
∗i
F,t(j) dj+D
∗i
t +B
∗i
t ≤
D∗it−1
Qt−1,t+B
∗i
t−1(1+it−1)+(1−τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗it +T ∗it +Γ∗it
(2.11)
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where all the starred (∗) variables are the Foreign equivalent of the unstarred ones
explained above.
All variables are expressed in units of the union’s currency. Last but not least, households in countries
H and F respectively, are subject to the following solvency constraints, for all t, that prevent them from
engaging in Ponzi-schemes:
lim
T→∞
Et
{Qt,TDiT} ≥ 0 lim
T→∞
Et
{Qt,TD∗iT } ≥ 0 (2.12)
The first order conditions for the household’s problem in country H are6:
(Cit)
σ(N it )
ϕ = (1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
(2.13)
which is the household’s intratemporal optimality condition, and:
Qt,t+1 = β ξt+1
ξt
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(2.14)
which is the household’s intertemporal optimality condition or Euler Equation, that holds for all states
of nature at t and t+ 1, and:
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} (2.15)
which is the no-arbitrage condition between riskless government bonds and state-contingent claims.
Aggregating the intratemporal optimality condition, equation 2.13, yields the aggregate labour supply
equation for households in country H:
Nt = (h)
1+ σϕ (Ct)
− σϕ
[
(1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
] 1
ϕ
(2.16)
where Nt is aggregate labour supply and Ct is aggregate consumption for households in country H,
defined by:
Nt ≡
∫ h
0
N it di = hN
i
t Ct ≡
∫ h
0
Cit di = hC
i
t (2.17)
while aggregating the intertemporal optimality condition for households in country H, equation 2.14,
taking conditional expectations on both sides of the equation and using the no-arbitrage condition
6See Appendix A.8 for all derivations for this section.
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between government bonds and state-contingent claims, yields:
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} = βEt
{
ξt+1
ξt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
1
Πt+1
}
(2.18)
where 11+it = Et{Qt,t+1} is the price of a one-period riskless government bond paying off one unit of the
union’s currency in t+ 1 and Πt+1 ≡ Pt+1Pt is gross CPI inflation in country H.
Specular equations for country F can be obtained following the same procedure, where the results
are the same, but with all the relevant starred (∗) variables instead of the unstarred ones.
The first order conditions for the household’s problem in country F are:
(C∗it )
σ(N∗it )
ϕ = (1− τ∗wt )
W ∗t
P ∗t
(2.19)
which is the household’s intratemporal optimality condition, and:
Qt,t+1 = β
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗it+1
C∗it
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(2.20)
which is the household’s intertemporal optimality condition or Euler Equation, that holds for all states
of nature at t and t+ 1, and:
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} (2.21)
which is the no-arbitrage condition between riskless government bonds and state-contingent claims.
The aggregate labour supply equation for households in country F is given by:
N∗t = (1− h)1+
σ
ϕ (C∗t )
− σϕ
[
(1− τ∗wt )
W ∗t
P ∗t
] 1
ϕ
(2.22)
where N∗t is aggregate labour supply and C
∗
t is aggregate consumption for households in country F ,
defined by:
N∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
N∗it di = (1− h)N∗it C∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
C∗it di = (1− h)C∗it (2.23)
while taking conditional expectations on both sides of the aggregate intertemporal optimality condition
and using the no-arbitrage condition between government bonds and state-contingent claims yields:
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} = βEt
{
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
1
Π∗t+1
}
(2.24)
where 11+it = Et{Qt,t+1} is the price of a one-period riskless government bond paying off one unit of the
union’s currency in t+ 1, which is the same for both countries in the currency union, and Π∗t+1 ≡ P
∗
t+1
P∗t
is gross CPI inflation in country F .
Aggregating the budget constraints of households in countries H and F respectively and considering
that in optimality they hold with equality yields:
PtCt +Dt +Bt = (1 + it−1)(Dt−1 +Bt−1) + (1− τwt )WtNt + Tt + Γt (2.25)
P ∗t C
∗
t +D
∗
t +B
∗
t = (1 + it−1)(D
∗
t−1 +B
∗
t−1) + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗t + T ∗t + Γ∗t (2.26)
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where aggregate contingent claims and aggregate bonds are respectively defined as:
Dt ≡
∫ h
0
Dit di = hD
i
t D
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
D∗it di = (1− h)D∗it (2.27)
Bt ≡
∫ h
0
Bit di = hB
i
t B
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
B∗it di = (1− h)B∗it (2.28)
while aggregate transfers and profits are respectively defined as:
Tt ≡
∫ h
0
T it di = hT
i
t T
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
T ∗it di = (1− h)T ∗it (2.29)
Γt ≡
∫ h
0
Γit di = hΓ
i
t Γ
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
Γ∗it di = (1− h)Γ∗it (2.30)
and aggregate consumption and labour supply are as previously defined.
Pt is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country H, given by
7:
Pt ≡
[
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (2.31)
while P ∗t is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country F , given by:
P ∗t ≡
[
(1− α∗)(P ∗H,t)1−η + α∗(P ∗F,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (2.32)
where PH,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country H and PF,t is a price
index for goods imported from country F , respectively defined by:
PH,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(2.33)
PF,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(2.34)
while P ∗H,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country F and P
∗
F,t is a price
index for goods imported from country H, respectively defined by:
P ∗H,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(2.35)
P ∗F,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(2.36)
Since one-period state-contingent claims can be traded freely between households within and across
borders, they are in zero international net supply, so that the market clearing condition for these assets
7The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country H, Pt, can be found by minimizing a given expenditure on both domestic
and foreign goods under the constraint that equation 2.3 equals one:
min
Ci
H,t
,Ci
F,t
PH,tC
i
H,t + PF,tC
i
F,t s.t.
[
(1− α) 1η (CiH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CiF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
= 1
The same applies to the respective Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country F , P ∗t . In the particular case in which
η = 1, the CPI in country H takes the form Pt = (PH,t)
1−α(PF,t)α, while the CPI in country F takes the form P ∗t =
(P ∗H,t)
1−α∗ (P ∗F,t)
α∗ . For a derivation see Appendix A.7.
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in every period t is consequently given by:∫ h
0
Dit di+
∫ 1
h
D∗it di = hD
i
t + (1− h)D∗it = Dt +D∗t = 0 (2.37)
Adding up the two budget constraints and imposing the market clearing condition for state-contingent
claims yields an equation linking consumption in the two countries:
PtCt +Bt + P
∗
t C
∗
t +B
∗
t = (1 + it−1)
(
Bt−1 +B∗t−1
)
+ (1− τwt )WtNt + Tt + Γt + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗t + T ∗t + Γ∗t (2.38)
2.2.2 International Identities and Assumptions
Several international identities and assumptions need to be spelled out in order to link the Home economy
to the Foreign one and to be able to close the model.
The terms of trade are defined as the price of foreign goods in terms of home goods, for households
in country H and in country F , and are given respectively by:
St ≡ PF,t
PH,t
and S∗t ≡
P ∗F,t
P ∗H,t
(2.39)
Although deviations from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) may arise because of home bias in con-
sumption, we assume that the Law of One Price (LOP) holds for every single good j, which implies:
PH,t(j) = P
∗
F,t(j) and PF,t(j) = P
∗
H,t(j) (2.40)
for all j ∈ [0, 1], where PH,t(j) (or PF,t(j) for goods imported from country F ) is the price of good j in
country H and P ∗F,t(j) (or P
∗
H,t(j) for goods produced in country F ) is the price of good j in country F
in terms of the union’s currency. Plugging the previous expressions into the definitions of PH,t and PF,t
respectively yields:
PH,t = P
∗
F,t and PF,t = P
∗
H,t (2.41)
Combining the previous result with the definition of the terms of trade for countries H and F yields:
St = PF,t
PH,t
=
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
=
1
S∗t
(2.42)
Dividing the CPIs in countries H and F by the relative price indices for domestic and imported goods
and combining them with the definition of the terms of trade yields the following relationships8:
Pt
PH,t
=
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η (2.43)
Pt
PF,t
=
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η
St (2.44)
8In the special case in which η = 1 the CPIs take the form shown in Appendix A.7, so these ratios consequently take
the form:
Pt
PH,t
=
(
PF,t
PH,t
)α
= Sαt and
Pt
PF,t
=
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−α
= Sα−1t
P ∗t
P ∗H,t
=
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗H,t
)α∗
= (S∗t )α
∗
= (St)−α∗ and P
∗
t
P ∗F,t
=
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
)1−α∗
= (S∗t )α
∗−1 = (St)1−α∗
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P ∗t
P ∗H,t
=
[
1− α∗ + α∗(S∗t )1−η
] 1
1−η =
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (2.45)
P ∗t
P ∗F,t
=
[
1− α∗ + α∗(S∗t )1−η
] 1
1−η
S∗t
= St
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (2.46)
Computing the first price ratio for periods t and t− 1 and dividing one by the other yields:
Pt
PH,t
PH,t−1
Pt−1
=
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η
[1− α+ α(St−1)1−η]
1
1−η
(2.47)
which rearranged yields a relationship between PPI inflation and CPI inflation in country H9:
Πt = ΠH,t
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
1− α+ α(St−1)1−η
] 1
1−η
(2.48)
The same relationship can be derived for country F and will be given by:
Π∗t = Π
∗
H,t
[
1− α∗ + α∗Sη−1t
1− α∗ + α∗(St−1)η−1
] 1
1−η
(2.49)
Dividing the terms of trade in period t by the terms of trade in period t − 1 yields a relationship
showing the evolution of the terms of trade over time:
St
St−1 =
ΠF,t
ΠH,t
=
Π∗H,t
ΠH,t
=⇒ St =
Π∗H,t
ΠH,t
St−1 (2.50)
as a function of PPI inflation in both countries H and F .
The Real Exchange Rate between the Home country and country F is the ratio of the two countries’
CPIs, expressed both in terms of the union’s currency, and is defined by:
Qt ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
(2.51)
Combining the previous results with the definition of the real exchange rate yields a relationship
between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade10:
Qt =
P ∗t
P ∗F,t
PH,t
Pt
=
[
1− α∗ + α∗(S∗t )1−η
] 1
1−η
S∗t [1− α+ α(St)1−η]
1
1−η
= St
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η
(2.52)
where the difference between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade is given by the degree of
openness of the two countries and the international trade elasticity. If the countries both have complete
home bias (α = α∗ = 0), then they are in autarky and the real exchange rate is exactly equal to the
9In the special case in which η = 1 the price ratios take the form shown above and the relationships between PPI
inflation and CPI inflation in countries H and F respectively take the form:
Πt = ΠH,t
( St
St−1
)α
and Π∗t = Π
∗
H,t
(
S∗t
S∗t−1
)α∗
= Π∗H,t
(St−1
St
)α∗
10In the special case in which η = 1 the CPIs take the form shown in Appendix A.7 and the real exchange rate takes the
form:
Qt =
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−α−α∗
= S1−α−α∗t
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terms of trade, because the CPI and PPI are the same in each country.
2.2.3 International Risk-Sharing
The no-arbitrage condition for state-contingent claims and the assumption of complete markets implies
that the price of the state-contingent claims must be the same for households in both countries. This
in turn implies that we can link the consumption of households in the two countries by equating their
Euler Equations through their Stochastic Discount Factor, which yields an international risk-sharing
condition.11
The risk sharing condition linking consumption of households in country H to consumption of house-
holds in country F , through their Euler Equations, is given by:
Cit+1 =
(
ξt+1
ξt
ξ∗t
ξ∗t+1
Qt+1
Qt
) 1
σ Cit
C∗it
C∗it+1 (2.53)
By repeated substitution of Home consumption backward in time and moving backwards one period,
the previous equation reduces to one linking the consumption of households in the two countries as a
function of initial conditions, the real exchange rate and preference shocks:
Cit =
(
ξ∗0
ξ0
1
Q0
) 1
σ
(
Ci0
C∗i0
)(
ξt
ξ∗t
Qt
) 1
σ
C∗it (2.54)
By assuming symmetric initial conditions for households in countries H and F , the previous expression
reduces to:
Cit =
(
ξt
ξ∗t
Qt
) 1
σ
C∗it (2.55)
where household consumption in the two countries differs only in the presence of asymmetric preference
shocks and of deviations from purchasing power parity (when the real exchange rate is different from
one).
Aggregating the previous condition across households in each country yields:
Ct =
h
1− h
(
ξt
ξ∗t
Qt
) 1
σ
C∗t (2.56)
where Ct and C
∗
t are aggregate consumption for households in countries H and F respectively, as
previously defined, and the difference in aggregate consumption across countries is also given by the
relative size of the two countries.
Substituting the real exchange rate with equation 2.52 yields an international risk-sharing condition
linking aggregate consumption in the two countries as a function of the terms of trade, the degree of
openness of the two countries and the international trade elasticity, other than preference shocks and
country size12:
Ct =
h
1− h
[
ξt
ξ∗t
St
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) 1
1−η
] 1
σ
C∗t (2.58)
11All derivations for this section are in Appendix A.9.
12In the special case in which η = 1 the CPIs take the form shown in Appendix A.7 and the international risk-sharing
condition takes the form:
Ct =
h
1− h
(
ξt
ξ∗t
S1−α−α∗t
) 1
σ
C∗t (2.57)
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2.2.4 Firms
In country H there is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, h), while in country F there is a continuum
of firms, indexed by j ∈ [h, 1], each producing a differentiated good with the same technology represented
respectively by the following production functions:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) Y
∗
t (j) = A
∗
tN
∗
t (j) (2.59)
where At and A
∗
t represent the level of technology in countries H and F , respectively, which evolve
exogenously over time following the AR(1) processes in logs:
At = (At−1)ρaeεt and A∗t = (A
∗
t−1)
ρ∗aeεt (2.60)
where ρa ∈ [0, 1] and ρ∗a ∈ [0, 1] are measures of persistence of the shocks and εt is a zero mean white
noise process.
From the production functions we can derive labour demand for individual firms in countries H and
F and the respective nominal and real marginal costs of production, which are equal across firms in each
country and are given by13:
Nt(j) =
Yt(j)
At
=⇒ MCnt =
Wt
At
=⇒ MCt = Wt
AtPH,t
(2.61)
N∗t (j) =
Y ∗t (j)
A∗t
=⇒ MC∗nt =
W ∗t
A∗t
=⇒ MC∗t =
W ∗t
A∗tP ∗H,t
(2.62)
Aggregating individual labour demand across firms in each country yields the aggregate labour de-
mand for countries H and F , respectively given by14:
Nt ≡
∫ h
0
Nt(j) dj =
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
At
dj =
Yt
At
∫ h
0
1
h
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj =
Yt
At
dt (2.63)
N∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
N∗t (j) dj =
∫ 1
h
Y ∗t (j)
A∗t
dj =
Y ∗t
A∗t
∫ 1
h
1
1− h
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
dj =
Y ∗t
A∗t
d∗t (2.64)
where Yt and Y
∗
t are aggregate output in countries H and F , respectively given by:
Yt ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
Y ∗t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
Y ∗t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.65)
13Individual labour demand can be derived directly from the production function by dividing both sides by At, while
nominal marginal costs can be derived by minimizing costs for firms subject to the production function, or labour demand:
min
Yt(j)
WtNt(j) s.t. Yt(j) = AtNt(j)
Real marginal costs are simply nominal marginal costs divided by the PPI, which is the relevant price for firms.
14The results are obtained by substituting in the demand functions for output in each country, given by:
Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε Yt
h
and Y ∗t (j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
Y ∗t
1− h
as derived in Appendix A.10.
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and where the terms:
dt ≡
∫ h
0
1
h
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj and d∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
1
1− h
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
dj (2.66)
represent relative price dispersion across firms in each country. In steady state and in a flexible price
equilibrium these relative price dispersions are equal to one.
Firm j’s period t profits net of taxes in country H are given by:
Γt(j) = (1− τst )PH,t(j)Yt(j)−WtNt(j) (2.67)
where τst is the marginal tax rate on firm sales in country H. Substituting in labour demand, marginal
costs, substituting the output of firm j with the demand function for output, integrating over all j ∈ [0, h),
using the definition of PH,t, and substituting in price dispersion yields aggregate profits net of taxes in
country H:
Γt = (1− τst )PH,tYt − PH,tMCtYtdt = PH,tYt(1− τst −MCtdt) (2.68)
Analogous results can be obtained for aggregate profits net of taxes in country F :
Γ∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
Γ∗t (j) dj = (1− τ∗st )P ∗H,tY ∗t − P ∗H,tMC∗t Y ∗t d∗t = P ∗H,tY ∗t (1− τ∗st −MC∗t d∗t ) (2.69)
where τ∗st is the marginal tax rate on firm sales in country F , and where firm j’s period t profits net of
taxes in country F are given by:
Γ∗t (j) = (1− τ∗st )P ∗H,t(j)Y ∗t (j)−W ∗t N∗t (j) = Y ∗t (j)[(1− τ∗st )PH,t(j)−MC∗nt ] (2.70)
Here we can see how aggregate profits are a function of the PPI, aggregate output, marginal cost
and price dispersion for both countries H and F , other than the tax rate on firm sales, while nominal
aggregate labour income is shown to be a function of some of the same variables and equal to:
WtNt = Wt
Yt
At
dt = MC
n
t Ytdt = PH,tYtMCtdt (2.71)
in country H, and:
W ∗t N
∗
t = W
∗
t
Y ∗t
A∗t
d∗t = MC
∗n
t Y
∗
t d
∗
t = P
∗
H,tY
∗
t MC
∗
t d
∗
t (2.72)
in country F .
Following Calvo (1983), each firm in country H may reset its price with probability 1−θ in any given
period. Thus, each period a fraction 1 − θ of randomly selected firms reset their price, while a fraction
θ keep their prices unchanged. As a result, the average duration of a price in country H is given by
(1− θ)−1, and θ can be seen as a natural index of price stickiness for country H. In country F each firm
may reset its price with probability 1 − θ∗ in any given period. Thus, each period a fraction 1 − θ∗ of
randomly selected firms reset their price, while a fraction θ∗ keep their prices unchanged. As a result,
the average duration of a price in country F is given by (1 − θ∗)−1, and θ∗ can be seen as a natural
index of price stickiness for country F . This allows for the two countries to have different degrees of
price rigidity.
A firm in country H re-optimizing in period t will choose the price P¯H,t that maximizes the current
market value of the profits net of taxes generated while that price remains effective. Formally, it solves
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the problem:
max
P¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{Qt,t+kYt+k|t(j) [(1− τst+k)P¯H,t −MCnt+k]} (2.73)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints15:
Yt+k|t(j) =
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
(2.74)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where Qt,t+k is the households’ stochastic discount factor in country H for discounting
k-period ahead nominal payoffs from ownership of firms, defined by:
Qt,t+k = βk ξt+k
ξt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
(2.75)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and where Yt+k|t(j) is the output in period t + k for firm j which last reset its price
in period t.
Analogously, a firm in country F re-optimizing in period t will choose the price P¯ ∗H,t that maximizes
the current market value of the profits net of taxes generated while that price remains effective. Formally,
it solves the problem:
max
P¯∗H,t
∞∑
k=0
θ∗kEt
{
Qt,t+kY ∗t+k|t(j)
[
(1− τ∗st+k)P¯ ∗H,t −MC∗nt+k
]}
(2.76)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints:
Y ∗t+k|t(j) =
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t+k
)−ε
Y ∗t+k
1− h (2.77)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where Qt,t+k is the households’ stochastic discount factor in country F for discounting
k-period ahead nominal payoffs from ownership of firms, defined by:
Qt,t+k = βk
ξ∗t+k
ξ∗t
(
C∗t+k
C∗t
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+k
(2.78)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., which is equal to the stochastic discount factor for households in country H, and
where Y ∗t+k|t(j) is the output in period t+ k for firm j which last reset its price in period t.
The optimal price chosen by firms in country H can be expressed as a function of only aggregate
variables16:
P¯H,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
MCnt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
(1− τst+k)
} (2.79)
Notice that in the zero inflation steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium the previous equation
simplifies to:
P¯H =
ε
(ε− 1)(1− τs)MC
n (2.80)
where MCn is the nominal marginal cost in steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium in country
15As shown in Appendix A.10 the derivation of the demand function for firms is much like the derivation of the demand
function for consumption goods, except for the timing of price setting, which implies that PH,t+k(j) = P¯H,t(j) with
probability θk for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and the fact that all firms are the same and so they set the same price in any given period,
which allows us to drop the j index.
16See Appendix A.11 for the derivation of the optimal price-setting by firms.
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H, and where the optimal price is shown to be set as a markup over nominal marginal costs.
Analogous results hold for firms in country F . The optimal price chosen by firms in country F can
be expressed as a function of only aggregate variables:
P¯ ∗H,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
Y ∗t+k
(P∗H,t+k)
−εMC
∗n
t+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
Y ∗t+k
(P∗H,t+k)
−ε (1− τ∗st+k)
} (2.81)
In the zero inflation steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium the previous equation simplifies to:
P¯ ∗H =
ε
(ε− 1)(1− τ∗s)MC
∗n (2.82)
where MC∗n is the nominal marginal cost in steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium in country
F , and where the optimal price is shown to be set as a markup over nominal marginal costs.
2.2.5 Net Exports, Net Foreign Assets and the Balance of Payments
Net Exports are defined as domestic production minus domestic consumption, which is equal to exports
minus imports, and for country H are given by:
NXt ≡ PH,tYt − PtCt − PH,tGt (2.83)
In real terms (divided by PH,t), Net Exports for country H can be written as:
N˜Xt = Yt − Pt
PH,t
Ct −Gt = Yt −
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η Ct −Gt (2.84)
where net exports are shown to be a function of the country’s degree of openness and the terms of trade,
other than domestic production and public and private domestic consumption.
Since exports for country H are imports for country F and viceversa, then net exports are in zero
international net supply: NXt+NX
∗
t = 0. In real terms: N˜Xt+StN˜X
∗
t = 0. This implies the following
relationship between output in the two countries:
Yt + StY
∗
t =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η Ct + St
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η C∗t +Gt + StG
∗
t (2.85)
Net Foreign Assets are given by the sum of private and public assets held abroad, and for countries
H and F are given respectively by:
NFAt ≡ Dt +Bt −BGt and NFA∗t ≡ D∗t +B∗t −B∗Gt (2.86)
In real terms (divided by PH,t and P
∗
H,t respectively), Net Foreign Assets for countries H and F can
be written respectively as:
N˜FAt ≡ D˜t + B˜t − B˜Gt and N˜FA
∗
t ≡ D˜∗t + B˜∗t − B˜∗Gt (2.87)
Since foreign assets for country H are domestic assets for country F , then net foreign assets are in
zero international net supply: NFAt +NFA
∗
t = 0. In real terms: N˜FAt + StN˜FA
∗
t = 0.
The Balance of Payments is given by net exports plus interest accrued on net foreign assets:
BP t ≡ NXt + it−1NFAt−1 (2.88)
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In real terms (divided by PH,t), the Balance of Payments for country H can be written as:
B˜P t ≡ N˜Xt + it−1 N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
(2.89)
Combining the relationships between net foreign assets and net exports in the two countries shows
that the balance of payments of the two countries are related in the following way: BP t +BP
∗
t = 0. In
real terms: B˜P t + StB˜P
∗
t = 0.
From the households’ budget constraint, substituting in firm profits and labour income, and sub-
stituting in the expression for transfers backed out from the government budget constraint, yields the
following relationship between assets and goods for country H:
Dt +Bt − (Dt−1 +Bt−1)(1 + it−1) = BGt −BGt−1(1 + it−1) + PH,tYt − PtCt − PH,tGt (2.90)
while substituting in the definitions of net exports and net foreign assets yields:
NFAt = NFAt−1(1 + it−1) +NXt (2.91)
while substituting in the definition of the balance of payments yields a relationship between net foreign
assets and the balance of payments:
NFAt = NFAt−1 +BP t (2.92)
which shows that the balance of payments is equal to the variation of net foreign assets over one period.
In real terms (divided by PH,t), the previous equation can be rewritten as:
N˜FAt = (1 + it−1)
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ N˜Xt =
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ B˜P t (2.93)
2.2.6 Central Bank and Monetary Policy
The only central bank in the currency union sets monetary policy by choosing the nominal interest rate
to target union-wide inflation through a Taylor rule.
Monetary policy follows an Inflation Targeting regime of the kind:
β(1 + it) =
(
ΠUt
ΠU
)φpi(1−ρi)
[β(1 + it−1)]
ρi (2.94)
where union-wide output is defined as the population-weighted geometric average of per-capita output
in the two countries:
Y Ut ≡
(
Yt
h
)h(
Y ∗t
1− h
)1−h
(2.95)
while the union-wide CPI is analogously defined:
PUt ≡ (Pt)h(P ∗t )1−h (2.96)
so that consequently union-wide inflation is defined as the population-weighted geometric average of the
CPI inflations in the two countries:
ΠUt ≡ (Πt)h(Π∗t )1−h (2.97)
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while variables without subscripts t denote their respective steady state levels, φpi represents the respon-
siveness of the interest rate to inflation and ρi is a measure of the persistence of the interest rate over
time (interest rate smoothing).
2.2.7 Government and Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union
In a Pure Currency Union each government chooses the amount of government consumption and transfers,
financed by marginal tax rates on labour income and firm sales and by short-term government bonds.
In country H the government finances a stream of public consumption Gt and transfers Tt subject
to the following sequence of budget constraints:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Gt(j) dj +
∫ h
0
T it di+B
G
t−1(1 + it−1) = B
G
t + τ
s
t PH,tYt +
∫ h
0
τwt WtN
i
t di (2.98)
where the right hand side represents government income from taxation and newly issued government
bonds, while the left hand side represents total government spending on consumption and transfers, and
on government bonds due at the end of period t, including interest. BGt are government bonds issued by
country H in period t, while all other variables are as explained above. Government consumption, Gt,
is given by the following CES function, just like equation 2.74 for the demand function for firms, where
we assume that the government purchases only goods produced domestically (complete home bias):
Gt ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
Gt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.99)
The optimal allocation of any given public expenditure within each category of goods yields the
following demand function17:
Gt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
Gt
h
(2.100)
and total government expenditure on public consumption simplifies to:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Gt(j) dj = PH,tGt (2.101)
The government budget constraint can be rewritten in aggregate form as:
PH,tGt + Tt +B
G
t−1(1 + it−1) = B
G
t + τ
s
t PH,tYt + τ
w
t WtNt (2.102)
while dividing the government budget constraint by PH,t yields the government budget constraint in real
terms:
Gt + T˜t + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= τst Yt + τ
w
t MCtdtYt + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(2.103)
where variables with a tilde ( ˜ ) are in real terms (divided by PH,t), and where the left hand side
represents current government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt, while the right
hand side represents government financing of that expenditure through taxes and the possible variation
of government debt.
In the consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses government consumption to stabilize
17As shown in Appendix A.5 for private domestic consumption, CH,t.
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the output gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
Gt
G
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρg)(Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (2.104)
while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the budget:
T˜t = T˜ B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(2.105)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ through the following tax
rule18:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (2.106)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without subscripts t represent their respective
steady state level, while ψy ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government consumption to variations
of the output gap.
In the transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses real transfers to stabilize the output gap
countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρt)( T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (2.107)
while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the budget:
Gt = G B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(2.108)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ through the following tax
rule:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (2.109)
where ρt ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψy ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the output gap.
In country F the government finances a stream of public consumption G∗t and transfers T
∗
t subject
to the following sequence of budget constraints:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)G
∗
t (j) dj +
∫ 1
h
T ∗it di+B
∗G
t−1(1 + it−1) = B
∗G
t + τ
∗s
t P
∗
H,tY
∗
t +
∫ 1
h
τ∗wt W
∗
t N
∗i
t di (2.110)
where the right hand side represents government income from taxation and newly issued government
18If the overall tax rate is defined as:
τot ≡ τst + τwt
then the variation of the tax rates on labour income and on firm sales will be given respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and
1− γ of the variation of the overall tax rate in the following way:
(τwt − τw) ≡ γ(τot − τo)
(τst − τs) ≡ (1− γ)(τot − τo)
which implies the tax rule in the text.
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bonds, while the left hand side represents total government spending on consumption and transfers, and
on government bonds due at the end of period t, including interest. B∗Gt are government bonds issued by
country F in period t, while all other variables are as explained above. Government consumption, G∗t ,
is given by the following CES function, just like equation 2.77 for the demand function for firms, where
we assume that the government purchases only goods produced domestically (complete home bias):
G∗t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
G∗t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(2.111)
The optimal allocation of any given public expenditure within each category of goods yields the
following demand function19:
G∗t (j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
G∗t
1− h (2.112)
and total government expenditures on public consumption simplify to:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)G
∗
t (j) dj = P
∗
H,tG
∗
t (2.113)
The government budget constraint can be rewritten in aggregate form as:
P ∗H,tG
∗
t + T
∗
t +B
∗G
t−1(1 + it−1) = B
∗G
t + τ
∗s
t P
∗
H,tY
∗
t + τ
∗w
t W
∗
t N
∗
t (2.114)
while dividing the government budget constraint by P ∗H,t yields the government budget constraint in real
terms:
G∗t + T˜
∗
t + it−1
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
= τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t + B˜
∗G
t −
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(2.115)
where variables with a tilde ( ˜ ) are in real terms (divided by P ∗H,t), and where the left hand side
represents current government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt, while the right
hand side represents government financing of that expenditure through taxes and the possible variation
of government debt.
In the consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses government consumption to stabilize
the output gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗g)(G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (2.116)
while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the budget:
T˜ ∗t = T˜
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(2.117)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − γ∗ through the following
19As shown in Appendix A.5 for private domestic consumption, CH,t.
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tax rule20:
γ∗(τ∗st − τ∗s) = (1− γ∗)(τ∗wt − τ∗w) (2.118)
where ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without subscripts t represent their respective
steady state level, while ψ∗y ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government consumption to variations
of the output gap.
In the transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses real transfers to stabilize the output gap
countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗t )( T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (2.119)
while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the budget:
G∗t = G
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(2.120)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on firm sales and labour
income from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ∗ through the following
tax rule:
γ∗(τ∗st − τ∗s) = (1− γ∗)(τ∗wt − τ∗w) (2.121)
where ρ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψ∗y ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the output gap.
Since government bonds are traded freely within and across borders without frictions and are perfectly
substitutable because they offer the same return, the total amount of bonds held by households in both
countries must equal the total amount of bonds issued by the two countries’ governments, so the market
clearing condition for these assets in every period t is given by:
Bt +B
∗
t = B
G
t +B
∗G
t (2.122)
which can be rewritten in real terms (dividing by PH,t) as:
B˜t + StB˜
∗
t = B˜
G
t + StB˜
∗G
t (2.123)
2.2.8 Government and Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union
If the Governments of the two countries choose to coordinate, they will use their fiscal instruments
to target a common objective, while maintaining independent budget constraints. Instead of using
government consumption or transfers to stabilize the domestic output gap countercyclically, they will
use the same fiscal instruments to stabilize the net exports gap procyclically. This represents the act of
20If the overall tax rate is defined as:
τ∗o ≡ τ∗st + τ∗wt
then the variation of the tax rates on labour income and on firm sales will be given respectively by a share γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and
1− γ∗ of the variation of the overall tax rate in the following way:
(τ∗wt − τ∗w) ≡ γ∗(τ∗ot − τ∗o)
(τ∗st − τ∗s) ≡ (1− γ∗)(τ∗ot − τ∗o)
which implies the tax rule in the text.
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coordinating their policies on a common objective, which depends on the interactions between the two
economies. The budget constraints of the two fiscal authorities instead remain unmodified.
In the consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses government consumption to stabilize
its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal
rule:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (2.124)
while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the budget:
T˜t = T˜ B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(2.125)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ through the following tax
rule:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (2.126)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψnx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government
consumption to variations of the real net exports gap.
In the same consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses government consumption to
stabilize its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the
fiscal rule:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (2.127)
while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the budget:
T˜ ∗t = T˜
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(2.128)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − γ∗ through the following
tax rule:
γ∗(τ∗st − τ∗s) = (1− γ∗)(τ∗wt − τ∗w) (2.129)
where ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψ
∗
nx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government
consumption to variations of the real net exports gap.
In the transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses real transfers to stabilize its real net
exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (2.130)
while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the budget:
Gt = G B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(2.131)
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which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ through the following tax
rule:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (2.132)
where ρt ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψnx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the real net exports gap.
In the same transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses real transfers to stabilize its real net
exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (2.133)
while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the budget:
G∗t = G
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(2.134)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on firm sales and labour
income from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ∗ through the following
tax rule:
γ∗(τ∗st − τ∗s) = (1− γ∗)(τ∗wt − τ∗w) (2.135)
where ρ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψ∗nx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the real net exports gap.
2.2.9 Government and Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union
If instead of considering two fiscal authorities managing fiscal policy independently, one for each country,
or coordinating their policies, but with two separate budget constraints, we consider only one fiscal
authority managing fiscal policy for both countries at the same time in a coordinated way and with a
consolidated budget constraint, then we can think of it as an extreme case of fiscal policy coordination
and call it a Full Fiscal Union.
A Full Fiscal Union uses local government spending to manage fiscal policy at the union level with a
consolidated budget constraint. The Fiscal Union finances streams of local public consumption, Gt and
G∗t , and transfers, Tt and T
∗
t , subject to the consolidated budget constraint of the two national fiscal
authorities:
PH,tGt+P
∗
H,tG
∗
t +Tt+T
∗
t +BGt−1(1+it−1) = BGt +τst PH,tYt+τ∗st P ∗H,tY ∗t +τwt WtNt+τ∗wt W ∗t N∗t (2.136)
where BGt is overall nominal government debt at time t, defined by the sum of the government debts of
countries H and F :
BGt ≡ BGt +B∗Gt (2.137)
Dividing the government budget constraint by PH,t yields the government budget constraint in real
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terms (for country H):
Gt + T˜t +St(G
∗
t + T˜
∗
t ) + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= (τst + τ
w
t MCtdt)Yt + (τ
∗s
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
t )StY
∗
t + B˜Gt −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(2.138)
where variables with a tilde (˜) are in real terms (divided by PH,t), and where the left hand side represents
current government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt, while the right hand side
represents government financing of that expenditure through taxes and the possible variation of overall
government debt, which is given by:
B˜Gt = B˜Gt + StB˜t
∗G
(2.139)
In the consumption scenario, union-wide fiscal policy chooses government consumption in each coun-
try to stabilize its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through
the fiscal rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (2.140)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (2.141)
while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the overall budget:
T˜t = T˜ T˜
∗
t = T˜
∗ and B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
=⇒ B˜Gt −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= St
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt
)
(2.142)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − γ in each country through
the following tax rule:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (2.143)
while distributing equally among the two countries the cost of fiscal policy by varying jointly the tax
rates in the following way:
(τst − τs) = (τ∗st − τ∗s) (2.144)
(τwt − τw) = (τ∗wt − τ∗w) (2.145)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] for country H and ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] for country F are measures of persistence of the government
consumption shocks in their AR(1) processes in logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables
without subscripts t represent their respective steady state level, while ψnx ≥ 0 for country H and
ψ∗nx ≥ 0 for country F represent the responsiveness of government consumption to variations of the real
net exports gap.
In the transfer scenario, union-wide fiscal policy chooses real transfers in each country to stabilize its
real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rules:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (2.146)
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (2.147)
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while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the overall budget:
Gt = G G
∗
t = G
∗ B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
=⇒ B˜Gt + StB˜∗Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+ St
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(2.148)
which means that fiscal policy is financed by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm
sales from their steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − γ in each country through
the following tax rule:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (2.149)
while distributing equally among the two countries the cost of fiscal policy by varying jointly the tax
rates in the following way:
(τst − τs) = (τ∗st − τ∗s) (2.150)
(τwt − τw) = (τ∗wt − τ∗w) (2.151)
where ρt ∈ [0, 1] for country H and ρ∗t ∈ [0, 1] for country F are measures of persistence of the transfer
shocks in their AR(1) processes in logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without
subscripts t represent their respective steady state level, while ψnx ≥ 0 for country H and ψ∗nx ≥ 0 for
country F represent the responsiveness of real transfers to variations of the real net exports gap.
2.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated21 following mainly Ferrero (2009), so we consider the top 5 Eurozone countries,
which account for more than 80% of Eurozone GDP and we divide them into the periphery (namely,
France, Netherlands, Italy and Spain), country F , and the core (namely Germany), country H. The size
of country H is set according to the relative GDP size to h = 0.4, as Germany accounts for over 35% of
Eurozone GDP.
As in Ferrero (2009) most of the parameters governing the economies of the two countries are set
symmetrically, with the exception of the degree of price rigidity, which has been set such that in country
H the average duration of a price is 4 quarters while in country F it is 5 quarters. The gross markup
ε
ε−1 has been set to 1.1, which implies a net markup of 10%, and the discount factor has been chosen to
match a compounded annual interest rate of 2%. The parameters for monetary policy follow common
values used in the literature, so we set the response of the interest rate to inflation to φpi = 1.5, according
to the Taylor principle, and the interest rate smoothing parameter to ρi = 0.8. Table 2.1 collects all
calibrated parameters and steady state stances.
In the calibration, we set η > 1σ so that CH and CF are substitutes and hence the substitution effect
of a price change dominates the income effect. In the opposite case
(
η < 1σ
)
CH and CF are complements
and the income effect of a price change dominates the substitution effect. This implies that fiscal policy
and spillovers from one country to the other have very different effects based on the two calibrations.
In our analysis we focus on the case in which CH and CF are substitutes because we believe it is more
realistic, especially for advanced economies, and more in line with the recent literature (See Ferrero
(2009) and Blanchard, Erceg and Linde´ (2015) for instance), but we also consider the case in which they
are complements, as a sensitivity analysis for the effects of fiscal policy, as studied in Hjortsø (2012).
The calibration of the two countries mainly differs in the fiscal policy parameters. In particular, the
government consumption-to-GDP ratios have been set respectively to 18.7% for country H and 21.9%
for country F , according to the average of the last 9 years (source ECB-SDW). The marginal tax rates
21The calibration is done on the steady state values described in Appendix A.15.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters and Steady State Stances.
Parameters Description Country H Country F
h Relative size of domestic economy .4 .6
β Discount factor .995 .995
ε Elasticity of substitution of domestic goods 11 11
ε
ε−1 Gross Price Mark-Up 1.1 1.1
η Elasticity of substitution foreign and domestic goods [0.3, 4.5] [0.3, 4.5]
σ Inverse Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 3 3
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of labour supply 0.5 0.5
θ Degree of price rigidity 3/4 4/5
α Openness of domestic economy .52 .361
α
h Relative openness of domestic economy 1.3 .6017
1−α
h Home bias 1.2 1.065
ψy Responsiveness of fiscal policy to output gap 0.045 0.001
ψnx Responsiveness of fiscal policy to net exports gap 0.0697 0.0092
φpi Responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation 1.5 1.5
ρi Interest Rate smoothing parameter 0.8 0.8
ρξ Persistence of preference shock 0.94 0.8
ρa Persistence of technology shock 0.58 0.70
ρg Persistence of fiscal shock 0.74 0.81
σξ Standard deviation preference shock 0.0024 0.0086
σa Standard deviation technology shock 0.0087 0.0033
σg Standard deviation fiscal shock 0.0056 0.0031
corrξ Correlation preference shock 0.625 0.625
corra Correlation technology shock 0.418 0.418
corrg Correlation fiscal shock 0 0
Steady State Ratios Description Country H Country F
(1 + i)4 − 1 Annualized Interest Rate 2% 2%
τw Tax Rate on wage income 40.6% 27.9%
τs Tax Rate on firm sales 2.5% 19.5%
τwMC + τs Tax Revenues-to-GDP 38.49% 39.92%
G
Y Government consumption-to-GDP 18.7% 21.9%
T˜
Y Real Transfers-to-GDP 18.58% 16.81%
N˜X
Y Net Exports-to-GDP 1.72% -1.14%
C
Y Consumption-to-GDP 79.58% 79.24%
α∗C
∗
Y Exports-to-GDP 43.1% 27.47%
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on labour income have been set respectively to 40.61% for country H and 27.94% for country F in
accordance to the average in the last 9 years of the labour income tax wedges, excluding social security
contributions made by the employer, for the median individual, as reported in OECD (2015). The
marginal tax rate on firm sales has been set to 19.5% for country F according to the average in the last
9 years of the VAT for France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands as reported in Eurostat, European-
Commission et al. (2015), while it has been calibrated for country H to match the average ratio of net
exports-to-GDP of 1.73% observed over the past 9 years for Germany22. Although the observed VAT
rate for Germany is 19%, we set its marginal tax rate on firm sales to 2.5%, as if there was a production
incentive, to correct for the fact that country H should have a greater productivity compared to country
F , as Germany has a greater productivity than the periphery countries. This calibration implies a steady
state tax revenue-to-GDP ratio of respectively 38.49% for country H and 39.92% for country F , clearly
in line with the data observed over the past decades for Germany (38.72%) and for France, Italy, Spain
and The Netherlands (39.15%). Finally, the annualized steady state value of government debt-to-GDP
in both countries is set to roughly 60% as stated in the Maastricht Treaty.
Since the two countries’ fiscal policy ratios have been calibrated according to the data, the transfers-
to-GDP ratios have been set such that the government deficit is zero in steady state:
T˜
Y
= (τs + τwMC)− G
Y
−
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜G
Y
(2.152)
T˜ ∗
Y ∗
= (τ∗s + τ∗wMC∗)− G
∗
Y ∗
−
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜∗G (2.153)
Henceforth, the overall calibration of the fiscal sector implies a steady state ratio of transfers-to-GDP
of respectively 18.58% for country H and 16.81% for country F , and a steady state ratio of current
expenditure-to-GDP of respectively 37.28% for country H and 38.71% for country F . This calibration is
broadly in line with the observed data over the last 10 years for the subsidies-to-GDP ratio (26.85% for
Germany and 24.69% for the other countries) and the current expenditure (less interest)-to-GDP ratio
(35.54% for Germany and 36.85% for the other countries).
The parameters of openness have been set to match an export-to-GDP ratio
(
α∗C∗
Y
)
of roughly
43% for country H23 taken from the aggregate demand equation, while for country F the parameter of
openness is recovered by equating per-capita consumption across countries, which yields the following
equation24:
α∗ =
h
1− h
α+
(
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
)(
(1−τw)(1−τs)
(1−τ∗w)(1−τ∗s)
) 1
ϕ − 1
1 + h1−h
(
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
)(
(1−τw)(1−τs)
(1−τ∗w)(1−τ∗s)
) 1
ϕ
 (2.154)
Consequently, home biases are given by 1−αh = 1.2 and
1−α∗
1−h = 1.065. Since both home biases are larger
than one it means that the share of consumption of domestic goods is higher than the share of production
of domestic goods. This generates a gap between the relative production price indices and the relative
consumption price indices based on the different composition of the households’ consumption basket in
the two countries. Hence, the dynamics of the real exchange rate follow the dynamics of the terms of
trade in a non-linear way. As Figure 2.1 shows, the real exchange rate increases as the terms of trade
increase if the degree of openness of country H is less than the size of country F (1− h = 0.6), which is
the case for our calibration (α = 0.52), while the real exchange rate decreases when the terms of trade
22The average current account to GDP ratio observed over the past 9 years for Germany is roughly 6.36%. However, we
adjust the data for the overall trade weight with France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands (26%).
23The value recovered from the data as the average of the last 9 years is 43.5%.
24Appendix A.16 shows the derivation.
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Figure 2.1: Elasticity of the Real Exchange Rate to the Terms of Trade as a function of Trade Openness
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increase if the degree of openness of country H is more than the size of country F (h = 0.4). These two
conditions imply respectively, given equation 2.154, that the degree of openness of country F is less than
the size of country H (h = 0.4) for the real exchange rate to increase as the terms of trade increase,
and that the degree of openness of country F is more than the size of country H (h = 0.4) for the real
exchange rate to decrease as the terms of trade increase.
Regarding the dynamic parametrization of the shocks, all three exogenous shocks are assumed to
follow a V AR(1) process that generally allows for both direct spillovers and second order correlation
of the innovations. However, the structure has been restricted for both the technology shocks and
the preference shocks to exclude direct spillovers and for the fiscal shocks to assume fully independent
stochastic processes.
With the exception of the preference shocks, whose dynamics have been calibrated following Kollmann
et al. (2014), the parameters characterizing the dynamics of both technology shocks and fiscal shocks
have been estimated. For the estimation we have employed the time series for Germany, France, Italy
and Spain of respectively final government consumption expenditure for the fiscal shocks and labour
productivity per hours worked for the technology shocks. All the series are chain-linked volumes re-
based respectively in 2005 (fiscal shocks) and 2010 (technology shocks), seasonally adjusted and filtered
by means of a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The sample considered spans at quarterly frequency from 2002
Q1 to 2014 Q2 for the fiscal shocks and to 2015 Q3 for the technology shocks. Finally, despite a large
debate on the high correlation between preference shocks in the Eurozone, there is no proper reference
in the literature for its calibration. We decide to set this parameter according to the observed business
33
Figure 2.2: Laffer Curve for Country H
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cycle correlation (which is roughly 0.5) and we pick the value that maximizes the simulated correlation
between output in the two countries (which is roughly 0.42)25.
2.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show a sensitivity analysis for the tax rates on labour income and firm sales in steady
state for each of the two countries, where the tax rates on labour income and firm sales that maximize
overall tax revenues in each country are shown in red, while the calibrated tax rates on labour income
and firm sales are shown in green.
We can see from the graphs that the revenue maximizing value for the tax rate on labour income is
zero because it is highly distortionary, which implies that the distortion it creates through a reduction
in the tax base dominates the increase in the tax revenues. On the other hand the revenue maximizing
value for the tax rate on firm sales is between 40% and 50%, which implies it is much less distortionary
compared to the tax rate on labour income, so the burden of adjustment should be mainly borne by the
tax rate on firm sales. Notice also that if the tax rate on firm sales exceeds the values in red, then it will
reduce tax revenues and might as well have the opposite effects on the economy.
These graphs also show how relatively far the calibrations of the tax rates are from their revenue
maximizing values, so that for the given calibration revenues are increasing in the tax rate on firm sales
and decreasing in the tax rate on labour income. At the same time the revenue maximizing values are
close for the two countries, because the dynamics are similar, while the calibrations are quite different
because of the different structure of the two economies.
25The simulated values of the correlation of business cycles in our model, given our calibration, are always lower than
the observed correlation. Therefore, we decide to select the correlation of preference shocks that maximizes the correlation
of business cycles.
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Figure 2.3: Laffer Curve for Country F
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2.4 Welfare Analysis and Optimal Fiscal Policy Parameters
The selection of the optimal fiscal policy parameters follows from the analysis of the fiscal policy rules
used in our model. In the search for the optimal fiscal policy parameters, we limit the analysis to an
expenditure rule that sets government consumption to target either the output gap or the net exports gap.
Specifically, these fiscal policy parameters have been selected to maximize the unconditional expectation
of lifetime utility of the total population of households26 under the condition that they induce a locally
unique rational expectations equilibrium27. Therefore the fiscal policy rules in our model are judged
optimal in their class of rules, because the fiscal policy parameters are chosen to yield the highest
average level of welfare to the representative household compared to all other fiscal policy parameters.
As a measure of welfare we consider the weighted average of the second order approximation of the
utility of households in each country, given by:
W˜t = hWt + (1− h)W ∗t (2.155)
where welfare for country H is given by:
Wt = ξt
(Cth )1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(
Ytdt
Ath
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βWt+1 (2.156)
26Even if in the Pure Currency Union scenario the fiscal decisions are taken independently, we consider the results of the
joint maximization of average aggregate welfare because it is in line with the results of a dynamic game between the two
countries.
27Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), we discretize the policy space by means of a grid search, because welfare
is a non monotonic function of the fiscal policy parameters and has several local maxima. We consider 100 different values
for each target variable (i.e. either the output gap or the net exports gap) and limit the parameter space to lie between 0
and 0.1 or between -0.1 and 0 based on the expected sign of the parameter, because a larger parameter space would imply
a non stationary equilibrium given by the distortionary effect of taxation overcoming the stabilizing effect of government
spending.
35
and welfare for country F is given by:
W ∗t = ξ
∗
t

(
C∗t
1−h
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ −
(
Y ∗t d
∗
t
A∗t (1−h)
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βW ∗t+1 (2.157)
Although we select the fiscal policy parameters based on the unconditional expectation of lifetime
utility, to compare welfare attained under alternative fiscal policy scenarios we prefer to rely on the
expectation of lifetime utility conditional on the initial state being the non-stochastic steady state. In
this way, the welfare ranking of alternative policies will depend on the assumed value and distribution
of the initial state vector (x0). This measure accounts for the transitional dynamics leading back to
the stochastic steady state and, as the deterministic steady state is the same across all the scenarios
considered, we ensure that the economy begins from the same initial point under all possible policies.
2.4.1 Welfare Gains based on Consumption Equivalent Variations
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), we compute the welfare gain of a particular fiscal policy sce-
nario relative to our benchmark scenario: the Pure Currency Union scenario with exogenous government
consumption. We denote the benchmark policy scenario with b, the alternative scenarios with a, and
the steady state scenario with 0, and we consider the welfare gain λ as the percentage increase in the
benchmark scenario’s expected consumption that leaves the representative household as well off as in
the alternative scenario. Therefore λ can be recovered from the following identity:
E{Wa} = ξb
(1− β)

(
(1+λ)Cb
h
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ −
(
Ybdb
Abh
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
 =
(E{Wb} −W0) (1 + λ)(1−σ) + (1 + λ)
(1−σ) − 1
(1− σ)(1− β) +W0 (2.158)
The welfare gain is then equal to:
λ =
[
(1− σ) (E{Wa} −W0) + (1− β)−1
(1− σ) (E{Wb} −W0) + (1− β)−1
] 1
1−σ
− 1 (2.159)
Note that in the equation above λ is a function of both the initial conditions (x0) and the expected
variance (σ0), because it is a function of the conditional expectations of welfare, which in turn depend
on x0 and σ0. To compute the value of λ we consider its Taylor expansion around the point x = x0
and σ0 = 0. Since we choose the initial state to be the deterministic steady state, we need to consider
a second-order approximation of λ because only the second derivatives of welfare with respect to σ are
non-zero. Indeed, since the steady state is the same across all scenarios, λ vanishes around the point
(x0, σ0) and the first derivatives with respect to σ are null. Totally differentiating twice the welfare gain
λ and evaluating the results at (x0, σ0) yields:
λ ≈
(
∂2Wb
∂σ2
− ∂
2Wa
∂σ2
)
(1− β) (2.160)
The optimal fiscal policy parameters and the welfare gains based on Consumption Equivalent Varia-
tions are reported in Table 2.2. The optimal coefficients have been selected respectively under the Pure
Currency Union scenario for the response of government consumption to the output gap and under the
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Coordinated Currency Union scenario for the response of government consumption to the net exports
gap28.
Table 2.2: Optimal Fiscal Policy Parameters and Welfare Gains based on CEV
Policy Scenarios Optimal Parameters∗ Conditional Welfare Gains
ψ ψ∗ Country H Country F Average
PCU 0 0 0% 0% 0%
PCU 0.045 0.001 0% 0.86% 0.51%
CCU 0.0697 0.0092 2.17% 0.02% 0.88%
FFU 0.0697 0.0092 0.03% 0.27% 0.18%
FFU 0 0 0.03% -0.09% -0.04%
∗The optimal parameters are selected looking at the maximum unconditional expected lifetime utility.
From Table 2.2 we can see that the average welfare gain is highest in the Coordinated Currency Union
scenario compared to other scenarios, because stabilizing net exports is found to be welfare improving
compared to stabilizing output. Second place for average welfare is held by the Pure Currency Union
scenario, which has a greater welfare gain compared to the the Full Fiscal Union scenario, mainly because
the latter compared to the former reduces a lot welfare in country H and increases a little welfare in
country F , because of the distributional effects created by the consolidation of budget constraints.
The highest welfare gain for country H is in the Coordinated Currency Union scenario, because it
is the country with positive net exports and thus has more to gain in stabilizing the net exports gap.
Also, since country H has a lower degree of price rigidity, after a shock prices move more than in country
F , so that in country H the direct effect on output (income effect) and the indirect effect through the
terms of trade (substitution effect) move in the same direction, bringing the economy further away from
the initial equilibrium. Thus, stabilizing net exports yields greater welfare gains because it counteracts
the substitution effect, reducing the negative effects of the shock. Note that, although small, there is
a welfare gain for country H in the Full Fiscal Union scenario compared to the Pure Currency Union
scenario, given by the distributional effects of the consolidation of budget constraints, that puts more
burden of financing on the country with higher output (country F ). At the same time Table 2.2 shows
that targeting output rather than having stochastic government consumption produces no welfare gains
for country H.
The highest welfare gain for country F is instead in the Pure Currency Union scenario, because it
is the country with negative net exports and thus has more to gain in stabilizing the output gap. Also,
since country F has a higher degree of price rigidity, after a shock prices move less than in country H, so
that in country F the income effect and the substitution effect move in opposite directions not allowing
the economy to go far away from the initial equilibrium, and thus stabilizing output yields greater welfare
gains because it allows country F to partly offset the higher degree of price rigidity by letting the terms of
trade and thus net exports fluctuate freely. Note that, although small, there is a welfare gain for country
F in the Coordinated Currency Union scenario and the Full Fiscal Union scenario, but only compared
to the Pure Currency Union scenario with stochastic government consumption. At the same time, the
Full Fiscal Union scenario with stochastic government consumption has a welfare cost for country F ,
which is given by the additional burden of financing fiscal policy given by the distributional effect of
consolidating budget constraints, since country F has a larger output.
28The welfare gains for government transfers as a policy instrument are not reported, and the selected coefficients for
government transfers are set equal to the optimal coefficients for government consumption, to make them comparable and
to focus more on government consumption as a policy instrument.
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We can also see from Table 2.2 that using a targeting rule, whichever the target, rather than having
exogenous government consumption, is always welfare improving for any country because rules are meant
to stabilize a variable and thus reduce its volatility, which yields always a welfare gain. We can also
notice that the scenario which minimizes the difference in welfare gains between countries is the Full
Fiscal Union scenario, which is in fact meant to treat both countries as equally as possible. In the Full
Fiscal Union scenario the welfare gains for country H from targeting the net exports gap are coupled with
the distributional effects of consolidated budget constraints, which reduce the welfare gains for country
H increasing the welfare gains for country F . Although country F has practically no welfare gains from
targeting the net exports gap or consolidating budget constraints separately, it attains quite a welfare
gain from the two together, showing that the consolidation of budget constraints has a distributional
effect on welfare gains too, so that country F not only bears a higher financing burden, but also attains
a higher welfare gain from consolidation.
2.4.2 Welfare Gains based on an ad hoc Loss Function
Blanchard, Erceg and Linde´ (2015) argues that utility-based welfare measures probably underestimate
the benefits of reducing the output gap in economies facing a high resource slack (negative net exports),
as in the Euro Area periphery. Explicitly, the utility-based welfare measure shows less benefits from
fiscal expansions than a simple ad hoc welfare measure because net exports play a substantial role in
reducing the periphery’s output gap and the increase in consumption in the periphery is delayed so that
it has very small welfare effects.
We decide to compare the policy scenarios also based on an ad hoc loss function for the reasons stated
above, as in Blanchard, Erceg and Linde´ (2015). Since fiscal policy has a stabilizing function, it mimics
the behavior of monetary policy, and together they reduce both the inflation gap and the output gap.
Furthermore, there are gains in terms of consumption and unemployment related to closing the output
gap that are underestimated by utility-based measures. Hence, the gains from fiscal spillovers between
the core and the periphery lie between the ones based on consumption equivalent variations and the ones
based on an ad hoc loss function.
Using a standard quadratic loss function, the policymakers are assumed to care only about minimizing
the square of the output gap and of the inflation gap in both regions. Each region’s loss function is,
hence, simply the sum of the square of the inflation gap and the square of the output gap, with weights
3 and 1 respectively. The overall loss function is the weighted average of each region’s loss function:
Loss =
∞∑
j=0
βj
{
h
[
(pˆit+j)
2 +
1
3
(Yˆt+j)
2
]
+ (1− h)
[
(pˆi∗t+j)
2 +
1
3
(Yˆ ∗t+j)
2
]}
(2.161)
Table 2.3: Welfare Gains based on an ad hoc Loss Function
Policy Scenarios Losses Welfare Gains∗
Country H Country F Average Country H Country F Average
PCU (ψ = ψ∗ = 0) 0.6226 0.1899 0.1388 0 0 0
PCU 0.8872 0.2696 0.1972 -42.51% -41.92% -42.02%
CCU 0.0416 0.0969 0.0748 93.31% 94.90% 94.61%
FFU 0.0351 0.0744 0.0587 94.35% 96.08% 95.77%
FFU (ψ = ψ∗ = 0) 0.0409 0.0906 0.0707 93.42% 95.23% 94.91%
∗Welfare Gains are computed as Lossb−Lossa
Lossb
, with Lossb the loss of the PCU with ψ = ψ
∗ = 0.
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From Table 2.3 we can see that the average welfare gain is greater in the Full Fiscal Union scenario
compared to other scenarios, because targeting the net exports gap reduces the overall inflation gap
and consolidating budget constraints reduces the output gap, providing overall stabilization for both
countries. Second place for average welfare is held by the Coordinated Currency Union scenario, which
has welfare gains compared to the Pure Currency Union scenario which has welfare losses, mainly because
targeting the net exports gap reduces international spillovers by stabilizing overall output and inflation,
with little difference in welfare gains compared to the Full Fiscal Union scenario. At the same time we can
see that targeting the output gap is welfare reducing, compared to stochastic government consumption,
which means that output is stabilized more by targeting net exports or nothing.
We can see from Table 2.3 that the welfare gains for both countries, both individually and on average,
are increasing in the degree of coordination. The fact that both countries incur in big welfare losses in
the Pure Currency Union scenario, while incurring in welfare gains in the other scenarios, shows the big
welfare gains from either targeting the net exports gap compared to the output gap or consolidating
budget constraints. As a matter of fact, adding one dimension to the other yields very small additional
welfare gains, as most of the gains take place by either targeting net exports or consolidating budget
constraints. What is quite surprising is that, according to this welfare measure, even only consolidating
budget constraints yields welfare gains similar and a little greater to those achieved by targeting the net
exports gap compared to stochastic government consumption. This is because a consolidated budget
constraint stabilizes the inflation gap and the output gap on its own somehow, just like targeting the net
exports gap does.
2.5 Numerical Simulations
We simulate the model numerically using Dynare29, which takes a second-order approximation of the
model around its symmetric non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and constant government debt.
We compare the Impulse Response Functions of the main variables to negative shocks of one standard
deviation of different nature, under a range of fiscal policy specifications, to study the stabilization
properties of different fiscal policy instruments, financing schemes and coordination strategies and to
study the international transmission of fiscal policy shocks.
In the following graphs we compare the impulse responses to a negative technology shock in country
H and the impulse responses to a negative preference shock in country F . These two shocks represent
better than other shocks the relevant dynamics in the Eurozone, and give the most amplified dynamics.
This is because a supply shock is more relevant in a country like Germany (country H), which is a
main producer and exporter of goods and services in the EMU, while a demand shock is more relevant
for periphery countries (country F ), which are mainly consumers and importers in the EMU. We also
compare impulse responses to fiscal shocks in both countries.
2.5.1 Fiscal Policy Instruments
In the first set of graphs we compare different fiscal policy instruments in both the Pure Currency Union
scenario and the Full Fiscal Union scenario: countercyclical government consumption and countercyclical
real transfers with respect to stochastic government consumption.
Figure 2.4 shows the impulse responses with different fiscal instruments to a negative preference shock
in country F under the Pure Currency Union scenario. Because of the assumption of complete markets,
domestic and foreign consumption move in a similar way, and they reduce on impact after a negative
29All the equilibrium conditions of the model used for the simulations are shown in Appendix A.14.
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Figure 2.4: Fiscal Instruments - Pure Currency Union - Preference Shock in Country F
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preference shock. As a consequence real GDP goes down, while inflation diminishes bringing to an
increase in the terms of trade because of the difference in price rigidity, inducing a variation of net exports.
The reduction in inflation in both countries induces the common central bank to lower the interest rate,
while the response of national fiscal authorities varies according to the scenario. Countercyclical fiscal
policy implies an increase of government consumption or transfers, which calls for higher taxation to
keep the budget balanced. Therefore, private consumption and output are below their steady state
values for about ten quarters, with a more severe recession in country F because net exports increase
in country H (which means they decrease in country F ). Interestingly, most variables’ responses still
follow a similar path when fiscal policy uses countercyclical government consumption as when it uses
stochastic government consumption, with the latter creating slightly more stabilized dynamics. Using
countercyclical government transfers though, after a preference shock, brings to more amplified dynamics
for all variables.
After a technology shock30, which reduces labour supply and income, using countercyclical transfers
reduces the effects of the shock on prices and thus the interest rate, because it affects consumption which
is aimed at both domestic and foreign goods, while using countercyclical government consumption affects
prices more and directly, because it is aimed only at domestic goods. Instead, after a preference shock
30The model has been simulated after both a technology and a preference shock, but to keep it short we report and
discuss only the most relevant cases. The graphs related to the other shocks are available upon request.
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Figure 2.5: Fiscal Instruments - Full Fiscal Union - Preference Shock in Country F
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which reduces consumption and thus prices and the interest rate, government transfers are not able to
counteract the decrease in consumption and the fall in prices right away, but only partially and with a
delay, compared to government consumption which, since it is only aimed at domestic goods, counteracts
the fall in prices and thus the fall in the interest rate, stabilizing consumption more.
This implies that the best instrument for fiscal policy in the Pure Currency Union scenario depends
on the type of shock: government consumption is better in stabilizing consumption after a preference
shock, while transfers are slightly better in stabilizing consumption after a technology shock. To abstract
from the nature of the shock, we use countercyclical government consumption as an instrument for most
simulations, because it is generally less volatile than using government transfers.
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses with different fiscal instruments to the same negative pref-
erence shock in country F of figure 2.4, under the Full Fiscal Union scenario. The qualitative response
of the variables after the shock is similar to the Pure Currency Union scenario, but now the dynamics
are not significantly affected by the fiscal instrument used by the government, because consolidating
budget constraints provides on its own almost all the stabilization, leaving little job for the fiscal pol-
icy instrument. At this point only countercyclical government consumption can provide a little more
stabilization, by targeting net exports and purchasing only domestic goods, compensating directly inter-
national demand imbalances. To achieve as much stabilization as possible the best fiscal instrument to
use is countercyclical government consumption, especially in the Full Fiscal Union case, even if the gain
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Figure 2.6: Fiscal Financing - Pure Currency Union - Technology Shock in Country H
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is not that big.
2.5.2 Financing Fiscal Policy
Here we compare different financing schemes for fiscal policy, varying the percentage financed by the tax
rate on labour income and the tax rate on firm sales. More in detail, we simulate the model under three
combinations of τs and τw:
• γ = 0.2, financed roughly 20% by varying the tax rate on labour income and 80% by varying the
tax rate on firm sales.
• γ = 0.5, financed roughly by varying equally the two tax rates. This can be considered as the
baseline financing scheme, followed in all other sections.
• γ = 0.8, financed roughly 80% by varying the tax rate on labour income and 20% by varying the
tax rate on firm sales.
We also compare the outcomes of financing fiscal policy with lump-sum taxes, which do not produce
distortions in the economy. Figure 2.6 shows the impulse responses with different financing schemes to
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a negative technology shock in country H under the Pure Currency Union scenario31
After a technology shock in country H, most variables’ responses are quite more amplified when
fiscal policy is financed by varying more the tax rate on labour income (γ = 0.8), because it is more
distortionary than the tax rate on firm sales. The most stabilized dynamics are given by varying mainly
the tax rate on firm sales (γ = 0.2), which is less distortionary than the tax rate on labour income. At
the same time, varying equally the two tax rates (γ = 0.5) creates little more distortion compared to
γ = 0.2 and much less distortion compared to γ = 0.8. Thus, the amplification of the shocks is increasing
exponentially in γ, starting from non-distortionary lump-sum taxes, which follow similar but much less
amplified dynamics, to the most amplified dynamics given by the massive use of the tax rate on labour
income to finance fiscal policy.
This implies that fiscal policy has a greater stabilization role when it is mainly financed with taxation
on firm sales because it is less distortionary. In fact the tax rate on labour income affects very much the
equilibrium level of output because of its impact on labour supply, while the tax rate on firm sales affects
primarily prices and inflation, with secondary effects on output. We could reduce γ to a minimum, but
we prefer to use balanced financing (γ = 0.5) in all other simulations, as it appears to be more consistent
with the empirical evidence. Notice that the tax mix does not affect qualitatively the dynamics, even
with lump-sum taxes (non distortionary taxation).
2.5.3 Fiscal Policy Coordination
In the following graphs we compare the three different degrees of fiscal policy coordination, Pure Currency
Union, Coordinated Currency Union, and Full Fiscal Union, after a negative technology shock in country
H and after a negative preference shock in country F 32. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 2.7
and Figure 2.8 respectively.
Looking at Figure 2.7 and 2.8, we can see how the dynamics are much more amplified under the Pure
Currency Union scenario and much less amplified under the Coordinated Currency Union scenario. This
is because when government consumption targets net exports rather than output, international spillovers
are reduced and the economy is more stable. Specifically, net exports fluctuate highly after a shock, due
to the re-balancing of the household consumption baskets following movements in the terms of trade. By
stabilizing net exports the terms of trade are consequently more stable, reducing the substitution effect
of a price change, and making consumption and output less volatile than in the Pure Currency Union
scenario.
Furthermore, since government consumption is financed with distortionary tax rates, the stabilizing
effect of government consumption on output is small because of the opposite effect on consumption of
the movements in the tax rates. This is especially true in the Pure Currency Union scenario, where
fiscal policy cannot achieve much output stabilization. Whereas, rebalancing domestic demand to be
in line with domestic supply, by stabilizing net exports, is a target that fiscal policy can achieve. The
Full Fiscal Union scenario presents dynamics which are very close to those in the Coordinated Currency
Union scenario, because in both cases government consumption targets net exports. As a consequence,
we provide evidence of a significant gain in terms of stabilization when the government targets net
exports, while if we also consolidate budget constraints we obtain very small improvements in terms of
stabilization. However, government consumption reacts less in the Full Fiscal Union scenario than in the
Coordinated Currency Union scenario, because consolidating budget constraints produces international
stabilization on its own.
31The results are similar after a preference shock in country F , and also in the Full Fiscal Union scenario, so we don’t
show the impulse responses, although they are available on request.
32The financing scheme for these simulations is given by a balanced mix of the two tax rates, corresponding to the case
γ = γ∗ = 0.5 analyzed in the previous section.
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Figure 2.7: Fiscal Coordination - Government Consumption - Technology Shock in Country H
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2.6 Fiscal Shocks and Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers
In the previous sections we assessed the stabilizing properties of different degrees of fiscal policy coordi-
nation, but we can also evaluate the effects of a fiscal stimulus under the same scenarios. In this section
we study fiscal multipliers and spillovers, which describe the effects of exogenous variations of govern-
ment consumption on domestic and foreign output respectively. Although in Europe fiscal multipliers are
typically smaller than in the U.S., Coenen et al. (2010), using several macroeconomic models, found that
in the Eurozone the effects of government spending are sizable but require a large fiscal space, especially
in periods of economic downturn, and monetary support (i.e. holding the interest rate constant for some
periods). Furthermore, in a monetary union, a fiscal stimulus implemented in a country with larger fiscal
space (such as Germany) can create positive international spillovers.
2.6.1 Steady State Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers
Fiscal policy multipliers in steady state are defined as the effect of G on Y , while fiscal policy spillovers
in steady state are defined as the effect of G∗ on Y . Fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers in steady
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Figure 2.8: Fiscal Coordination - Government Consumption - Preference Shock in Country F
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state in country H are given respectively by the following equations:
∂Y
∂G
=
[
1− (1− α)h+ α
∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
]−1
(2.162)
∂Y
∂G∗
= −
[
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
] [
1− (1− α)h+ α
∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
]−1
(2.163)
These equations show that fiscal multipliers mainly depend on the degree of openness of the two countries
and, hence, international demand imbalances are a key determinant in the dynamics of output after a
fiscal shock. Specifically, from the previous equations, sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for fiscal
multipliers to be positive and greater than 1 and at the same time for fiscal spillovers to be negative are:
α∗
α
<
h
1− h (2.164)
τ∗s + τ∗w − τ∗sτ∗w > τs + τw − τsτw (2.165)
This tells us that when fiscal multipliers are positive and greater than 1, fiscal spillovers are negative,
and viceversa. Given our calibration, the conditions listed above are satisfied with opposite inequality
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Figure 2.9: Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers - Fiscal Shock in Country H
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signs and, hence, as reported in Table 2.4, in country H in steady state the fiscal multiplier is negative
and the fiscal spillover is positive. This implies that in country F in steady state the fiscal multiplier is
positive and the fiscal spillover is negative. This is because the degree of openness of country H is much
higher than that of country F.
Table 2.4: Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers in Steady State
Fiscal Multipliers Fiscal Spillovers G/Y
Country H -24.4062 16.8643 0.187
Country F 25.4062 -36.7682 0.219
Notice that these fiscal multipliers and spillovers do not consider the effects of how the government
consumption is financed, which implies variations of the tax rates as a function of the variations of G
and G∗, but they do include both supply and demand factors.
2.6.2 Short-Run Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers
In this section, we compare the short-run fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers for both countries H
and F in the Pure Currency Union scenario and in the Full Fiscal Union one. The short-run fiscal
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Figure 2.10: Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers - Fiscal Shock in Country F
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policy multiplier is defined as the percentage deviation in domestic output given by a 1% deviation
in domestic government consumption (or transfers), while the fiscal policy spillover is defined as the
percentage deviation in foreign output given by a 1% deviation in domestic government consumption
(or transfers)33. To study the effects of fiscal policy shocks, we show the dynamics of output and taxes
after these shocks in each country. Notice that in order to compute the fiscal policy multipliers and
spillovers we have to consider government consumption (or transfers) as purely stochastic, so that the
only difference between the Pure Currency Union scenario and the Full Fiscal Union one is given by the
consolidation of budget constraints.
Figure 2.9 shows fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers, output and taxes, after a positive fiscal policy
shock in country H financed by a mix of taxes (γ = 0.5), comparing the Pure Currency Union scenario
with the Full Fiscal Union one. Figure 2.10 reports the same analysis by considering a positive fiscal
policy shock in country F .
The figures show that there is a relationship between fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers: the bigger
the fiscal policy multiplier in one country over time, the bigger the fiscal policy spillover on the other
country. The graphs also show that fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers are smaller in absolute terms
in the Full Fiscal Union scenario compared to the Pure Currency Union scenario, after both a shock to
33The fiscal multiplier is computed as the log deviation of domestic output over the log-deviation of domestic government
consumption (or transfers) after a positive shock of one standard deviation to domestic government consumption (or
transfers), while the fiscal spillover is computed as the log-deviation of foreign output to a fiscal policy shock in the home
country.
47
government consumption or transfers. This is achieved through the consolidation of budget constraints,
as it allows to distribute tax distortions across countries, leading in turn to more stable dynamics of taxes
and output. Moreover, in the Pure Currency Union scenario, the fiscal policy multiplier and spillover
change sign after about 6 quarters, given by the persistence of the fiscal policy shock. This path is driven
mainly by the distortionary taxation, whose effect overturns the stimulus given by the expansionary fiscal
policy.
Another important result is that fiscal multipliers and spillovers are positive after a fiscal shock in
country F , while they are negative after a fiscal shock in country H. This is mainly given by the difference
in price rigidity and trade openness between the two countries and, in turn, the different effects that
government spending has on the terms of trade. In country H, where there is lower price rigidity, an
increase in government spending brings about an increase in the terms of trade and in net exports. As
a consequence, consumption and output decrease in both countries, because of complete markets. On
the other hand, in country F , where prices are more rigid, an increase in government spending induces
a decrease in the terms of trade and in net exports, fostering higher consumption and output in both
countries, also because of complete markets. The dynamics of taxes is another key factor explaining why
output in country H increases only in the Full Fiscal Union scenario, reversing the effect of government
consumption on output compared to the Pure Currency Union scenario.
All the simulations conducted suggest that generally a Full Fiscal Union produces more stabilization
in the economy, through the reduction of international spillovers attained by targeting a common in-
ternational variable such as net exports and/or by consolidating budget constraints, as we have seen in
this section. This also implies that fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers are greatly reduced in the Full
Fiscal Union scenario compared to the Pure Currency Union scenario. The stabilization is also induced
by the larger fiscal capacity observed under the Full Fiscal Union scenario, which allows one country to
benefit from the other country financing part of its expenditure, as if it received transfers from it or as
if it were allowed to increase its government debt.
2.6.3 Fiscal Shocks and Fiscal Policy Coordination
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the impulse responses to a negative fiscal policy shock in country H and
F , respectively, financed by a mix of taxes (γ = 0.5), for different degrees of fiscal policy coordination,
comparing the three scenarios of Pure Currency Union, Coordinated Currency Union, and Full Fiscal
Union.
Looking at Figure 2.11, we see that the transmission of a fiscal shock acts through the consequent
tax and price adjustments. In the Pure Currency Union scenario a decrease in government spending in
country H allows to reduce taxes, which spurs private consumption and consequently domestic output.
Higher private consumption has also inflationary effects, which brings net exports down. The drop in
net exports then concurs to revert the path of real output that goes below its steady state value, and
then back above it after net exports become positive. The dynamics of foreign variables follow closely
the domestic ones due to the presence of complete financial markets.
In the other two scenarios (Coordinated Currency Union and Full Fiscal Union), where government
consumption targets net exports, the international transmission of the fiscal policy shock is much more
muted, since the terms of trade and consequently net exports are much more stable by construction. As
a consequence, the overall volatility is consistently reduced with respect to the Pure Currency Union
scenario. The dynamics in the Full Fiscal Union scenario are more stabilized compared to the Coordinated
Currency Union scenario because of the international stabilization brought about by consolidating budget
constraints and distributing tax distortions. This implies that fiscal shocks are best managed by both
targeting net exports and consolidating budget constraints, because they jointly push most variables to
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Figure 2.11: Fiscal Policy Coordination - Government Consumption - Fiscal Shock in Country H
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be more stable over time, counteracting the spillovers coming from fiscal policy shocks. At the same
time, although it is not so clear which of the two dimensions is more important for stabilization purposes,
fiscal policy can take advantage of both the benefits from coordinating on the same target (net exports)
and those from consolidating budget constraints, so that if for some reason the stabilizing power of one
of the two is missing, the other can make up for it.
The same conclusions about the stabilizing properties of a scenario in which fiscal policy targets net
exports and governments consolidate budget constraints can be drawn by looking at Figure 2.12. Notice
that, however, a negative fiscal policy shock in country F reduces domestic and foreign output, conse-
quently increasing overall taxes. These opposite dynamics are mainly due to the structural differences
between the two countries and, in particular, due to the higher price rigidity and lower trade openness
of country F , that decreases the sensitivity of output and consumption to international adjustments.
As a consequence, net exports increase substantially to compensate for the weaker response of producer
prices in country F . The surge in net exports, however, is not sufficient to increase output in country
H, because of the opposite effect that taxation has on private consumption and output. These findings
are consistent with the different signs of the fiscal policy multipliers in country H and in country F .
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Figure 2.12: Fiscal Policy Coordination - Government Consumption - Fiscal Shock in Country F
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2.7 The Case for International Goods as Complements
In the discussion above we highlighted the role played by international demand gaps in shaping the
transmission of either demand, supply or fiscal shocks, where the substitution effect of a price change
dominates the income effect. However, Hjortsø (2012) shows that this latter result holds only in the case
of a high international trade elasticity (η), while the opposite holds in the case of a low international
trade elasticity, which is when goods are complements (η ≤ 1σ ). More importantly, this affects the ability
of fiscal policy to reduce international demand imbalances, given by fluctuations in the terms of trade
and in net exports. For these reasons, we assess how much the previous results are sensitive to the
alternative assumption of international goods as complements, instead of substitutes.
2.7.1 Fiscal Policy Coordination and Welfare: a Comparison
Figure 2.13 shows the impulse responses to a negative technology shock in country H in the Coordinated
Currency Union scenario and in the Full Fiscal Union one, comparing the two cases of international goods
as substitutes and complements. When goods are substitutes PPI inflation becomes relatively higher
in country H compared to country F . As a result the terms of trade deteriorate and the substitution
effect dominates the income effect, lowering net exports and output. When domestic and foreign goods
are instead complements, the income effect dominates the substitution effect, spurring net exports and
output in country H.
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Figure 2.13: International Substitutes vs Complements - Technology Shock in Country H
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Notice that in the Full Fiscal Union scenario the overall volatility of the economy is substantially
lower, in particular that of output and net exports. This finding is consistent with Hjortsø (2012), who
highlights the fact that the cross-country insurance role of fiscal policy is smaller when the traded goods
are substitutes instead of complements. More in detail, Figure 2.13 shows that, although with substitute
goods the dynamics are less amplified altogether, with complement goods the Full Fiscal Union scenario
produces quite more stabilization than the Coordinated Currency Union scenario.
The domination of the income effect on the substitution effect could also affect the welfare analysis,
both in terms of Consumption Equivalent Variations and in terms of an ad hoc loss function. When
the traded goods are complements, relative prices react more aggressively to shocks in response to
international demand imbalances, and the welfare gains in targeting net exports are quite inferior.
As Table 2.5 reports, the highest welfare gains in terms of Consumption Equivalent Variations are
attained in the Coordinated Currency Union scenario, but since the income effect dominates the substi-
tution effect, the largest welfare gains from demand stabilization are for country F . Even if there is a
welfare gain from stabilizing both the output gap and the net exports gap with a low elasticity of substi-
tution, the income effect and the substitution effect move in the same direction for the country featuring
the highest price rigidity (country F ), while they move in opposite directions for country H. Therefore,
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Table 2.5: Optimal Fiscal Policy Parameters and Welfare Gains based on CEV - Complements
Policy Scenarios Optimal Parameters∗ Conditional Welfare Gains
ψ ψ∗ Country H Country F Total
PCU 0 0 0% 0% 0%
PCU 0.0692 0.0373 0.01% 0.04% 0.03%
CCU 0.0729 0.0373 0.02% 0.23% 0.15%
FFU 0.0729 0.0373 0.02% -0.40% -0.23%
FFU 0 0 0.02% -0.12% -0.06%
∗The optimal parameters are selected looking at the maximum unconditional expected lifetime utility.
since the stabilization of net exports partially offsets the substitution effect, there are additional welfare
gains for country F from stabilizing international demand imbalances.
Finally, Table 2.5 shows that the consolidation of budget constraints leads to welfare losses, also when
the elasticity of substitution is low. Additionally, stabilizing net exports, when budget constraints are
consolidated, amplifies the effects of distributed tax adjustments, because it offsets price adjustments
that would otherwise counterbalance the tax adjustments, bringing to welfare losses for country F .
Table 2.6: Welfare Gains based on an ad hoc Loss Function - Complements
Policy Scenarios Loss Functions Welfare Gains∗
Country H Country F Total Country H Country F Total
PCU (ψ = ψ∗ = 0) 0.0226 0.0220 0.0222 0% 0% 0%
PCU 0.0222 0.0215 0.0218 1.62% 2.06% 1.88%
CCU 0.2228 0.2029 0.2108 -887% -822% -849%
FFU 0.1132 0.1015 0.1062 -401% -361% -377%
FFU (ψ = ψ∗ = 0) 0.0382 0.0375 0.0378 -69.31% -170.54% -70.04%
∗ Welfare Gains are computed as Lossb−Lossa
Lossb
, with Lossb the loss of the PCU with ψ = ψ
∗ = 0.
Since there is no trade off between price and output stabilization if the internationally traded goods
are complements, fiscal policy is able to successfully stabilize the output gap. For these reasons, Table
2.6 reports that only in the Pure Currency Union scenario with countercyclical government consump-
tion there is a gain in terms of an ad hoc loss function, compared to the case of exogenous government
consumption. Since with a low international trade elasticity there is a trade off between output stabi-
lization and international demand stabilization, targeting net exports has a cost in terms of both output
and price stabilization for both countries, which is why there are welfare losses in most cases. Finally,
consolidating budgets partially offsets the amplification effect due to the stabilization of net exports,
which is why the Full Fiscal Union scenario, despite being less stabilizing than the Pure Currency Union
scenario, has a lower cost in terms of the ad hoc loss function than the Coordinated Currency Union
scenario, as can be observed in Table 2.6.
2.7.2 Fiscal Shocks and Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers
Hjortsø (2012) argues that when goods are complements fiscal policy is more effective on consumption
and output. In Figure 2.14 we document similar evidence for the case of a fiscal tightening in country H.
Private consumption and output are more volatile, with the effect of the initial drop in the PPI amplified
by the reduction in net exports for country H, due to the substitution effect. On the other hand, a
negative fiscal shock in country F , shown in Figure 2.15, triggers a higher output in country H due
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Figure 2.14: Substitutes vs Complements - Government Consumption - Fiscal Shock in Country H
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to the increase in net exports. Consistently with the different reactions of net exports after a negative
fiscal policy shock in countries H and F , Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show that the sign of the fiscal policy
multipliers do not only depend on the degree of fiscal policy coordination, but also on the international
trade elasticity. The fiscal policy multiplier is positive for country H with a high international trade
elasticity. Moreover, also price rigidity plays a relevant role since it determines the sign of the substitution
effect, while the international trade elasticity determines which dominates between the substitution effect
and the income effect.
In Figures 2.14 and 2.15 we observe the opposite reactions of net exports after a fiscal policy shock,
while from Figures 2.16 and 2.17 it is clear that the effect of a fiscal shock on output is the opposite
if the internationally traded goods are complements rather than substitutes. Since this fact implies a
positive fiscal policy multiplier for country H when international goods are complements and a negative
one when international goods are substitutes, while for country F it is the contrary, we can infer that
the fiscal policy multiplier depends strongly and non-linearly on the relative degree of openness to
international trade and on the international trade elasticity. Indeed, together they determine the sign of
the substitution effect and whether the substitution effect or the income effect dominates.
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Figure 2.15: Substitutes vs Complements - Government Consumption - Fiscal Shock in Country F
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2.8 Conclusions and Possible Extensions
This paper provides a characterization of the stabilization properties of different fiscal policy scenarios in
a Two-Country Open-Economy New-Keynesian DSGE model of a Currency Union. We consider three
fiscal policy scenarios. In the Pure Currency Union scenario, each fiscal authority moves government
spending countercyclically in response to deviations of real output from steady state. In the other two
scenarios – Coordinated Currency Union and Full Fiscal Union respectively – each government targets
procyclically a common variable, the net exports gap, but in the Full Fiscal Union scenario the two
government budget constraints are consolidated and the tax rates in the two countries move together
to finance the government expenditure. In all three scenarios, the fiscal authorities have access only to
distortionary taxation and must balance the budget. The presence of distortionary taxation and price
rigidity implies that fiscal policy and monetary policy are interconnected and produce real effects in the
economy.
The main difference between our work and the previous literature is that we consider jointly the
stabilization properties of targeting rules for fiscal policy and its financing with distortionary taxation,
while most literature assumes stochastic government spending and lump-sum taxes, which imply very
different dynamics. Based on the strength of the targeting rule, distortionary taxation might reverse the
qualitative effects of fiscal policy on the economy, bringing to very different results.
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Figure 2.16: Substitutes vs Complements - Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers in Country H
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Our main result is that coordinating fiscal policy by targeting the net exports gap produces much
more stabilization in the economy than targeting the output gap, which provides even less stabiliza-
tion on output itself. By also consolidating budget constraints we attain the most stabilized dynamics
between countries through the joint adjustment of the tax rates. Actually, even only consolidating bud-
get constraints with stochastic government consumption produces about as much stabilization as only
targeting the net exports gap without consolidating budget constraints, which implies that adding one
dimension to the other barely produces more stabilization. This can be viewed as two instruments for
stabilization that can be used jointly, while one can make up for the temporary lack of the other, as a
sort of insurance mechanism.
Our analysis also highlights that taxes on labour income entail exponentially more distortionary
effects than taxes on firm sales, which implies that the latter should be generally preferred to the former.
This has a significant effect on the sign of fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers. A fiscal expansion
generally implies a negative multiplier in the Core country (H) of our model, which is characterized
by lower price rigidity and trade openness. On the contrary, the multiplier is positive in the Periphery
country (F ), where prices are stickier and a fiscal expansion induces a deterioration in the terms of trade,
fostering bigger consumption and output, which then spills over to the other country through complete
financial markets. This also implies that the signs of the fiscal spillovers on the other country are the
same as the signs of the fiscal multipliers in the first country.
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Figure 2.17: Substitutes vs Complements - Fiscal Multipliers and Spillovers in Country F
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In a robustness check, we also show that if the internationally traded goods are considered as com-
plements, instead of substitutes, most of the dynamic effects of the shocks on the economy are reversed,
consistently with the previous literature. Compared to the case of substitutes, the Full Fiscal Union
scenario improves substantially the stability of the economy with respect to the Coordinated Currency
Union, which is actually destabilizing in the case of complements, compared to the Pure Currency Union
scenario. Consolidating budget constraints allows to partially offset this destabilization produced by
targeting the net exports gap. Although with international goods as complements the dynamics of the
economy are reversed, our result that the Full Fiscal Union scenario is more stabilizing than the Coor-
dinated Currency Union scenario still holds and to a greater extent compared to the case of substitutes.
Our model and results have nonetheless some shortcomings, which also entail possible future avenues
of research. We assume complete international financial markets, which is a quite strong assumption, and
more of an objective than a reality. Nonetheless, if fiscal policy has a cross-country insurance role with
complete international financial markets, it must have an even stronger insurance role with incomplete
international financial markets, where private cross-country insurance is no more available. We do
not take into consideration explicitly the Zero Lower Bound on the nominal interest rate, which is an
important feature of the recent global liquidity trap. In this case too, if fiscal policy affects the economy
without constraints on monetary policy, with these constraints fiscal policy should be even more effective.
Last but not least, we allow for positive government debt, but without allowing it to vary over time.
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Allowing for government debt dynamics would modify the evolution of most variables in the economy
and would influence the government budget and the effects of fiscal policy. Also constraining households’
access to financial markets would amplify the effects of fiscal policy, as households’ consumption would
be much more dependent on current income rather than permanent income.
This research was conducted to assess the stabilization properties of fiscal policy coordination in the
Eurozone and to bring to policy conclusions for the proper macroeconomic management of a Currency
Union. The policy prescriptions are that countries in the Eurozone should reduce international demand
imbalances by either stabilizing trade flows across countries or by creating some form of fiscal union
with a common budget and taxation strategy, or both, while avoiding the excessive use of labour taxes,
in favour of sales taxes. This would dampen all shocks hitting different countries of the Eurozone and
would reduce the volatility of output and consumption in every country. A future Fiscal Union would
also need a Eurozone treasury for collective decision-making on fiscal policy, which would need to be
accountable and legitimated democratically, but this is out of the scope of the present paper.
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Chapter 3
Government Debt Deleveraging in
the EMU1
3.1 Introduction
What are the effects of government debt deleveraging in a monetary union? What are the different effects
of deleveraging in the face of alternative shocks and which is the best timing for deleveraging?
Given a situation of high government debt in the EMU and a request to reduce government debt
positions to 60% of GDP, finding the best way and timing for deleveraging is an important issue. Should
governments deleverage no matter what the macroeconomic conditions are or should they deleverage in
such a way to leave room for fiscal policy stabilization in bad times? As Ferrero (2009) shows, there
are important welfare gains in adopting a flexible fiscal policy, because by constraining fiscal policy,
deleveraging creates a trade-off between discipline and stabilization. The effects of government debt
deleveraging in the face of alternative shocks are evaluated both with respect to timing and with respect
to other macroeconomic factors.
We focus on government debt deleveraging with incomplete international financial markets and a debt-
elastic government bond spread and show the effects of deleveraging in the face of supply (productivity)
and demand (preference) shocks hitting a single country under alternative fiscal policy scenarios and
compare uncoordinated fiscal policy (Pure Currency Union scenario), where government debt deleverag-
ing is managed independently, with coordinated fiscal policy (Full Fiscal Union scenario), where debt is
aggregated and managed at the union level with a consolidated budget. An intermediate case (Coordi-
nated Currency Union scenario) will show the effects of coordinating fiscal policy without consolidating
the budget.
We study the effects of different paths for dynamic government debt deleveraging and analyze the
best timing for countries’ deleveraging and the optimal taxation and spending combinations, taking into
account the possibility of a Redemption Fund, as outlined in Van Rompuy et al. (2012). The possibility
for countries to finance their debt at a lower interest rate, and all at the same interest rate, and the
possibility for countries in dire circumstances to obtain a partial debt relief through transfers by a central
EMU government may be welfare improving for the union as a whole, especially in the face of asymmetric
shocks.
We follow the open economy approach of Gal´ı (2009), in a two-country setting like in Silveira (2006),
but without taking the limit case of a small open economy. Our model follows the specifications of
1This chapter is co-authored with Chiara Guerello, LUISS Guido Carli, and Guido Traficante, Universita` Europea di
Roma.
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Ferrero (2009), which adapts the optimal approach of Benigno and Woodford (2004) to monetary and
fiscal policy in a cashless closed economy without capital, where there are only distortionary taxes as
sources of government revenue, to a two-country open-economy Currency Union setting. Ferrero (2009)
follows also the optimal monetary approach of Benigno (2004) in a Currency Union, by adding a fiscal
authority and including a government budget constraint, but without money in the utility function and
concentrating on the cashless limit case. Our model adds home bias in consumption (or a degree of
openness to international trade) and government transfers to households to the model in Ferrero (2009).
Following Hjortsø (2012) we add a stabilization rule for government consumption or alternatively for
government transfers, but in a setting where distortionary taxes and government debt add the financing
dimension to the fiscal policy problem. We also add a debt-elastic government bond spread in an
incomplete financial market setting, to account for international financial frictions, also following Hjortsø
(2012).
As in Ferrero (2009), this model is structured so as to allow for spillovers from monetary to fiscal
policy and viceversa, and from one country to another through country-specific fiscal policies. Nominal
rigidities, in the form of staggered price adjustments, generate real effects of monetary policy, while
distortionary taxation generates non-Ricardian effects of fiscal policy. Monetary policy influences fiscal
policy through its effect on the real value of debt, which depends on the interest rate and inflation.
Fiscal policy influences monetary policy through its effect on prices and wages, which depend on the
tax rates. This framework allows to study the interaction between country-specific fiscal policies, where
in the absence of the nominal exchange rate as an automatic stabilizer, fiscal policies influence each
other through their effects on output and the terms of trade. Incomplete financial markets with a
government bond spread and government debt deleveraging dynamics provide additional frictions in the
economy which can be addressed by monetary or fiscal authorities, or by an additional macro-prudential
authority.
The EMU is represented by two countries of different size forming a Currency Union. Each country
has an independent Fiscal Authority, while the Currency Union shares a common Monetary Authority.
The EMU is inhabited by a continuum of Households of measure one, which can trade a complete
set of one-period state-contingent claims only within their own country, implying that international
financial markets are incomplete. Additionally, only one government’s debt is tradable internationally
and has a debt-elastic government bond spread. This assumption implies that the international trade of
foreign bonds is subject to intermediation costs, following mainly De Paoli (2009), which in turn follows
Turnovsky (1985). As explained in Ghironi (2006) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) this assumption
ensures stationarity of net foreign assets and is an assumption also used in Eggertsson, Ferrero and
Raffo (2014). The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate for the whole Currency Union, which is
the interest rate paid on the government bonds which are not traded internationally. Monetary policy
sets the nominal interest rate following an Inflation Targeting regime, where the target is on union-wide
CPI inflation. This assumption reflects the current functioning of the ECB, whose primary objective of
price stability is formulated as a situation in which the one-year increase in the CPI for the Eurozone is
less than, but close to, 2%. Fiscal policy is designed following the Fiscal Compact Rules, by imposing
that the Government Debt-to-GDP ratio is about 60% in steady state and that countries must either
adopt a balanced budget law in their national legislation or adopt the Debt Brake Rule, which implies
that if government debt-to-GDP is more than 60% it should decrease by 5% of the excess every year.
Following Hjortsø (2012), we add a stabilization rule for government consumption or alternatively for
government transfers, but in a setting where distortionary taxes and government debt add the financing
dimension to the fiscal policy problem, and we also add a government bond spread, which depends
on government debt-to-GDP. Governments choose the level of government consumption and transfers,
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which are financed by distortionary taxes on labour income and firm sales and by short-term government
bonds. In particular:
• In a Pure Currency Union scenario governments choose the level of government consumption or
transfers for domestic stabilization purposes by setting them alternatively to target the output gap,
while following in part an exogenous process, financed by a mix of distortionary tax rates, while
using the other to deleverage government debt.
• In a Coordinated Currency Union scenario governments choose the level of local government con-
sumption or transfers for international stabilization purposes by setting them to target the net
exports gap, while following in part an exogenous process, financed by a mix of distortionary tax
rates, while using the other to deleverage government debt.
• A Full Fiscal Union scenario uses a consolidated budget constraint to finance local government
consumption or transfers for international stabilization purposes by setting them to target the net
exports gap, while following in part an exogenous process, financed by a mix of distortionary tax
rates, while using the other to deleverage government debt, just like in the Currency Union case,
but varying equally the fiscal instruments across countries, so as to use union-wide resources to
finance the government expenditure and the deleveraging.
Our main results are the following. First, with incomplete markets targeting the output gap pro-
duces more stabilization than targeting the net exports gap, while under deleveraging it makes hardly
a difference because the deleveraging shock drives the dynamics much more than other shocks. Sec-
ond, consolidating budget constraints may provide more stabilization, but the joint movement of the
fiscal instruments does not in an incomplete market setting, which is even more true under deleveraging.
These are the two results which are overturned in a setting with complete international financial markets.
Third, taxes are a better instrument for deleveraging compared to government consumption or trans-
fers, because they counteract the deflationary effect of the deleveraging shock much more. Fourth, by
backloading the deleveraging process one can achieve greater stabilization over time, because the fiscal
instruments move less initially, as they need to deleverage less at the beginning and more over time. The
policy prescriptions for the Eurozone in this case are that government debt should be reduced more grad-
ually, to avoid excessive volatility in the economy, and should be reduced by varying distortionary taxes,
while countries should concentrate on reducing their output gap and avoid creating a fiscal union like
the one we describe, until financial markets are integrated completely, allowing for perfect international
risk-sharing, like in our previous complete markets model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general model differen-
tiating between a Pure Currency Union, a Coordinated Currency Union and a Full Fiscal Union with
different deleveraging scenarios and instruments. Section 3 presents the calibration of the parameters
and steady state stances of the model to two groups of countries in the European Monetary Union.
Section 4 provides numerical simulations under different deleveraging scenarios, comparing Pure Cur-
rency Union, Coordinated Currency Union and Full Fiscal Union outcomes, other than alternative fiscal
policy instruments for deleveraging and alternative deleveraging schemes. Section 5 describes a welfare
measure based on an ad hoc loss function and provides welfare evaluations of the different deleveraging
scenarios and instruments. Section 6 collects the main conclusions and provides possible extensions. The
Mathematical Appendix provides all derivations, collects all equilibrium conditions of the model used
for the simulations, and describes the steady state on which the model is calibrated.
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3.2 A Two-Country Currency Union Model
The world economy is composed of two countries, which form a Currency Union. Both economies are
assumed to share identical preferences, technology and market structure, but may be subject to different
shocks, price rigidities, initial conditions and fiscal stances. The two countries are indexed by H and
F for Home and Foreign. The world is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households of
measure one, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each household owns a monopolistically competitive firm producing
a differentiated good, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The population on the segment [0, h) belongs to country H
while the population on the segment [h, 1] belongs to country F . This means that the relative size of
country H is h ∈ [0, 1], while the relative size of country F is 1 − h. This is true for both households
and firms.
Firms set prices in a staggered fashion following Calvo (1983) and use only labour for production.
There is no capital and no investment. Labour markets are competitive and internationally segmented,
so that labour supply is country-wide and not firm-specific. All goods are tradable and the Law of One
Price (LOP) holds for all single goods j. At the same time deviations from Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) may arise because of home bias in consumption. Financial markets are incomplete internation-
ally, allowing households to trade a full set of one-period state-contingent claims only within their own
country. Households in country H can purchase one-period bonds issued by both of the two countries’
governments, while households in country F can only purchase one-period bonds issued by their own
country’s government.
The world economy comprises also two Governments or Fiscal Authorities (one for each country), each
one choosing government consumption and transfers to stabilize the economy, financed by distortionary
taxes on labour income and firm sales and by short-term government bonds, and a Central Bank or
Monetary Authority (one for the whole EMU), which sets the nominal interest rate targeting union-wide
inflation.
We denote variables referred to the Foreign country with a star (∗).
3.2.1 Households
In each country there is a continuum of households, which gain utility from private consumption and
disutility from labour, consume goods produced in both countries with home bias, supply labour to
domestic firms, and collect profits from those firms. Households can trade a complete set of one-period
state-contingent claims only within their own country. Households in country H can purchase one-
period bonds issued by both countries’ governments, while households in country F can only purchase
one-period bonds issued by their own country’s government, subject to their budget constraints.
Each household in country H, indexed by i ∈ [0, h), and each household in country F , indexed by
i ∈ [h, 1], seeks to maximize respectively the present-value utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξt U(C
i
t , N
i
t ) E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξ∗t U(C
∗i
t , N
∗i
t ) (3.1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the common discount factor, which households use to discount future utility, ξt is
a preference shock to Home households and ξ∗t is a preference shock to Foreign households. These
preference shocks are assumed to follow the AR(1) processes in logs:
ξt = (ξt−1)ρξeεt and ξ∗t = (ξ
∗
t−1)
ρ∗ξeεt (3.2)
where ρξ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ∗ξ ∈ [0, 1] are measures of persistence of the shocks and εt is a zero mean white
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noise process. N it denotes hours of labour supplied by households in country H, N
∗i
t denotes hours of
labour supplied by households in country F . Cit is a composite index for private consumption defined
by:
Cit ≡
[
(1− α) 1η (CiH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CiF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(3.3)
for households in country H, while the analogous index for households in country F , C∗it , is defined by:
C∗it ≡
[
(1− α∗) 1η (C∗iH,t)
η−1
η + α∗
1
η (C∗iF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(3.4)
where CiH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods for households in country H, given by the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function (also known as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator
function):
CiH,t ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
CiH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.5)
whereas, for households in country F the same index of consumption of domestic goods, C∗iH,t, is given
by:
C∗iH,t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
C∗iH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.6)
where j ∈ [0, 1] denotes a single good variety of the continuum of differentiated goods produced in the
world economy. CiF,t is an index of imported goods for households in country H, given by the analogous
CES function:
CiF,t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
CiF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.7)
while the same index for imported goods for households in country F , C∗iF,t, is given by:
C∗iF,t ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
C∗iF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.8)
The parameter ε > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within a
given country. The parameter η > 0 measures the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods
(international trade elasticity). The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of openness of the Home economy
to international trade. Equivalently (1 − α) is a measure of the degree of home bias in consumption
in country H. When α tends to zero the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption vanishes and
the country ends up in autarky, consuming only domestic goods. If 1 − α > h there is home bias in
consumption in country H, because the share of consumption of domestic goods is greater than the share
of production of domestic goods. The same applies to the Foreign parameter of openness to international
trade α∗ ∈ [0, 1] for country F , except for the fact that if 1−α∗ > 1−h there is home bias in consumption
in country F , because the share of consumption of domestic goods in country F is greater than the share
of production of domestic goods in country F .
We choose to specify additively separable period utility of the type with Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA), so with constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and with constant elasticity
of labour supply, which take the following form:
U(Cit , N
i
t ) ≡
(Cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
U(C∗it , N
∗i
t ) ≡
(C∗it )
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N∗it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(3.9)
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for countries H and F respectively, where σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(it is also the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)), and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply.
Households in country H maximize their present-value utility, equation 3.1, subject to the following
sequence of budget constraints:
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)C
i
H,t(j) dj +
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)C
i
F,t(j) dj +D
i
t +B
i
H,t +B
i
F,t
≤ D
i
t−1
Qt−1,t +B
i
H,t−1(1 + it−1) +B
i
F,t−1(1 + i
∗
t−1)(1− δt−1) + (1− τwt )WtN it + T it + Γit + I∗it (3.10)
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where PH,t(j) is the price of domestic variety j, PF,t(j) is the price of variety j
imported from country F , Dit−1 is the portfolio of state-contingent claims purchased by the household in
period t− 1, Qt−1,t is the stochastic discount factor for households in country H, which is different for
households in the two countries and represents the price of state-contingent claims or equivalently the
inverse of the gross return on state-contingent claims, BiH,t are government bonds issued by country H
and purchased by the household in period t, it−1 is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank in
period t− 1, which is also the net return on government bonds issued by country H, Wt is the nominal
wage for households in country H, T it denotes lump-sum transfers from the government to households,
Γit denotes the share of profits net of taxes to households from ownership of firms, Iit denotes the share
of profits to households in country H from ownership of the financial intermediaries and τwt ∈ [0, 1] is a
marginal tax rate on labour income paid by households to the government.
The only financial assets traded internationally are given by BiF,t, which are government bonds issued
by country F and purchased by households in country H in period t, i∗t−1 is the nominal interest rate for
country F in period t− 1, which is also the net return on government bonds issued by country F , while
δt ∈ [0, 1] is a transaction cost for households in country H on purchases of government bonds issued by
country F , given by the AR(1) process:
δt ≡ (1− ρδ)δB
(
B∗Gt−1
P ∗H,t−1Y
∗
t−1
− B
∗G
P ∗HY ∗
)
+ ρδδt−1 + εt (3.11)
where
B∗Gt−1
P∗H,t−1Y
∗
t−1
is the overall real government debt-to-GDP for country F in period t − 1, variables
without subscript t are their respective steady state values, ρδ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of
the government bond spread shock and εt is a zero-mean white noise process. The previous equation
shows how the transaction cost for households in country H on purchases of government bonds issued
by country F , or the government bond spread given by (1 + i∗t )δt, is increasing in the deviation of
government debt-to-GDP from steady state by a factor given by δB , which represents the sensitivity of
the government bond spread or of the transaction cost to deviations of government debt-to-GDP from
steady state.
The financial intermediaries, owned by the households in country H, earn profits on all the interna-
tionally traded bonds BiF,t−1 by collecting savings from households in country H at the interest rate set
by the central bank it−1 and lending to the government in country F at the interest rate paid on its
government bonds i∗t−1. The aggregate profits of these financial intermediaries are given by:
It ≡
∫ h
0
Iit di ≡ hIit ≡ BF,t−1
[
(1 + i∗t−1)− (1 + i∗t−1)(1− δt−1)
]
= BF,t−1(1 + i∗t−1)δt−1 (3.12)
where BF,t−1 ≡
∫ h
0
BiF,t−1 di ≡ hBiF,t−1 are aggregate bonds issued by the government in country F and
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purchased by households in country H and where the government bond spread for country F , on which
financial intermediaries make profits, is given by (1 + i∗t−1)δt−1.
Households in country F analogously maximize their present-value utility, equation 3.1, subject to
the following sequence of budget constraints:
∫ h
0
P ∗H,t(j)C
∗i
H,t(j) dj +
∫ 1
h
P ∗F,t(j)C
∗i
F,t(j) dj +D
∗i
t +B
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F,t
≤ D
∗i
t−1
Q∗t−1,t
+B∗iF,t−1(1 + i
∗
t−1) + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗it + T ∗it + Γ∗it (3.13)
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where all the starred (∗) variables are the Foreign equivalent of the unstarred ones
explained above, so that Q∗t−1,t is the stochastic discount factor for households in country F and B∗iF,t
are government bonds issued by country F and purchased by the household in country F in period t. As
shown by the budget constraint, households in country F can only purchase government bonds issued
by their own country and, differently from households in country H, they do not pay any transaction
costs on the purchase of these government bonds.
All variables are expressed in units of the union’s currency. Last but not least, households in countries
H and F respectively, are subject to the following solvency constraints, for all t, that prevent them from
engaging in Ponzi-schemes:
lim
T→∞
Et
{Qt,TDiT} ≥ 0 lim
T→∞
Et
{Q∗t,TD∗iT } ≥ 0 (3.14)
The first order conditions for the household’s problem in country H are2:
(Cit)
σ(N it )
ϕ = (1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
(3.15)
which is the household’s intratemporal optimality condition, and:
Qt,t+1 = β ξt+1
ξt
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(3.16)
which is the household’s intertemporal optimality condition or Euler Equation, that holds for all states
of nature at t and t+ 1, and:
1
(1 + i∗t )(1− δt)
=
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} (3.17)
which is the no-arbitrage condition between government bonds issued by both countries and state-
contingent claims.
Aggregating the intratemporal optimality condition, equation 3.15, yields the aggregate labour supply
equation for households in country H:
Nt = (h)
1+ σϕ (Ct)
− σϕ
[
(1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
] 1
ϕ
(3.18)
where Nt is aggregate labour supply and Ct is aggregate consumption for households in country H,
defined by:
Nt ≡
∫ h
0
N it di = hN
i
t Ct ≡
∫ h
0
Cit di = hC
i
t (3.19)
2See Appendix B.1 for all derivations for this section.
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while aggregating the intertemporal optimality condition for households in country H, equation 3.16,
taking conditional expectations on both sides of the equation and using the no-arbitrage condition
between government bonds and state-contingent claims yields:
1
(1 + i∗t )(1− δt)
=
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} = βEt
{
ξt+1
ξt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
1
Πt+1
}
(3.20)
where 11+it = Et{Qt,t+1} is the price of a one-period government bond issued by country H paying off
one unit of the union’s currency in t+ 1 and Πt+1 ≡ Pt+1Pt is gross CPI inflation in country H.
Specular equations for country F can be obtained following the same procedure, where the results
are similar, but with all the relevant starred (∗) variables instead of the unstarred ones.
The first order conditions for the household’s problem in country F are:
(C∗it )
σ(N∗it )
ϕ = (1− τ∗wt )
W ∗t
P ∗t
(3.21)
which is the household’s intratemporal optimality condition, and:
Q∗t,t+1 = β
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗it+1
C∗it
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(3.22)
which is the household’s intertemporal optimality condition or Euler Equation, that holds for all states
of nature at t and t+ 1, and:
1
1 + i∗t
= Et{Q∗t,t+1} (3.23)
which is the no-arbitrage condition between government bonds issued by country F and state-contingent
claims.
The aggregate labour supply equation for households in country F is given by:
N∗t = (1− h)1+
σ
ϕ (C∗t )
− σϕ
[
(1− τ∗wt )
W ∗t
P ∗t
] 1
ϕ
(3.24)
where N∗t is aggregate labour supply and C
∗
t is aggregate consumption for households in country F ,
defined by:
N∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
N∗it di = (1− h)N∗it C∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
C∗it di = (1− h)C∗it (3.25)
while taking conditional expectations on both sides of the aggregate intertemporal optimality condition
and using the no-arbitrage condition between government bonds and state-contingent claims yields:
1
1 + i∗t
= Et{Q∗t,t+1} = βEt
{
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
1
Π∗t+1
}
(3.26)
where 11+i∗t
= Et{Q∗t,t+1} is the price of a one-period government bond issued by country F paying off
one unit of the union’s currency in t+ 1 and Π∗t+1 ≡ P
∗
t+1
P∗t
is gross CPI inflation in country F .
Aggregating the budget constraints of households in countries H and F respectively and considering
that in optimality they hold with equality yields:
PtCt +Dt +BH,t +BF,t = (1 + it−1)(Dt−1 +BH,t−1 +BF,t−1) + (1− τwt )WtNt + Tt + Γt + It (3.27)
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P ∗t C
∗
t +D
∗
t +B
∗
F,t =
1 + it−1
1− δt−1 (D
∗
t−1 +B
∗
F,t−1) + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗t + T ∗t + Γ∗t (3.28)
where aggregate contingent claims and aggregate bonds are respectively defined as:
Dt ≡
∫ h
0
Dit di = hD
i
t D
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
D∗it di = (1− h)D∗it (3.29)
BH,t ≡
∫ h
0
BiH,t di = hB
i
H,t (3.30)
BF,t ≡
∫ h
0
BiF,t di = hB
i
F,t B
∗
F,t ≡
∫ 1
h
B∗iF,t di = (1− h)B∗iF,t (3.31)
while aggregate transfers and profits are respectively defined as:
Tt ≡
∫ h
0
T it di = hT
i
t T
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
T ∗it di = (1− h)T ∗it (3.32)
Γt ≡
∫ h
0
Γit di = hΓ
i
t Γ
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
h
Γ∗it di = (1− h)Γ∗it (3.33)
It ≡
∫ h
0
Iit di = hIit (3.34)
and aggregate consumption and labour supply are as previously defined.
Pt is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country H, given by:
Pt ≡
[
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (3.35)
while P ∗t is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country F , given by:
P ∗t ≡
[
(1− α∗)(P ∗H,t)1−η + α∗(P ∗F,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (3.36)
where PH,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country H and PF,t is a price
index for goods imported from country F , respectively defined by:
PH,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(3.37)
PF,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(3.38)
while P ∗H,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country F and P
∗
F,t is a price
index for goods imported from country H, respectively defined by:
P ∗H,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(3.39)
P ∗F,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(3.40)
Since one-period state-contingent claims can be traded freely between households only within each
country, they are in zero national net supply, so that the market clearing conditions for these assets in
66
every period t are consequently given by:∫ h
0
Dit di = hD
i
t = Dt = 0
∫ 1
h
D∗it di = (1− h)D∗it = D∗t = 0 (3.41)
Rewriting the aggregate budget constraints by imposing the previous market clearing conditions
yields:
PtCt +BH,t +BF,t = (1 + it−1)(BH,t−1 +BF,t−1) + (1− τwt )WtNt + Tt + Γt + It (3.42)
P ∗t C
∗
t +B
∗
F,t =
1 + it−1
1− δt−1B
∗
F,t−1 + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗t + T ∗t + Γ∗t (3.43)
3.2.2 International Identities and Assumptions
Several international identities and assumptions need to be spelled out in order to link the Home economy
to the Foreign one and to be able to close the model.
The terms of trade are defined as the price of foreign goods in terms of home goods, for households
in country H and in country F , and are given respectively by:
St ≡ PF,t
PH,t
and S∗t ≡
P ∗F,t
P ∗H,t
(3.44)
Although deviations from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) may arise because of home bias in con-
sumption, we assume that the Law of One Price (LOP) holds for every single good j, which implies:
PH,t(j) = P
∗
F,t(j) and PF,t(j) = P
∗
H,t(j) (3.45)
for all j ∈ [0, 1], where PH,t(j) (or PF,t(j) for goods imported from country F ) is the price of good j in
country H and P ∗F,t(j) (or P
∗
H,t(j) for goods produced in country F ) is the price of good j in country F
in terms of the union’s currency. Plugging the previous expressions into the definitions of PH,t and PF,t,
equations 3.37 and 3.38, respectively yields:
PH,t = P
∗
F,t and PF,t = P
∗
H,t (3.46)
Combining the previous result with the definition of the terms of trade for countries H and F yields:
St = PF,t
PH,t
=
P ∗H,t
P ∗F,t
=
1
S∗t
(3.47)
Dividing the CPIs in countries H and F by the relative price indices for domestic and imported goods
and combining them with the definition of the terms of trade yields the following relationships:
Pt
PH,t
=
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η (3.48)
Pt
PF,t
=
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η
St (3.49)
P ∗t
P ∗H,t
=
[
1− α∗ + α∗(S∗t )1−η
] 1
1−η =
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (3.50)
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P ∗t
P ∗F,t
=
[
1− α∗ + α∗(S∗t )1−η
] 1
1−η
S∗t
= St
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (3.51)
Computing the first price ratio for periods t and t− 1 and dividing one by the other yields:
Pt
PH,t
PH,t−1
Pt−1
=
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η
[1− α+ α(St−1)1−η]
1
1−η
(3.52)
which rearranged yields a relationship between PPI inflation and CPI inflation in country H:
Πt = ΠH,t
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
1− α+ α(St−1)1−η
] 1
1−η
(3.53)
The same relationship can be derived for country F and will be given by:
Π∗t = Π
∗
H,t
[
1− α∗ + α∗Sη−1t
1− α∗ + α∗(St−1)η−1
] 1
1−η
(3.54)
Dividing the terms of trade in period t by the terms of trade in period t − 1 yields a relationship
showing the evolution of the terms of trade over time:
St
St−1 =
ΠF,t
ΠH,t
=
Π∗H,t
ΠH,t
=⇒ St =
Π∗H,t
ΠH,t
St−1 (3.55)
as a function of PPI inflation in both countries H and F .
The Real Exchange Rate between the Home country and country F is the ratio of the two countries’
CPIs, expressed both in terms of the union’s currency, and is defined by:
Qt ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
(3.56)
Combining the previous results with the definition of the real exchange rate yields a relationship
between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade:
Qt =
P ∗t
P ∗F,t
PH,t
Pt
=
[
1− α∗ + α∗(S∗t )1−η
] 1
1−η
S∗t [1− α+ α(St)1−η]
1
1−η
= St
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η
(3.57)
where the difference between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade is given by the degree of
openness of the two countries and the international trade elasticity. If the countries both have complete
home bias (α = α∗ = 0), then they are in autarky and the real exchange rate is exactly equal to the
terms of trade, because the CPI and PPI are the same in each country.
Since state-contingent claims cannot be traded internationally there is no full international risk-
sharing, but the only assets traded internationally, the bonds issued by the government in country
F , yield an equation linking the interest rates in the two countries, through the transaction cost or
government bond spread, given by:
1 + it = (1 + i
∗
t )(1− δt) =⇒ 1 + i∗t =
1 + it
1− δt (3.58)
which implies that the interest rate paid on government bonds issued by country F is increasing in the
transaction cost δt, or in the government bond spread (1 + i
∗
t )δt, other than increasing in the interest
rate set by the central bank and paid on government bonds issued by country H, it.
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3.2.3 Firms
In country H there is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, h), while in country F there is a continuum
of firms, indexed by j ∈ [h, 1], each producing a differentiated good with the same technology represented
respectively by the following production functions:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) Y
∗
t (j) = A
∗
tN
∗
t (j) (3.59)
where At and A
∗
t represent the level of technology in countries H and F , respectively, which evolve
exogenously over time following the AR(1) processes in logs:
At = (At−1)ρaeεt and A∗t = (A
∗
t−1)
ρ∗aeεt (3.60)
where ρa ∈ [0, 1] and ρ∗a ∈ [0, 1] are measures of persistence of the shocks and εt is a zero mean white
noise process.
From the production functions we can derive labour demand for individual firms in countries H and
F and the respective nominal and real marginal costs of production, which are equal across firms in each
country and are given by:
Nt(j) =
Yt(j)
At
=⇒ MCnt =
Wt
At
=⇒ MCt = Wt
AtPH,t
(3.61)
N∗t (j) =
Y ∗t (j)
A∗t
=⇒ MC∗nt =
W ∗t
A∗t
=⇒ MC∗t =
W ∗t
A∗tP ∗H,t
(3.62)
Aggregating individual labour demand across firms in each country yields the aggregate labour de-
mand for countries H and F , respectively given by:
Nt ≡
∫ h
0
Nt(j) dj =
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
At
dj =
Yt
At
∫ h
0
1
h
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj =
Yt
At
dt (3.63)
N∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
N∗t (j) dj =
∫ 1
h
Y ∗t (j)
A∗t
dj =
Y ∗t
A∗t
∫ 1
h
1
1− h
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
dj =
Y ∗t
A∗t
d∗t (3.64)
where Yt and Y
∗
t are aggregate output in countries H and F , respectively given by:
Yt ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
Y ∗t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
Y ∗t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.65)
and where the terms:
dt ≡
∫ h
0
1
h
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj and d∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
1
1− h
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
dj (3.66)
represent relative price dispersion across firms in each country. In steady state and in a flexible price
equilibrium these relative price dispersions are equal to one.
Firm j’s period t profits net of taxes in country H are given by:
Γt(j) = (1− τst )PH,t(j)Yt(j)−WtNt(j) (3.67)
where τst is the marginal tax rate on firm sales in country H. Substituting in labour demand, marginal
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costs, substituting the output of firm j with the demand function for output, integrating over all j ∈ [0, h),
using the definition of PH,t, and substituting in price dispersion yields aggregate profits net of taxes in
country H:
Γt ≡
∫ h
0
Γt(j) dj = (1− τst )PH,tYt − PH,tMCtYtdt = PH,tYt(1− τst −MCtdt) (3.68)
Analogous results can be obtained for aggregate profits net of taxes in country F :
Γ∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
Γ∗t (j) dj = (1− τ∗st )P ∗H,tY ∗t − P ∗H,tMC∗t Y ∗t d∗t = P ∗H,tY ∗t (1− τ∗st −MC∗t d∗t ) (3.69)
where τ∗st is the marginal tax rate on firm sales in country F , and where firm j’s period t profits net of
taxes in country F are given by:
Γ∗t (j) = (1− τ∗st )P ∗H,t(j)Y ∗t (j)−W ∗t N∗t (j) = Y ∗t (j)[(1− τ∗st )PH,t(j)−MC∗nt ] (3.70)
Here we can see how aggregate profits are a function of the PPI, aggregate output, marginal cost
and price dispersion for both countries H and F , other than the tax rate on firm sales, while nominal
aggregate labour income is shown to be a function of some of the same variables and equal to:
WtNt = Wt
Yt
At
dt = MC
n
t Ytdt = PH,tYtMCtdt (3.71)
in country H, and:
W ∗t N
∗
t = W
∗
t
Y ∗t
A∗t
d∗t = MC
∗n
t Y
∗
t d
∗
t = P
∗
H,tY
∗
t MC
∗
t d
∗
t (3.72)
in country F .
Following Calvo (1983), each firm in country H may reset its price with probability 1−θ in any given
period. Thus, each period a fraction 1 − θ of randomly selected firms reset their price, while a fraction
θ keep their prices unchanged. As a result, the average duration of a price in country H is given by
(1− θ)−1, and θ can be seen as a natural index of price stickiness for country H. In country F each firm
may reset its price with probability 1 − θ∗ in any given period. Thus, each period a fraction 1 − θ∗ of
randomly selected firms reset their price, while a fraction θ∗ keep their prices unchanged. As a result,
the average duration of a price in country F is given by (1 − θ∗)−1, and θ∗ can be seen as a natural
index of price stickiness for country F . This allows for the two countries to have different degrees of
price rigidity.
A firm in country H re-optimizing in period t will choose the price P¯H,t that maximizes the current
market value of the profits net of taxes generated while that price remains effective. Formally, it solves
the problem:
max
P¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{Qt,t+kYt+k|t(j) [(1− τst+k)P¯H,t −MCnt+k]} (3.73)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints:
Yt+k|t(j) =
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
(3.74)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where Qt,t+k is the households’ stochastic discount factor in country H for discounting
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k-period ahead nominal payoffs from ownership of firms, defined by:
Qt,t+k = βk ξt+k
ξt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
(3.75)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and where Yt+k|t(j) is the output in period t + k for firm j which last reset its price
in period t.
Analogously, a firm in country F re-optimizing in period t will choose the price P¯ ∗H,t that maximizes
the current market value of the profits net of taxes generated while that price remains effective. Formally,
it solves the problem:
max
P¯∗H,t
∞∑
k=0
θ∗kEt
{
Q∗t,t+kY ∗t+k|t(j)
[
(1− τ∗st+k)P¯ ∗H,t −MC∗nt+k
]}
(3.76)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints:
Y ∗t+k|t(j) =
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t+k
)−ε
Y ∗t+k
1− h (3.77)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where Q∗t,t+k is the households’ stochastic discount factor in country F for discounting
k-period ahead nominal payoffs from ownership of firms, defined by:
Q∗t,t+k = βk
ξ∗t+k
ξ∗t
(
C∗t+k
C∗t
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+k
(3.78)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., which is equal to the stochastic discount factor for households in country H, and
where Y ∗t+k|t(j) is the output in period t+ k for firm j which last reset its price in period t.
The optimal price chosen by firms in country H can be expressed as a function of only aggregate
variables:
P¯H,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
MCnt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
(1− τst+k)
} (3.79)
Notice that in the zero inflation steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium the previous equation
simplifies to:
P¯H =
ε
(ε− 1)(1− τs)MC
n (3.80)
where MCn is the nominal marginal cost in steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium in country
H, and where the optimal price is shown to be set as a markup over nominal marginal costs.
Analogous results hold for firms in country F . The optimal price chosen by firms in country F can
be expressed as a function of only aggregate variables:
P¯ ∗H,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
Y ∗t+k
(P∗H,t+k)
−εMC
∗n
t+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
Y ∗t+k
(P∗H,t+k)
−ε (1− τ∗st+k)
} (3.81)
In the zero inflation steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium the previous equation simplifies to:
P¯ ∗H =
ε
(ε− 1)(1− τ∗s)MC
∗n (3.82)
where MC∗n is the nominal marginal cost in steady state and in the flexible price equilibrium in country
71
F , and where the optimal price is shown to be set as a markup over nominal marginal costs.
3.2.4 Net Exports, Net Foreign Assets and the Balance of Payments
Net Exports are defined as domestic production minus domestic consumption, which is equal to exports
minus imports, and for country H are given by:
NXt ≡ PH,tYt − PtCt − PH,tGt (3.83)
In real terms (divided by PH,t), Net Exports for country H can be written as:
N˜Xt = Yt − Pt
PH,t
Ct −Gt = Yt −
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η Ct −Gt (3.84)
where net exports are shown to be a function of the country’s degree of openness and the terms of trade,
other than domestic production and public and private domestic consumption.
Since exports for country H are imports for country F and viceversa, then net exports are in zero
international net supply: NXt+NX
∗
t = 0. In real terms: N˜Xt+StN˜X
∗
t = 0. This implies the following
relationship between output in the two countries:
Yt + StY
∗
t =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η Ct + St
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η C∗t +Gt + StG
∗
t (3.85)
Net Foreign Assets are given by the sum of private and public assets held abroad, and for countries
H and F are given respectively by:
NFAt ≡ BF,t and NFA∗t ≡ B∗F,t −B∗Gt (3.86)
In real terms (divided by PH,t and P
∗
H,t respectively), Net Foreign Assets for countries H and F can
be written respectively as:
N˜FAt ≡ B˜F,t and N˜FA
∗
t ≡ B˜∗F,t − B˜∗Gt (3.87)
Since foreign assets for country H are domestic assets for country F , then net foreign assets are in
zero international net supply: NFAt +NFA
∗
t = 0. In real terms: N˜FAt + StN˜FA
∗
t = 0.
The Balance of Payments is given by net exports plus interest accrued on net foreign assets and
income from abroad (from financial intermediaries):
BP t ≡ NXt + it−1NFAt−1 + δt−1(1 + i∗t−1)BF,t−1 = NXt +
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1 NFAt−1 (3.88)
In real terms (divided by PH,t), the Balance of Payments for country H can be written as:
B˜P t ≡ N˜Xt + it−1 N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ δt(1 + i
∗
t−1)
BF,t−1
ΠH,t
= N˜Xt +
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
(3.89)
Combining the relationships between net foreign assets and net exports in the two countries shows
that the balance of payments of the two countries are related in the following way: BP t +BP
∗
t = 0. In
real terms: B˜P t + StB˜P
∗
t = 0.
Since government bonds issued by country H are not traded internationally, while government bonds
issued by country F are traded internationally, the market clearing conditions for these bonds are given
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by:
BH,t −BGt = 0 BF,t +B∗F,t −B∗Gt = 0 (3.90)
From the households’ budget constraint, substituting in firm profits and labour income, substituting
in the expression for transfers backed out from the government budget constraint and substituting in the
market clearing condition for government bonds issued by country H, yields the following relationship
between assets and goods for country H:
BF,t − it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1 BF,t−1 = PH,tYt − PtCt − PH,tGt (3.91)
while substituting in the definitions of net exports and net foreign assets yields:
NFAt =
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1 NFAt−1 +NXt (3.92)
while substituting in the definition of the balance of payments yields a relationship between net foreign
assets and the balance of payments:
NFAt = NFAt−1 +BP t (3.93)
which shows that the balance of payments is equal to the variation of net foreign assets over one period.
In real terms (divided by PH,t), the previous equations can be rewritten as:
N˜FAt =
1 + it−1
1− δt−1
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ N˜Xt =
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ B˜P t (3.94)
3.2.5 Central Bank and Monetary Policy
The only central bank in the currency union sets monetary policy by choosing the nominal interest rate
to target union-wide inflation through a Taylor rule.
Monetary policy follows an Inflation Targeting regime of the kind:
β(1 + it) =
(
ΠUt
ΠU
)φpi(1−ρi)
[β(1 + it−1)]
ρi (3.95)
where union-wide output is defined as the population-weighted geometric average of per-capita output
in the two countries:
Y Ut ≡
(
Yt
h
)h(
Y ∗t
1− h
)1−h
(3.96)
while the union-wide CPI is analogously defined:
PUt ≡ (Pt)h(P ∗t )1−h (3.97)
so that consequently union-wide inflation is defined as the population-weighted geometric average of the
CPI inflations in the two countries:
ΠUt ≡ (Πt)h(Π∗t )1−h (3.98)
while variables without subscripts t denote their respective steady state levels, φpi represents the respon-
siveness of the interest rate to inflation and ρi is a measure of the persistence of the interest rate over
time (interest rate smoothing).
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3.2.6 Government and Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union
In a Pure Currency Union each government chooses the amount of government consumption and transfers,
financed by marginal tax rates on labour income and firm sales and by short-term government bonds.
In country H the government finances a stream of public consumption Gt and transfers Tt subject
to the following sequence of budget constraints:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Gt(j) dj +
∫ h
0
T it di+B
G
t−1(1 + it−1) = B
G
t + τ
s
t PH,tYt +
∫ h
0
τwt WtN
i
t di (3.99)
where the right hand side represents government income from taxation and newly issued government
bonds, while the left hand side represents total government spending on consumption and transfers, and
on government bonds due at the end of period t, including interest. BGt are government bonds issued by
country H in period t, while all other variables are as explained above. Government consumption, Gt,
is given by the following CES function, just like equation 3.74 for the demand function for firms, where
we assume that the government purchases only goods produced domestically (complete home bias):
Gt ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
Gt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.100)
The optimal allocation of any given public expenditure within each category of goods yields the
following demand function:
Gt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
Gt
h
(3.101)
and total government expenditure on public consumption simplifies to:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Gt(j) dj = PH,tGt (3.102)
The government budget constraint can be rewritten in aggregate form as:
PH,tGt + Tt +B
G
t−1(1 + it−1) = B
G
t + τ
s
t PH,tYt + τ
w
t WtNt (3.103)
while dividing the government budget constraint by PH,t yields the government budget constraint in real
terms:
Gt + T˜t + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= τst Yt + τ
w
t MCtdtYt + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(3.104)
where variables with a tilde ( ˜ ) are in real terms (divided by PH,t), and where the left hand side
represents current government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt, while the right
hand side represents government financing of that expenditure through taxes and the possible variation
of government debt.
In the transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses government consumption to stabilize the
output gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
Gt
G
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρg)(Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (3.105)
74
while keeping real transfers constant and maintaining a balanced budget, through the debt rule:
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
T˜t = T˜ (3.106)
as the government does not need to deleverage its government debt, and varying equally the tax rates
on labour income and firm sales to finance the government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τwt − τw = τst − τs (3.107)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without subscripts t represent their respective
steady state level, while ψy ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government consumption to variations
of the output gap.
In the consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses real transfers to stabilize the output
gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρt)( T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (3.108)
while keeping government consumption constant and maintaining a balanced budget, through the debt
rule:
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
Gt = G (3.109)
as the government does not need to deleverage its government debt, and varying equally the tax rates
on labour income and firm sales to finance the government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τwt − τw = τst − τs (3.110)
where ρt ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψy ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the output gap.
In the distortionary tax scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses government consumption to
stabilize the output gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the
fiscal rule:
Gt
G
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρg)(Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (3.111)
while keeping real transfers constant and maintaining a balanced budget, through the debt rule:
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
T˜t = T˜ (3.112)
as the government does not need to deleverage its government debt, and varying equally the tax rates
on labour income and firm sales to finance the government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τwt − τw = τst − τs (3.113)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψy ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government
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consumption to variations of the output gap.
In country F the government finances a stream of public consumption G∗t and transfers T
∗
t subject
to the following sequence of budget constraints:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)G
∗
t (j) dj +
∫ 1
h
T ∗it di+B
∗G
t−1(1 + i
∗
t−1) = B
∗G
t + τ
∗s
t P
∗
H,tY
∗
t +
∫ 1
h
τ∗wt W
∗
t N
∗i
t di (3.114)
where the right hand side represents government income from taxation and newly issued government
bonds, while the left hand side represents total government spending on consumption and transfers, and
on government bonds due at the end of period t, including interest. B∗Gt are government bonds issued by
country F in period t, while all other variables are as explained above. Government consumption, G∗t ,
is given by the following CES function, just like equation 3.77 for the demand function for firms, where
we assume that the government purchases only goods produced domestically (complete home bias):
G∗t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
G∗t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.115)
The optimal allocation of any given public expenditure within each category of goods yields the
following demand function:
G∗t (j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
G∗t
1− h (3.116)
and total government expenditures on public consumption simplify to:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)G
∗
t (j) dj = P
∗
H,tG
∗
t (3.117)
The government budget constraint can be rewritten in aggregate form as:
P ∗H,tG
∗
t + T
∗
t +B
∗G
t−1
1 + it−1
1− δt−1 = B
∗G
t + τ
∗s
t P
∗
H,tY
∗
t + τ
∗w
t W
∗
t N
∗
t (3.118)
while dividing the government budget constraint by P ∗H,t yields the government budget constraint in real
terms:
G∗t + T˜
∗
t +
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
= τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t + B˜
∗G
t −
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(3.119)
where variables with a tilde ( ˜ ) are in real terms (divided by P ∗H,t), and where the left hand side
represents current government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt, while the right
hand side represents government financing of that expenditure through taxes and the possible variation
of government debt.
In the transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses government consumption to stabilize the
output gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗g)(G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (3.120)
while using real transfers T˜ ∗t to deleverage its government debt, through the debt rule:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(3.121)
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and varying equally the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the remaining government
expenditure, through the tax rules:
τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s (τ∗st Y ∗t + τ∗wt MC∗t d∗tY ∗t )− (τ∗sY ∗ + τ∗wMC∗Y ∗) = G∗t −G∗ (3.122)
where ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without subscripts t represent their respective
steady state level, while ψ∗y ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government consumption to variations of
the output gap, γ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is the desired share of reduction per period of the excess real government debt
with respect to steady state. If γ∗t increases over time then the deleveraging is fast and backloaded, while
if γ∗t decreases over time then the deleveraging is slow and frontloaded. If γ
∗
t = γ
∗ then the deleveraging
is constant and linear in the desired fraction of reduction per period of the excess real government debt,
as the fraction of deleveraging does not vary over time.
In the consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses real transfers to stabilize the output
gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗t )( T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (3.123)
while using government consumption G∗t to deleverage its government debt, through the debt rule:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(3.124)
and varying equally the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the remaining government
expenditure, through the tax rules:
τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s (τ∗st Y ∗t + τ∗wt MC∗t d∗tY ∗t )− (τ∗sY ∗ + τ∗wMC∗Y ∗) = T˜ ∗t − T˜ ∗ (3.125)
where ρ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψ∗y ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the output gap.
In the distortionary tax scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses government consumption to
stabilize the output gap countercyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the
fiscal rule:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗g)(G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (3.126)
while keeping real transfers constant and varying equally the tax rates on labour income and firm sales
to deleverage its government debt, through the debt rule:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
T˜ ∗t = T˜
∗ (3.127)
and also to finance the remaining government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s (3.128)
where ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψ
∗
y ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government
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consumption to variations of the output gap.
3.2.7 Government and Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union
If the Governments of the two countries choose to coordinate, they will use their fiscal instruments
to target a common objective, while maintaining independent budget constraints. Instead of using
government consumption or transfers to stabilize the domestic output gap countercyiclically, they will
use the same fiscal instruments to stabilize the net exports gap procyclically. This represents the act of
coordinating their policies on a common objective, which depends on the interactions between the two
economies. The budget constraints of the two fiscal authorities instead remain unmodified.
In the transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses government consumption to stabilize its
real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (3.129)
while keeping real transfers constant and maintaining a balanced budget, through the debt rule:
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
T˜t = T˜ (3.130)
as the government does not need to deleverage its government debt, and varying equally the tax rates
on labour income and firm sales to finance the government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τwt − τw = τst − τs (3.131)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without subscripts t represent their respective
steady state level, while ψnx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government consumption to variations
of the real net exports gap.
In the same transfer scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses government consumption to stabilize
its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal
rule:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (3.132)
while using real transfers T˜ ∗t to deleverage its government debt, through the debt rule:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(3.133)
and varying equally the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the remaining government
expenditure, through the tax rules:
τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s (τ∗st Y ∗t + τ∗wt MC∗t d∗tY ∗t )− (τ∗sY ∗ + τ∗wMC∗Y ∗) = G∗t −G∗ (3.134)
where ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables without subscripts t represent their respective
steady state level, while ψ∗nx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government consumption to variations
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of the real net exports gap, γ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is the desired share of reduction per period of the excess real
government debt with respect to steady state. If γ∗t increases over time then the deleveraging is fast and
backloaded, while if γ∗t decreases over time then the deleveraging is slow and frontloaded. If γ
∗
t = γ
∗
then the deleveraging is constant and linear in the desired fraction of reduction per period of the excess
real government debt, as the fraction of deleveraging does not vary over time.
In the consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses real transfers to stabilize its real net
exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (3.135)
while keeping government consumption constant and maintaining a balanced budget, through the debt
rule:
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
Gt = G (3.136)
as the government does not need to deleverage its government debt, and varying equally the tax rates
on labour income and firm sales to finance the government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τwt − τw = τst − τs (3.137)
where ρt ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψnx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the real net exports gap.
In the same consumption scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses real transfers to stabilize its
real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal rule:
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (3.138)
while using government consumption G∗t to deleverage its government debt, through the debt rule:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(3.139)
and varying equally the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the remaining government
expenditure, through the tax rules:
τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s (τ∗st Y ∗t + τ∗wt MC∗t d∗tY ∗t )− (τ∗sY ∗ + τ∗wMC∗Y ∗) = T˜ ∗t − T˜ ∗ (3.140)
where ρ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the transfer shock in its AR(1) process in logs and εt is a
zero mean white noise process, while ψ∗nx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of real transfers to variations
of the real net exports gap.
In the distortionary tax scenario, fiscal policy in country H chooses government consumption to
stabilize its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the
fiscal rule:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (3.141)
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while keeping real transfers constant and maintaining a balanced budget, through the debt rule:
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
T˜t = T˜ (3.142)
as the government does not need to deleverage its government debt, and varying equally the tax rates
on labour income and firm sales to finance the government expenditure, through the tax rule:
τwt − τw = τst − τs (3.143)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψnx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government
consumption to variations of the real net exports gap.
In the same distortionary tax scenario, fiscal policy in country F chooses government consumption
to stabilize its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through
the fiscal rule:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (3.144)
while keeping real transfers constant and varying equally the tax rates on labour income and firm sales
to deleverage its government debt, through the debt rule:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
T˜ ∗t = T˜
∗ (3.145)
and also to finance the remaining government expenditure, through the tax rules:
τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s (3.146)
where ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of persistence of the government consumption shock in its AR(1) process in
logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψ
∗
nx ≥ 0 represents the responsiveness of government
consumption to variations of the real net exports gap.
3.2.8 Government and Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union
If instead of considering two fiscal authorities managing fiscal policy independently, one for each country,
or coordinating their policies, but with two separate budget constraints, we consider only one fiscal
authority managing fiscal policy for both countries at the same time in a coordinated way and with a
consolidated budget constraint, then we can think of it as an extreme case of fiscal policy coordination
and call it a Full Fiscal Union. In this case government debt will be aggregated across countries and
both countries will contribute to the deleveraging of government debt. Nonetheless, given that financial
markets are still incomplete, there continue to be two separate government bonds for the two countries,
which pay different interest rates and so have different bond yields.
A Full Fiscal Union uses local government spending to manage fiscal policy at the union level with a
consolidated budget constraint. The Fiscal Union finances streams of local public consumption, Gt and
G∗t , and transfers, Tt and T
∗
t , subject to the consolidated budget constraint of the two national fiscal
80
authorities:
PH,tGt + P
∗
H,tG
∗
t + Tt + T
∗
t +B
G
t−1(1 + it−1) +B
∗G
t−1
1 + it−1
1− δt−1 =
BGt +B
∗G
t + τ
s
t PH,tYt + τ
∗s
t P
∗
H,tY
∗
t + τ
w
t WtNt + τ
∗w
t W
∗
t N
∗
t (3.147)
Dividing the government budget constraint by PH,t yields the government budget constraint in real
terms (for country H):
Gt + T˜t + St(G
∗
t + T˜
∗
t ) + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
St−1B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
=
(τst + τ
w
t MCtdt)Yt + (τ
∗s
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
t )StY
∗
t + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+ StB˜t
∗G − St−1B˜
∗G
t−1
Π∗H,t
(3.148)
where variables with a tilde (˜) are in real terms (divided by PH,t), and where the left hand side represents
current government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt, while the right hand side
represents government financing of that expenditure through taxes and the possible variation of overall
government debt.
In the transfer scenario, union-wide fiscal policy chooses government consumption in each country to
stabilize its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the
fiscal rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (3.149)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (3.150)
while using real transfers equally in both countries to deleverage the government debt of country F ,
while country H maintains its government debt constant, through the debt rules:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
T˜t − T˜ = T˜ ∗t − T˜ ∗ (3.151)
and varying equally across countries the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the remaining
government expenditure, through the tax rules:
τwt − τw = τst − τs τ∗wt − τ∗w = τwt − τw τ∗st − τ∗s = τst − τs (3.152)
(τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t )− (τ∗sY ∗ + τ∗wMC∗Y ∗) = G∗t −G∗ (3.153)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] for country H and ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] for country F are measures of persistence of the government
consumption shocks in their AR(1) processes in logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process. Variables
without subscripts t represent their respective steady state level, while ψnx ≥ 0 for country H and
ψ∗nx ≥ 0 for country F represent the responsiveness of government consumption to variations of the real
net exports gap, γ∗t ∈ [0, 1] is the desired share of reduction per period of the excess real government debt
with respect to steady state. If γ∗t increases over time then the deleveraging is fast and backloaded, while
if γ∗t decreases over time then the deleveraging is slow and frontloaded. If γ
∗
t = γ
∗ then the deleveraging
is constant and linear in the desired fraction of reduction per period of the excess real government debt,
as the fraction of deleveraging does not vary over time.
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In the consumption scenario, union-wide fiscal policy chooses real transfers in each country to stabilize
its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process, through the fiscal
rules:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (3.154)
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (3.155)
while using government consumption equally in both countries to deleverage the government debt of
country F , while country H maintains its government debt constant, through the debt rules:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
Gt −G = G∗t −G∗ (3.156)
and varying equally across countries the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the remaining
government expenditure, through the tax rules:
τwt − τw = τst − τs τ∗wt − τ∗w = τwt − τw τ∗st − τ∗s = τst − τs (3.157)
(τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t )− (τ∗sY ∗ + τ∗wMC∗Y ∗) = T˜ ∗t − T˜ ∗ (3.158)
where ρt ∈ [0, 1] for country H and ρ∗t ∈ [0, 1] for country F are measures of persistence of the transfer
shocks in their AR(1) processes in logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψnx ≥ 0 for
country H and ψ∗nx ≥ 0 for country F represent the responsiveness of real transfers to variations of the
real net exports gap.
In the distortionary tax scenario, union-wide fiscal policy chooses government consumption in each
country to stabilize its real net exports gap procyclically, while following in part an exogenous process,
through the fiscal rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (3.159)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
N˜X
∗
t
N˜X
∗
)ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt =
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (3.160)
while keeping real transfers constant and varying equally across countries the tax rates on labour income
and firm sales to deleverage the government debt of country F , while country H maintains its government
debt constant, through the debt rules:
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
T˜t = T˜ T˜
∗
t = T˜
∗ (3.161)
and also varying equally across countries the tax rates on labour income and firm sales to finance the
remaining government expenditure, through the tax rules:
τwt − τw = τst − τs τ∗wt − τ∗w = τwt − τw τ∗st − τ∗s = τst − τs (3.162)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] for country H and ρ∗g ∈ [0, 1] for country F are measures of persistence of the government
consumption shocks in their AR(1) processes in logs and εt is a zero mean white noise process, while ψnx ≥
0 for country H and ψ∗nx ≥ 0 for country F represent the responsiveness of government consumption to
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variations of the real net exports gap.
3.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated3 following mainly Ferrero (2009), so we consider the top 5 Eurozone countries,
which account for more than 80% of Eurozone GDP and we divide them into the periphery (namely,
France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands), country F , and the core (namely Germany), country H. The
size of country H is set according to the relative GDP size to h = 0.4, as Germany accounts for over
35% of Eurozone GDP.
As in Ferrero (2009) most of the parameters governing the economies of the two countries are set
symmetrically, with the exception of the degree of price rigidity, which has been set such that in country
H the average duration of a price is 4 quarters while in country F it is 5 quarters. The gross markup εε−1
has been set to 1.1, which implies a net markup of 10%, and the discount factor has been chosen to match
a compounded annual interest rate of 2%. The parameters for monetary policy follow common values
used in the literature, so we set the response of the interest rate to inflation to φpi = 1.5, according to
the Taylor principle, and the interest rate smoothing parameter to ρi = 0.8. We estimate the sensitivity
of the transaction cost, or of the government bond spread, δt to deviations of government debt-to-GDP
from steady state and find that for every ten percentage points increase in government debt-to-GDP the
government bond spread increases by 0.7 percentage points4, according to which we set δB = 0.07. Table
3.1 collects all calibrated parameters and steady state stances.
In the calibration, we set η > 1σ so that CH and CF are substitutes and hence the substitution
effect of a price change dominates the income effect. In the opposite case
(
η < 1σ
)
CH and CF are
complements and the income effect of a price change dominates the substitution effect. This implies
that fiscal policy and spillovers from one country to the other have very different effects based on the
two calibrations. In our analysis we focus on the case in which CH and CF are substitutes because we
believe it is more realistic, especially for advanced economies, and more in line with the recent literature
(See Ferrero (2009) and Blanchard, Erceg and Linde´ (2015) for instance), although it is quite different
from the assumption in Hjortsø (2012).
The calibration of the two countries mainly differs in the fiscal policy parameters. In particular, the
government consumption-to-GDP ratios have been set respectively to 18.7% for country H and 21.9%
for country F , according to the average of the last 9 years (source ECB-SDW). The marginal tax rates
on labour income have been set respectively to 40.61% for country H and 27.94% for country F in
accordance to the average in the last 9 years of the labour income tax wedges, excluding social security
contributions made by the employer, for the median individual, as reported in OECD (2015). The
marginal tax rate on firm sales has been set to 19.5% for country F according to the average in the last
9 years of the VAT for France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands as reported in Eurostat, European-
Commission et al. (2015), while it has been calibrated for country H to match the average ratio of net
exports-to-GDP of 1.73% observed over the past 9 years for Germany5. Although the observed VAT
rate for Germany is 19%, we set its marginal tax rate on firm sales to 2.5%, as if there was a production
incentive, to correct for the fact that country H should have a greater productivity compared to country
F , as Germany has a greater productivity than the periphery countries. This calibration implies a steady
state tax revenue-to-GDP ratio of respectively 38.49% for country H and 39.92% for country F , clearly
in line with the data observed over the past decades for Germany (38.72%) and for France, Italy, Spain
3The calibration is done on the steady state values described in Appendix B.6.
4This result is in line with Hjortsø (2012), which finds a similar sensitivity to be 0.5 instead of 0.7.
5The average current account to GDP ratio observed over the past 9 years for Germany is roughly 6.36%. However, we
adjust the data for the overall trade weight with France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands (26%).
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters and Steady State Stances.
Parameters Description Country H Country F
h Relative size of domestic economy 0.4 0.6
β Discount factor 0.995 0.995
ε Elasticity of substitution of domestic goods 11 11
ε
ε−1 Gross Price Mark-Up 1.1 1.1
η Elasticity of substitution foreign and domestic goods 4.5 4.5
σ Inverse Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 3 3
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of labour supply 0.5 0.5
θ Degree of price rigidity 3/4 4/5
δB Sensitivity of bond spread to debt-to-GDP deviations 0.07 0.07
γ Desired reduction of excess government debt-to-GDP 0 0.05
α Openness of domestic economy 0.52 0.361
α
h Relative openness of domestic economy 1.3 0.6017
1−α
h Home bias 1.2 1.065
ψy Responsiveness of fiscal policy to output gap 0.045 0.001
ψnx Responsiveness of fiscal policy to net exports gap 0.0697 0.0092
φpi Responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation 1.5 1.5
ρi Interest Rate smoothing parameter 0.8 0.8
ρξ Persistence of preference shock 0.94 0.8
ρa Persistence of technology shock 0.58 0.70
ρδ Persistence of spread shock 0.95 0.95
σξ Standard deviation preference shock 0.0024 0.0086
σa Standard deviation technology shock 0.0087 0.0033
σδ Standard deviation spread shock 0.14 0.14
corrξ Correlation preference shock 0.625 0.625
corra Correlation technology shock 0.418 0.418
Steady State Ratios Description Country H Country F
(1 + i)4 − 1 Annualized Interest Rate 2% 2%
τw Tax Rate on wage income 40.6% 27.9%
τs Tax Rate on firm sales 2.5% 19.5%
τwMC + τs Tax Revenues-to-GDP 38.49% 39.92%
G
Y Government consumption-to-GDP 18.7% 21.9%
T˜
Y Real Transfers-to-GDP 18.58% 16.81%
N˜X
Y Net Exports-to-GDP 1.72% -1.14%
C
Y Consumption-to-GDP 79.58% 79.24%
α∗C
∗
Y Exports-to-GDP 43.1% 27.47%
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and The Netherlands (39.15%). Finally, the annualized steady state value of government debt-to-GDP
in both countries is set to roughly 60% as stated in the Maastricht Treaty. In the simulations, country
F starts with a higher level of government debt-to-GDP, equal to roughly 90%, in line with the average
level of government debt-to-GDP for France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands. The desired fraction
of reduction of excess government debt is set to γ = 0.05 for country F , corresponding to a 5% yearly
reduction of excess government debt6, to comply with the Debt Brake Rule in the Fiscal Compact, and
0 for country H, as only country F needs to deleverage in our simulations. The calibration of the fiscal
policy parameters, ψy and ψnx, follows the estimations done in our previous work, Cole, Guerello and
Traficante (2016).
Since the two countries’ fiscal policy ratios have been calibrated according to the data, the transfers-
to-GDP ratios have been set such that the government deficit is zero in steady state:
T˜
Y
= (τs + τwMC)− G
Y
−
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜G
Y
(3.163)
T˜ ∗
Y ∗
= (τ∗s + τ∗wMC∗)− G
∗
Y ∗
−
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜∗G (3.164)
Henceforth, the overall calibration of the fiscal sector implies a steady state ratio of transfers-to-GDP
of respectively 18.58% for country H and 16.81% for country F , and a steady state ratio of current
expenditure-to-GDP of respectively 37.28% for country H and 38.71% for country F . This calibration is
broadly in line with the observed data over the last 10 years for the subsidies-to-GDP ratio (26.85% for
Germany and 24.69% for the other countries) and the current expenditure (less interest)-to-GDP ratio
(35.54% for Germany and 36.85% for the other countries).
The parameters of openness have been set to match an export-to-GDP ratio
(
α∗C∗
Y
)
of roughly
43% for country H7 taken from the aggregate demand equation, while for country F the parameter of
openness is recovered by equating per-capita consumption across countries, which yields the following
equation8:
α∗ =
h
1− h
α+
(
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
)(
(1−τw)(1−τs)
(1−τ∗w)(1−τ∗s)
) 1
ϕ − 1
1 + h1−h
(
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
)(
(1−τw)(1−τs)
(1−τ∗w)(1−τ∗s)
) 1
ϕ
 (3.165)
Consequently, home biases are given by 1−αh = 1.2 and
1−α∗
1−h = 1.065. Since both home biases are larger
than one it means that the share of consumption of domestic goods is higher than the share of production
of domestic goods. This generates a gap between the relative production price indices and the relative
consumption price indices based on the different composition of the households’ consumption basket in
the two countries. Hence, the dynamics of the real exchange rate follow the dynamics of the terms of
trade in a non-linear way. As Figure 3.1 shows, the real exchange rate increases as the terms of trade
increase if the degree of openness of country H is less than the size of country F (1− h = 0.6), which is
the case for our calibration (α = 0.52), while the real exchange rate decreases when the terms of trade
increase if the degree of openness of country H is more than the size of country F (h = 0.4). These
two conditions imply respectively, given Equation 3.165, that the degree of openness of country F is less
than the size of country H (h = 0.4) for the real exchange rate to increase as the terms of trade increase,
and that the degree of openness of country F is more than the size of country H (h = 0.4) for the real
exchange rate to decrease as the terms of trade increase.
Regarding the dynamic parametrization of the shocks, both technology and preference shocks are
6This corresponds to a similar reduction in government debt-to-steady state GDP.
7The value recovered from the data as the average of the last 9 years is 43.5%.
8Appendix B.7 shows the derivation.
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Figure 3.1: Elasticity of the Real Exchange Rate to the Terms of Trade as a function of Trade Openness
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assumed to follow a V AR(1) process that generally allows for both direct spillovers and second order
correlation of the innovations. However, the structure has been restricted for all shocks to exclude direct
spillovers.
With the exception of the preference shocks, whose dynamics have been calibrated following Kollmann
et al. (2014), the parameters characterizing the dynamics of the technology shocks have been estimated.
For the estimation we have employed the time series for Germany, France, Italy and Spain of labour
productivity per hours worked for the technology shocks. All the series are chain-linked volumes re-based
respectively in 2010, seasonally adjusted and filtered by means of a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The sample
considered spans at quarterly frequency from 2002 Q1 to 2015 Q3. Finally, despite a large debate on the
high correlation between preference shocks in the Eurozone, there is no proper reference in the literature
for its calibration. We decide to set this parameter according to the observed business cycle correlation
(which is roughly 0.5) and we pick the value that maximizes the simulated correlation between output
in the two countries (which is roughly 0.42)9. The transaction cost δt responds to the debt-to-GDP
ratio in deviation from Maastricht treaty’s objective of 60%. It is assumed to follow an autoregressive
AR(1) process. The parameters defining the AR(1) process and the response to the debt-to-GDP ratio
are calibrated looking at the data for the spread between the long run interest rates on government
bonds10 for France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands and the same yield for Germany. These series
9The simulated values of the correlation of business cycles in our model, given our calibration, are always lower than
the observed correlation. Therefore, we decide to select the correlation of preference shocks that maximizes the correlation
of business cycles.
10The data is collected by Eurostat and reported in the ECB statistical data warehouse. It is harmonized to assess the
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are combined with data on the government debt-to-GDP ratio (as a difference from Maastricht treaty’s
objective) using a panel VAR technique and taking the estimated parameters in the bond spread equation
and the estimated variance of the residuals. In order to account for the effects of the european sovereign
debt crisis, the data on the spread has been demeaned and country fixed effects have been introduced
in the model to account for the initial conditions (i.e. few countries show historically high levels of
government debt).
3.4 Numerical Simulations
We simulate the model numerically using Dynare11, which takes a first-order approximation of the model
around its symmetric non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and constant government debt12.
We compare the Impulse Response Functions of the main variables to negative shocks of one standard
deviation of different nature under deleveraging by country F from 90% government debt-to-GDP to its
steady state value of 60% government debt-to-GDP, under a range of fiscal policy specifications, to study
the stabilization properties of different fiscal policy instruments for deleveraging, different fiscal policy
coordination strategies, and different deleveraging schemes, and to study the international transmission
of shocks with incomplete financial markets.
3.4.1 The role of Incomplete Markets
In our previous work, Cole, Guerello and Traficante (2016), we studied different fiscal policy instruments
for stabilization purposes and different degrees of fiscal policy coordination in a model with complete
markets. We found that coordinating fiscal policy by targeting net exports, rather than output, produces
more stable dynamics, and that consolidating government budget constraints across countries and moving
tax rates jointly provides greater stabilization. This means that a Full Fiscal Union scenario with complete
financial markets produces more stabilization than a Coordinated Currency Union one, which in turn is
more stable than a Pure Currency Union scenario.
Now we turn to incomplete financial markets, as described in the present model, to see if the same
results we found with complete financial markets still hold.
Looking at Figure 3.2 we can see that with incomplete markets in a Pure Currency Union, since house-
holds cannot fully insure themselves against country-specific shocks, consumption in the two countries
follows two very different paths. This is the main difference with complete markets, where consump-
tion in both countries follows a similar path, because there is perfect international risk-sharing. This
difference in consumption is mainly given by the deviation of government debt in country F and by the
consequent interest rate spread, shown by the government bond spread. The assumption of incomplete
markets gives rise to two different interest rates for the households in the two countries, which in turn
gives rise to the differences in consumption and asset allocation in the two countries, because of the
deviation of government debt in country F from its steady state. This deviation occurs only because
government debt is kept constant in nominal terms, which implies movements of real government debt
given by inflation fluctuations.
After a negative technology shock in country H, the increase in marginal costs for firms brings output
down and prices up on impact, bringing down consumption in country H and the terms of trade. As the
shock fades away over time, consumption in both countries, the interest rate and the government bond
convergence of the Member Countries. The sample spans between 2002 and 2015 and features quarterly frequency.
11All the equilibrium conditions of the model used for the simulations are shown in Appendix B.5.
12All simulations are given by first-order approximations of the equilibrium conditions, except for Section 3.4.2, where
the simulations are given by second-order approximations of the equilibrium conditions.
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Figure 3.2: Instruments in Incomplete Markets - Pure Currency Union - Technology Shock in Country
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spread go back to their steady state, while the increase in the terms of trade makes net exports increase,
which creates the gap in the GDPs of the two countries that we can see in the graph, whose persistence
depends on that of the terms of trade and net exports.
Figure 3.2 shows that using government consumption rather than government transfers to target
the output gap makes little difference, but it is more stabilizing than having exogenous government
consumption, at least for household consumption, meaning that in the presence of a technology shock
in country H in the Pure Currency Union scenario there is always a gain for household consumption in
stabilizing the economy, whichever instrument we use. This can be seen because consumption follows a
much more stable path in both countries when using a targeting rule for fiscal policy, although output
is less stabilized. This is because the opposite movements in the tax rates bring consumption in both
countries back to steady state faster. These results hold qualitatively also in the presence of a preference
shock in country F or in the presence of a shock to the bond spread in country F , in all scenarios,
although it less evident in the Full Fiscal Union scenario13.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the comparison between different degrees of fiscal policy coordination with
incomplete financial markets, where government debt is stabilized using taxes, after a negative technology
shock in country H and after a positive shock to the government bond spread in country F , respectively.
13The other simulations are available upon request.
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Figure 3.3: Coordination in Incomplete Markets with Taxes - Technology Shock in Country H
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The simulations after a negative preference shock in country F give opposite dynamics compared to a
negative technology shock in country H, although the ranking of the scenarios by degree of stabilization
is more or less the same. Looking at the figures we can see how in both cases most variables, especially
consumption and GDP, are more stabilized in the Pure Currency Union scenario compared to the other
scenarios. GDP is more volatile in the Coordinated Currency Union scenario after a technology shock
in country H, showing that with incomplete markets targeting output rather than net exports stabilizes
more output and net exports, the opposite result compared to the one obtained with complete financial
markets. However, consumption is more volatile in the Full Fiscal Union scenario compared to the other
two scenarios, because moving the tax rates jointly in the two countries amplifies the effects of shocks,
due to the fact that with incomplete markets consumption in the two countries follows different paths,
and would probably need opposite movements of the tax rates in the two countries to produce more
stabilization. Additionally in the Full Fiscal Union scenario the loss in stabilization given by targeting
net exports rather than output is counteracted by the gain in stabilization given by the consolidation of
budget constraints. This can be seen in Figure 3.3, because most variables are more stabilized in the
Full Fiscal Union scenario compared to the Coordinated Currency Union scenario.
After a shock to the government bond spread in country F the dynamics are a little different, which
brings to a slightly different ranking in the stabilization properties of different degrees of coordination. In
Figure 3.4 we can see that after a shock to the bond spread in country F the Full Fiscal Union scenario
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Figure 3.4: Coordination in Incomplete Markets with Taxes - Shock to Bond Spread in Country F
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follows dynamics which are much more similar to the Coordinated Currency Union scenario, compared to
after a technology shock in country H, although in most cases the Full Fiscal Union scenario is worst in
terms of stabilization. This is because consolidating budget constraints always reduces inflation and the
terms of trade which, after a shock to the bond spread in country F , amplifies the negative movements
of the interest rate and terms of trade.
After analyzing the stabilization properties of different fiscal instruments for debt stabilization and
of different degrees of fiscal policy coordination in a setting with incomplete financial markets, we find
that stabilizing output after a shock using government consumption or transfers produces more stabi-
lization than without using a targeting rule, while stabilizing net exports rather than output actually
amplifies most dynamics. Also, although consolidating budget constraints might provide more stabiliza-
tion, moving tax rates jointly does not, which implies that the Full Fiscal Union scenario might be more
stabilizing than the Coordinated Currency Union scenario, but is surely not more stabilizing than the
Pure Currency union scenario. These results are opposite to those obtained under complete financial
markets, showing the important role of the assumption of incomplete financial markets in our present
model.
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Figure 3.5: Paths for γt with different Deleveraging Schemes
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3.4.2 Deleveraging Schemes
Country F features an initial level of government debt-to-GDP of about 90%, which is quite higher than
its steady state level of 60%. The deleveraging scheme implies that country F has to gradually reduce
its government debt over time by using a fiscal instrument, either government transfers or taxes. In the
baseline calibration, country F has to reduce its government debt by 5% of the excess each quarter until
it goes back to steady state, as stated in the Maastricht Treaty. However, to fully understand the effects
of a deleveraging scheme in an economy, it is interesting to analyze how a different speed of deleveraging
affects the transmission of the shock on government debt, which brings its level from a steady state value
of 60% to 90% before deleveraging. Specifically, we assume the coefficient governing the deleveraging
rule, γt, to be time-varying and its process to be determined by the following alternative paths:
• Frontloading: the amount and consequent cost of deleveraging is higher initially and decreases over
time as the level of excess government debt goes down. This is achieved through a path for γt that
starts from a level of roughly 13% and is reduced to 0.1% in 10 years (40 quarters). However, for
this path to be comparable with the baseline case, it is designed such that the average reduction
of excess government debt is 5%, as in the baseline calibration.
• Backloading: the amount and consequent cost of deleveraging is more evenly distributed over time,
as the percentage of desired reduction of excess government debt increases over time, while the
excess government debt decreases. The features of this path are symmetric to the one assumed for
the frontloading case. Specifically, γt starts from a level of roughly 1% and increases to 10% in 10
years (40 quarters), while the average value for γt is roughly 5%.
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Figure 3.6: Deleveraging Schemes - Government Transfers - Pure Currency Union
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The three paths for γt are shown in Figure 3.5. We can notice that the frontloading case implies a higher
cost of deleveraging than the baseline case in the first 4 years and the backloading case implies a lower
speed of convergence for roughly 5 years.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 compare different deleveraging schemes in respectively the Pure Currency Union
and the Full Fiscal Union scenarios, where transfers are used to deleverage the government debt of
country F . The positive shock to the government debt of country F at time zero implies that from the
first quarter onwards government transfers are not kept constant any longer, but they adjust to reduce
the government debt by the desired amount. Therefore, the cost of deleveraging affects negatively the
economy through a wealth effect on households’ consumption, in country F in the Pure Currency Union
scenario and in both countries in the Full Fiscal Union scenario.
Looking at Figure 3.6, we can observe that the government transfers strongly decrease by roughly 40%
on impact and persist below their steady state for a very long period, due to the deleveraging. The first
and main effect is that also consumption in country F strongly decreases and, even if the negative wealth
effect of a reduction in government transfers is smoothed by international adjustments, consumption
stays below the steady state for at least 5 years. Notice that the wealth effect on consumption is
strongly amplified by the response of the bond spread to a higher debt-to-GDP. As we observe, the
transaction cost δt slowly increases over time for roughly 10 quarters because, although the government
debt constantly decreases, the effect of the initial positive shock on government debt persists because of
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Figure 3.7: Deleveraging Schemes - Government Transfers - Full Fiscal Union
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the high persistence of the bond spread process. Therefore, the interest rate for country F , approximately
i∗t ≈ it + δt, increases, although the central bank decreases the interest rate for country H, it, to
contrast deflationary pressures. The higher interest rate in country F brings households in the country
to postpone consumption, while the lower interest rate in country H brings households to increase current
consumption.
Comparing the different deleveraging schemes, we can notice that as long as the government bond
spread increases, the effect of the interest rate on consumption, driven by the increase in the bond
spread, dominates the wealth effect that follows from the decrease in government transfers. In the first
12 quarters the difference in the speed of deleveraging can hardly be seen. However, after roughly 3
years the government bond spread decreases, converging back to its steady state value, following the
decrease of government debt in country F . Therefore, most of the variables converge back to steady
state, mainly driven by the reduction in excess government debt, although with different persistence
given by the different deleveraging schemes. Indeed, a real government debt higher than steady state
implies a deflationary pressure on the economy that is reduced as the excess government debt goes
down. It is possible to observe this phenomenon in Figure 3.6 looking at the path of the interest rate, as
well as household consumption in country H and GDP in both countries, while household consumption
in country F and the bond spread converge back to steady state. Specifically, we can see that with
the backloading scheme, due to a higher implied deleveraging rate after 5 years, when the interest rate
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effect and the wealth effect on household consumption in country F vanish, deflationary pressures reduce
faster, implying more stabilization in the economy. Symmetrically, as the speed of deleveraging in the
frontloading scheme slows down compared to both the linear and the backloading schemes after 4 years,
the strong persistence of the excess government debt observed after 20 quarters at values far above the
steady state (20% higher) implies that inflation in country F , the interest rate in country H and, hence,
household consumption in country H persist at values far from the steady state as well.
Looking at Figure 3.7, it is possible to distinguish the role played by distortionary taxes in the Full
Fiscal Union scenario in increasing the persistence of the debt shocks. Specifically, in this scenario the
cost of deleveraging is shared between the two countries’ government transfers. However, since the tax
rates are assumed to move jointly between the two countries, the tax rates in country H decrease rather
than increase, as in the Pure Currency Union scenario, following the path of the tax rates in country
F . Therefore, to keep government debt constant in country H, while decreasing taxes and GDP, it is
necessary to decrease transfers in both countries even more. This implies higher persistence for most
variables in the economy, especially for consumption in country H, because in this country distortionary
taxes move in the opposite direction with respect to the Pure Currency Union scenario. For instance,
consumption in country H in the Full Fiscal Union scenario, as in Figure 3.7, persists at values above
the steady state for more than 10 years, while in the Pure Currency Union scenario, as in Figure 3.6,
it converges back to steady state in the same period of time. Although the higher persistence in the
economy makes both the movements in the interest rates and in the deleveraging instruments relevant
even at longer horizons, the differences in the speed of convergence are enhanced in the Full Fiscal Union
scenario because the inflation channel, which is the main driver of these differences, is amplified in country
H by the effect of lower taxes on consumption. In Figure 3.7 it is mainly possible to notice the much
slower convergence of the variables with the frontloading scheme because in this case the deflationary
pressure persists in the medium-to-long run.
In summary, this analysis shows two main results. First, that the speed of convergence matters only
in the medium-to-long run, after household consumption in country F has gone back to steady state.
Therefore the backloading scheme is more stabilizing than both the linear and frontloading schemes in
all scenarios. Second, it is clear that the Full Fiscal Union scenario is less stabilizing than the Pure
Currency Union scenario because of the opposite movements in the tax rates of country H.
3.4.3 Instruments for Deleveraging
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the comparison between different fiscal instruments for deleveraging after a
negative technology shock in country H in the Pure Currency Union and in the Full Fiscal Union scenario,
respectively. First, the effects of the technology shock, or any other shock, are marginal compared to
the much stronger deleveraging shock, as can be seen looking at government consumption and transfers
for country F . In fact, in Figure 3.8 we only see the dynamics of the fiscal policy instrument in country
F when it is used to deleverage government debt, but not when it is used to stabilize the output gap,
because the former has a much greater order of magnitude compared to the latter. Moreover we can
see the huge volatility of GDP, which is given by the strong deflationary pressure produced by the
deleveraging shock, bringing all variables to fluctuate much more than we saw in the simulations without
deleveraging. Therefore, it is quite indifferent to analyze the response of the economy to one shock or
another while deleveraging, as the deleveraging shock itself produces most of the dynamics that can be
seen in the model. For this reason we show most simulations after a technology shock in country H,
which is one of the most commonly used shocks to analyze business cycles, as most results hold also after
other shocks when deleveraging.
Looking at Figures 3.8 and 3.9 we can see that, as explained in the previous section, the shock to the
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Figure 3.8: Instruments for Deleveraging - Pure Currency Union - Technology Shock in Country H
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government debt at time zero, which brings it to 90% of GDP before deleveraging, creates deflationary
pressures in country F . This can be seen by the movements of the interest rate, which tracks average
CPI inflation in the Currency Union, and by the movements of the terms of trade, which show that
prices decrease more in country F than in country H. The path of net exports is given by movements
in the terms of trade, and in turn affects both output in countries H and F . The level of government
debt affects the path of the government bond spread, which in turn affects consumption in country F .
Looking at Figure 3.8 we can see that there are no great differences in the stabilization properties of
different fiscal instruments for deleveraging, although using distortionary taxes to deleverage government
debt produces more stable dynamics for most variables, except for consumption in country F and the
government bond spread. Compared to using government consumption, government transfers produce
more stabilization for all variables, mainly because they affect prices less. At the same time distortionary
taxes affect the dynamics of the economy more than other fiscal instruments, but depending on the
direction of their movement and consequent effect on consumption, they can reduce the deflationary
pressure much more than other fiscal instruments for deleveraging, bringing in the end to a gain in
stabilization. Figure 3.8 shows that most variables follow qualitatively very similar paths, except for the
fiscal policy instruments and household consumption in country F . The fiscal policy instruments behave
differently by construction. Taxes move much more when government transfers are used to deleverage,
because they need to counteract the effect of the smaller increase in GDP on the government budget
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Figure 3.9: Instruments for Deleveraging - Full Fiscal Union - Technology Shock in Country H
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constraint. Instead, when deleveraging with taxes, the stronger decrease in consumption in country F
makes output in country F increase less, so that taxes don’t need to decrease as much to balance the
effect of the smaller increase in GDP in country F on the government budget constraint. Taxes also
decrease less because they need to finance the deleveraging directly, compared to when the deleveraging
is financed by government transfers.
Figure 3.9 shows the same deleveraging dynamics, but in the Full Fiscal Union scenario. The first
thing that can be noticed is that there is much more divergence in the paths given by the different
instruments for deleveraging, compared to the Pure Currency Union scenario. This is mainly because the
tax rates and the fiscal instruments for deleveraging move jointly across countries, which amplifies most
dynamics in an incomplete market setting, while the dynamics for different fiscal instruments are more
similar to one another in the Pure Currency Union scenario, where taxes move in opposite directions in
the two countries. This affects also the persistence of most variables, which take longer to return to their
steady state in the Full Fiscal Union scenario, compared to the Pure Currency Union one. Nonetheless,
the ranking by stabilization property of the fiscal instruments for deleveraging does not change in the
Full Fiscal Union scenario. As in the Pure Currency Union scenario, distortionary taxes provide more
stabilization than other fiscal instruments for most variables, except for consumption in country F and
GDP in country H in this case. In general, in the Full Fiscal Union scenario there is more deflationary
pressure on the economy with respect to the Pure Currency Union scenario, because in this case country
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Figure 3.10: Coordination of Deleveraging - Government Transfers - Technology Shock in Country H
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H bares much more of the deflationary pressure and consequent cost of deleveraging, following the
consolidation of budget constraints and the joint movement in the tax rates and in the deleveraging
instruments. This is why in the Full Fiscal Union scenario GDP in country H is not stabilized as well by
deleveraging with taxes. Once again, as in the Pure Currency Union scenario, using government transfers
for deleveraging provides more stabilization than using government consumption for all variables, for the
same reasons explained above. In fact government transfers create the least distortion in the economy,
which is the reason that makes them such a good instrument. However, distortionary taxes may be
able to reduce the distortions in the economy if they move in the right direction, by counteracting the
distortions created by other means. This is why they are a very good instrument, although more difficult
to use. In the end taxes are the deleveraging instrument which stabilizes more the economy in any
scenario.
3.4.4 Coordination of Deleveraging
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 compare the three different degrees of fiscal policy coordination, or the three
different scenarios, while using government transfers or taxes, respectively, to deleverage the government
debt of country F . We can see in both cases how there is practically no difference in the dynamics of
all variables between the Pure Currency Union scenario and the Coordinated Currency Union one. In
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Figure 3.11: Coordination of Deleveraging - Taxes - Technology Shock in Country H
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fact the only difference is in the movements of government consumption which targets the output gap
in the Pure Currency Union scenario and the net exports gap in the Coordinated Currency Union one.
This tells us that stabilizing one variable or the other is irrelevant for the dynamics of all other variables.
This is because the technology shock and consequent fiscal policy response is of a much smaller order
of magnitude compared to the shock created by the high government debt and consequent deleveraging.
Therefore the difference in the dynamics of all variables can be seen in the Full Fiscal Union scenario,
where all variables evolve in a quite different way compared to the other scenarios. This effect is given by
the consolidation of budget constraints, which makes country H bear part of the deleveraging cost, and
the joint movements in the tax rates which, as we saw before, generally amplify the movements of most
variables. In fact we can see that the Full Fiscal Union scenario provides a greater amplification of the
deleveraging shock than the other scenarios, as we can see by looking at the increased volatility of most
variables. This is mainly due to the fact the financial markets are incomplete, which makes the joint
movements of the tax rates exacerbate the deleveraging shock rather than smooth it, like taxes smooth
shocks in the complete financial market setting of Cole, Guerello and Traficante (2016). Therefore, as in
the simulations in incomplete markets without deleveraging, the Full Fiscal Union scenario is the worst
in terms of stabilization of the deleveraging shock in incomplete markets.
Looking at Figure 3.10 we can see the different stabilization properties of the Full Fiscal Union
scenario compared to the other two scenarios, which yield approximately the same dynamics. It is clear
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that the Full Fiscal Union scenario amplifies more than the other scenarios the deleveraging shock. It
is also the scenario that yields the greatest persistence of most variables away from their steady state.
The fact that both countries share the cost of deleveraging creates some perverse effects in incomplete
markets, mainly given by the opposite movement in the tax rates in country H because of the shared
cost of fiscal policy. This creates a higher deflationary pressure, which can be seen by the more amplified
movements in the interest rate, and brings real government debt to decrease at a slower rate, giving more
persistence to the government bond spread. The lower taxes, lower interest rate and lower government
bond spread push consumption higher in both countries, amplifying the movements and persistence of
consumption in country H, but actually stabilizing more consumption in country F . In the Full Fiscal
Union scenario, since real transfers and taxes in country H move jointly with real transfers and taxes
in country F , the lower taxes in country H make consumption increase more and government debt
decrease less, because of the effect of deflation, and thus GDP decreases less in country H. The higher
GDP in both countries pushes taxes to decrease more to satisfy the budget constraint, while the greater
deflation gives more persistence to government debt and increases the cost of deleveraging borne by
real transfers in both country. This perverse effect makes it very costly and destabilizing to consolidate
budget constraints, especially by imposing a joint movement of the fiscal policy instruments.
Looking at Figure 3.11, most of the reasoning done when using real transfers to deleverage still holds
when using taxes. In this case taxes finance all expenditure and deleveraging and actually move much
less in the Full Fiscal Union scenario compared to the other scenarios. In reality both taxes decrease
rather than increase because the effect of the increase in GDP in country F on the consolidated budget
constraint is greater than the sum of the cost of deleveraging and of the effect of the decrease in GDP in
country H on the consolidated budget constraint. This shows how the main drivers of the dynamics are
given by the variations in GDP in both countries, which are mainly given by the deflationary effect of
the deleveraging shock on net exports through the terms of trade. Unfortunately this effect is amplified
in the Full Fiscal union scenario, because taxes and thus prices decrease instead of increasing in country
H creating more deflation and bringing net exports lower, pushing GDP in country F to persist longer
away from its steady state. When using taxes to deleverage in the Full Fiscal Union scenario the only
stabilization is on the fiscal instruments, while all other variables are more volatile and persistent. This
brings us to think that it is not convenient to consolidate budget constraints across countries with this
kind of fiscal policy coordination. This is true with incomplete markets and even more when deleveraging
government debt. On the other hand some different form of fiscal policy coordination might provide more
stabilization, along with the same consolidation of budget constraints.
3.4.5 Net Shocks from Deleveraging
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the dynamic simulations after a negative technology shock in country H in the
Pure Currency Union and Full Fiscal Union scenarios, respectively, when country F is forced to reduce
its government debt. The huge government debt deleveraging process that the fiscal authority is forced
to follow makes the effects of other shocks marginal on the economy. For this reason, in this Section we
try to isolate the effects of a productivity shock from those of the huge deleveraging shock hitting the
economy.
In Figures 3.12 and 3.13 we show the impulse response functions to a negative technology shock in
country H when neither country H nor country F are deleveraging (PCU and FFU without deleverag-
ing) and in the case of deleveraging (PCU and FFU with deleveraging). In the latter case, the impulse
responses are presented in deviation from the path implied by the government debt reduction, by sub-
tracting the effect of the pure deleveraging shock. This way we try to disentangle the effect of the
deleveraging shock from the constraint it imposes on fiscal policy stabilization, while leaving the effects
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Figure 3.12: Net Shock with Government Transfers - Technology Shock in Country H
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of the technology shock for all cases14. After a negative productivity shock in country H, the terms of
trade deteriorate, reducing net exports and output in country H on impact. Because of the assumption
of incomplete markets, household consumption in the two countries is not synchronized and moves in
different directions, decreasing in country H and increasing in country F .
Figure 3.12 analyzes the case in which the government in country F uses transfers to deleverage.
The graph confirms that the Pure Currency Union scenario stabilizes most variables of the economy
more than the Full Fiscal Union one, as documented in the previous Section. In particular, consumption
and output are less volatile, while CPI inflation increases more on impact, as can be inferred from the
dynamic response of the nominal interest rate. In the Pure Currency Union scenario, by subtracting
the effect of the deleveraging shock, we obtain dynamics which are quantitatively close to those without
deleveraging, while in the Full Fiscal Union scenario the distance between the two dynamics is still
quantitatively big. When the government in country F has to deleverage in the Full Fiscal Union
scenario, government transfers and taxes move jointly in both countries, reducing the volatility of real
foreign government debt. As a consequence all variables are more stabilized in the Full Fiscal Union
scenario with deleveraging compared to other scenarios, except for household consumption in country H.
On the other hand, when both budgets are balanced in the Pure Currency Union scenario, consumption
14A similar procedure is followed by Bodenstein, Guerrieri and Gust (2013) which presents impulse responses in deviation
from the path implied by a severe recession.
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Figure 3.13: Net Shock with Taxes - Technology Shock in Country H
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paths are more persistently distant from their steady state levels reflecting the fact that markets are
incomplete and country-specific fiscal instruments dampen the effects of the shock. In both scenarios
(PCU and FFU) the overall volatility and persistence is lower under deleveraging. We interpret this
finding in this way: when a productivity shock hits the economy, no matter if it originates in the other
country, and one country is in a relevant deleveraging process, the shock contributes less in driving the
dynamic response of the economy.
Figure 3.13 presents the same analysis when taxes are the instrument used to deleverage government
debt. The dynamics do not vary significantly with respect to the case in which transfers are used.
However, the volatility of the economy turns out to be higher than in the case in which government
transfers are used to deleverage. As an example, the average volatility of foreign consumption under the
Pure Currency Union scenario is about double when taxation varies to accomplish deleveraging, and it is
even bigger (about 5 times bigger) in the Full Fiscal Union scenario. This phenomenon is amplified in the
Full Fiscal Union scenario, making it worst in terms of stabilization even with deleveraging, compared to
both Pure Currency Union scenarios. This result suggests that characterizing the best fiscal instrument
to stabilize the economy is a difficult task while deleveraging occurs and that the conclusions can be
radically different when we analyze only the effects of a shock. In the end, in the presence of a shock, the
deleveraging process drives most variables back to steady state faster, overcoming partially the volatility
and persistence induced by the shock.
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3.5 Welfare Analysis based on an ad hoc Loss Function
As a further step of the analysis, we compare the stabilization properties of the fiscal policy scenarios
and of the deleveraging instruments by means of an ad hoc Loss Function. Since the main focus of
this work is to evaluate the role of fiscal policy as a stabilizer of the economy, we prefer to rely on a
quadratic loss function rather than look at consumption equivalent variations (CEV). Specifically, fiscal
policy has a stabilizing function for the real economy similar to the role played by monetary policy for
prices and, hence, together they aim to reduce both the inflation gap and the output gap. As argued
in Blanchard, Erceg and Linde´ (2015), since our model and calibration assume a large resource slack
(negative net exports) between the periphery (country F ) and the core (country H), the gains in terms
of consumption and unemployment related to closing the output gap are underestimated by utility-based
measures.
Using a standard quadratic Loss Function, the policymakers are assumed to care only about minimiz-
ing the square of the output gap and of the inflation gap in both regions. Each region’s Loss Function is,
hence, simply the sum of the square of the inflation gap and the square of the output gap, with weights
3 and 1 respectively. The overall Loss Function is given by the weighted average of each region’s Loss
Function:
Loss =
∞∑
j=0
βj
{
h
[
(pˆit+j)
2 +
1
3
(Yˆt+j)
2
]
+ (1− h)
[
(pˆi∗t+j)
2 +
1
3
(Yˆ ∗t+j)
2
]}
(3.166)
The welfare costs for each scenario are computed as the difference in the conditional mean of the
second order approximation of the Loss Function around the non-stochastic steady state with respect to
the scenario with the lowest loss.
Table 3.2: Welfare Costs: Comparison of Fiscal Scenarios
Welfare Costs based on ad hoc loss function
Debt stabilization with taxes without deleveraging
Country H Country F Average
PCU∗ 0% 0% 0%
CCU 230% 227% 228%
FFU 155% 157% 156%
Welfare Costs are computed as
Lossa−Lossb
Lossb
, with b the scenario featuring
the lowest loss for the selected fiscal instrument (indicated with *)
At first we compare the stabilizing properties of the the different fiscal policy scenarios in a model
with incomplete markets in which nominal government debt in both countries is kept constant by using
distortionary taxes. The welfare losses with this model specification are reported in Table 3.2 for each of
the three fiscal policy scenarios taken into consideration. This allows us to support the results of Section
3.4.1, which compares our incomplete markets setting with a complete markets one. In particular,
looking at Table 3.2, it is clear that stabilizing an international variable, such as net exports, by moving
government consumption strongly reduces the stabilizing power of fiscal policy. This contrasts with the
results in Cole, Guerello and Traficante (2016) because in the case of complete markets we find that
targeting net exports is strongly welfare improving with respect to the case with exogenous fiscal policy,
while targeting the output gap leads to a higher loss in terms of output and price stabilization with
respect to both the case of targeting net exports and of exogenous fiscal policy. The main reason for the
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opposite ranking of the different degrees of fiscal policy coordination observed under incomplete rather
than complete markets relies on the different drivers of consumption in the two models and, hence,
on the ability of fiscal policy to effectively stabilize its target. With complete markets, thanks to full
international risk sharing, household consumption in both countries moves jointly through the adjustment
of net foreign assets, the terms of trade and, hence, net exports. Therefore, stabilizing net exports by
counteracting variations in domestic aggregate demand with government consumption strongly reduces
international spillovers, mainly through the substitution effect of a price change. On the contrary, if
financial markets are incomplete, the response of consumption in the two countries typically diverges
after a shock because consumption in both countries is mainly driven by movements in the interest
rate, while consumption in country F is also driven by the government bond spread. Therefore, the
international variables, such as net exports and the terms of trade, depend mainly on the different price
rigidity in the two countries. In this case, stabilizing net exports reduces international spillovers less
because it does not counteract the substitution effect of a price change, while the movements in the tax
rates, which impact household consumption in both countries, counteract the direct effect of increasing
government consumption on net exports. With incomplete markets consumption follows closely the
interest rate, net exports adjusts to relative price changes and create a gap between consumption and
GDP in the same country, that is reduced by targeting the output gap, through the effect of government
consumption on output and that of taxes on consumption.
Looking at Table 3.2 we observe that the Full Fiscal Union scenario is more stabilizing than the
Coordinated Currency Union one, although the cost of targeting the net exports gap rather than the
output gap is still large. This contrasts with the results under complete markets (See Cole, Guerello
and Traficante (2016)), for which there are marginal differences between reducing international spillovers
by means of targeting net exports, consolidating the budget constraints and both, because symmetric
movements in taxes drive consumption in the same direction for both countries and, hence, reduce the
substitution effect of a price change as well as stabilize net exports. If financial markets are incomplete,
international spillovers are less relevant and movements in taxes reduce the fluctuations in household
consumption in both countries. Although consolidating budget constraints amplifies the fluctuations in
consumption because taxes are more stable, this does not affect the dynamics of output much, while it
reduces price volatility in both countries.
Table 3.3 compares the welfare costs in terms of the Loss Function for the three fiscal policy scenarios
in the case in which country F has a level of debt-to-GDP above the target of 60% and, hence, follows
a linear deleveraging scheme. The results are reported for the three alternative fiscal instruments for
deleveraging and support the findings in Section 3.4.4, that targeting the output gap is slightly welfare
improving with respect to targeting the net exports gap, for all instruments used for deleveraging.
However, the results regarding the Full Fiscal Union scenario do not hold as with complete markets
because, under deleveraging, consolidating budget constraints is much more destabilizing than targeting
net exports. This is mainly due to the fact that the fiscal policy instruments move jointly, which implies
a reduction in the tax rates for both countries under deleveraging with transfers and a reduction only
in the medium-to-long run under deleveraging with taxes. The movement in the opposite direction for
taxes in country H in the Full Fiscal Union scenario, makes household consumption, inflation and output
more persistent and more volatile.
Looking at Table 3.3, it is also possible to notice that the welfare costs from consolidating budget
constraints is extremely amplified if deleveraging is achieved by using government consumption. To
deeply investigate this phenomenon, Table 3.4 reports the welfare costs of using a specific fiscal instrument
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Table 3.3: Welfare Costs: Comparison of Deleveraging Scenarios by Instrument
Welfare Costs based on ad hoc loss function
Deleveraging Instrument: Government Consumption
Country H Country F Average
PCU∗ 0% 0% 0%
CCU -1% 1% 0%
FFU 243% 115% 181%
Deleveraging Instrument: Government Transfers
Country H Country F Average
PCU∗ 0% 0% 0%
CCU 2% 1% 1%
FFU 1% 82% 47%
Deleveraging Instrument: Taxes on Sales and on Wages
Country H Country F Average
PCU∗ 0% 0% 0%
CCU 2% 1% 1%
FFU 21% 31% 26%
Welfare Costs are computed as
Lossa−Lossb
Lossb
, with b the scenario featuring the lowest loss
for the selected fiscal instrument (indicated with *)
for deleveraging in each of the three scenarios for fiscal policy coordination. It is possible to notice that
if the cost of deleveraging, along with the cost of government consumption, is financed by distortionary
taxes, in all three scenarios we achieve the most stabilization. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, if deleveraging
is achieved with a different instrument than taxes, this adds an additional source of fluctuation in the
economy, because the large movements in this fiscal instrument drive large fluctuations in output in both
countries and only marginally affect consumption. Therefore, if the deleveraging is performed by moving
government consumption, it needs to fluctuate largely to achieve its goal and this destabilizes further
output in both countries. In particular, given the direct impact of government consumption on output,
its dynamics are amplified when government consumption is employed for deleveraging and government
transfers target either the output gap or the net exports gap.
From the analysis of Table 3.3 we can see that under deleveraging, to reduce international spillovers,
by targeting net exports, does not make the economy more stable, but marginally increases welfare
costs. This result holds even if using taxes rather than government consumption or government transfers
is welfare improving, as shown in Table 3.4. Consolidating budget constraints, especially by moving
jointly the fiscal instruments, is highly destabilizing with any of the three fiscal instruments because it
increases the persistence of consumption in both countries. Furthermore, these results are amplified if
government consumption or government transfers are used to reduce government debt, because the large
fluctuations of these instruments amplify movements in output.
3.6 Conclusions and Possible Extensions
In this paper we build a Two-Country Open-Economy New-Keynesian DSGE model of a Currency Union
with incomplete financial markets, to study the effects of government debt deleveraging in one country
and the stabilization properties of different fiscal instruments for deleveraging and of different scenarios
for fiscal policy coordination. This allows us to study also the international transmission of shocks and
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Table 3.4: Welfare Costs: Comparison of Deleveraging Instruments by Scenario
Welfare Costs based on ad hoc loss function
Fiscal Scenario: Pure Currency Union
Country H Country F Average
Gov. Cons. 44% 30% 37%
Gov. Tr. 1% 22% 12%
Taxes∗ 0% 0% 0%
Fiscal Scenario: Coordinated Currency Union
Country H Country F Average
Gov. Cons. 41% 30% 35%
Gov. Tr. 2% 23% 12%
Taxes∗ 0% 0% 0%
Fiscal Scenario: Full Fiscal Union
Country H Country F Average
Gov. Cons. 308% 113% 204%
Gov. Tr. -16% 70% 23%
Taxes∗ 0% 0% 0%
Welfare Costs are computed as
Lossa−Lossb
Lossb
, with b the instrument featuring the lowest loss
for the selected fiscal scenario (indicated with *)
their stabilization in a setting with incomplete international financial markets.
In the simulations after a technology shock in incomplete markets without deleveraging, we find
that stabilizing output by using government consumption or transfers produces more stabilization than
without using a targeting rule, while stabilizing net exports actually amplifies most dynamics. Also,
although consolidating budget constraints may provide more stabilization, moving fiscal instruments
jointly does not, which implies that the Full Fiscal Union scenario might be more stabilizing than the
Coordinated Currency Union scenario, but is surely not more stabilizing than the Pure Currency union
scenario. The ranking by stabilization property of these scenarios is reversed compared to that obtained
in a similar model with complete international financial markets, as in Cole, Guerello and Traficante
(2016), which shows how important the assumption of incomplete financial markets is for the dynamics
of the model in this paper.
By studying different deleveraging schemes, we find that the backloading scheme is more stabilizing
than both the linear and frontloading schemes in all scenarios, while the linear deleveraging scheme
produces more stabilization than the frontloading scheme.
The main drivers of the dynamics after a deleveraging shock are given by the variations in GDP in
both countries, which are mainly given by the deflationary effect of the deleveraging shock on net exports
through the terms of trade. This is because variations in GDP affect the tax base, which pushes tax rates
to vary so as to satisfy the budget constraint. This effect is amplified in the Full Fiscal Union scenario,
because taxes and thus prices decrease instead of increase in country H, creating more deflation and
bringing net exports lower, pushing GDP in country F to persist longer away from its steady state. This
brings us to think that it is not convenient to consolidate budget constraints across countries with this
kind of fiscal policy coordination. This is true with incomplete markets and even more when deleveraging
government debt. On the other hand some different form of fiscal policy coordination might provide more
stabilization, along with the same consolidation of budget constraints.
By comparing the dynamics after a technology shock with and without deleveraging, we can disen-
tangle the effect of the limitations imposed on fiscal policy stabilization by the deleveraging shock from
the effect of the deleveraging shock itself. In both the Pure Currency Union scenario and the Full Fiscal
Union one the overall volatility and persistence is lower under deleveraging, compared to no deleverag-
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ing. This is because when a productivity shock hits the economy, no matter if it originates in the other
country, and one country is in a relevant deleveraging process, the shock contributes less in driving the
dynamic response of the economy. This phenomenon is amplified in the Full Fiscal Union scenario, mak-
ing it worst in terms of stabilization even with deleveraging, compared to the two Pure Currency Union
scenarios. This result suggests that characterizing the best fiscal instrument to stabilize the economy
is a difficult task while deleveraging occurs and that the conclusions can be radically different when we
analyze only the effects of a shock. In the end, in the presence of a shock, the deleveraging process drives
most variables back to steady state faster, overcoming partially the volatility and persistence induced by
the shock.
From the analysis of the welfare costs based on an ad hoc Loss Function, by fiscal scenario and
by deleveraging instrument, we can see that by targeting net exports the economy is not more stable,
but welfare costs increase marginally, except when using government consumption to deleverage, which
decreases welfare costs marginally. This result holds even if using taxes to deleverage, rather than gov-
ernment consumption or government transfers, is welfare improving. Consolidating budget constraints
and moving fiscal instruments jointly, instead, is highly destabilizing with any of the three fiscal instru-
ments because it increases the persistence of output and inflation in both countries. Furthermore, these
results are amplified if government consumption or government transfers are used to reduce government
debt, because the large fluctuations of these instruments amplify movements in output. The results given
by the welfare costs in terms of an ad hoc Loss Function confirm the findings from the analysis of the
different simulations.
Our main results are the following. First, with incomplete markets targeting the output gap pro-
duces more stabilization than targeting the net exports gap, while under deleveraging it makes hardly
a difference because the deleveraging shock drives the dynamics much more than other shocks. Sec-
ond, consolidating budget constraints may provide more stabilization, but the joint movement of the
fiscal instruments does not in an incomplete market setting, which is even more true under deleveraging.
These are the two results which are overturned in a setting with complete international financial markets.
Third, taxes are a better instrument for deleveraging compared to government consumption or trans-
fers, because they counteract the deflationary effect of the deleveraging shock much more. Fourth, by
backloading the deleveraging process one can achieve greater stabilization over time, because the fiscal
instruments move less initially, as they need to deleverage less at the beginning and more over time.
Our model and results have nonetheless some shortcomings, which entail possible future avenues
of research. First, our model focuses on a very specific design of fiscal policy, and one can consider
coordination strategies which are different from ours, and which might bring to an increase in stabilization
in the economy. Second, even only allowing the Central Bank to be more aggressive in targeting inflation,
might reduce the deflationary effect induced by the deleveraging shock. Third, considering the Zero Lower
Bound on the nominal interest rate might make a big difference, especially because the deleveraging shock
pushes the interest rate down, possibly bringing the economy into a liquidity trap.
This research was conducted to assess the effects of deleveraging in the Eurozone, as requested by
the European Commission, and the stabilization properties of different instruments for deleveraging and
different scenarios for fiscal policy coordination, to bring to the proper government debt management
in a Currency Union. The policy prescriptions for the Eurozone in this case are that government debt
should be reduced more gradually, to avoid excessive volatility in the economy, and should be reduced by
varying distortionary taxes, while countries should concentrate on reducing their output gap and avoid
creating a fiscal union like the one we describe, until financial markets are integrated completely, allowing
for perfect international risk-sharing, like in our previous complete markets model.
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108 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
As a tool for students and researchers studying models of this kind for the first time, we provide as many
mathematical derivations of the model as possible here in the Appendix. This is meant for learning
purposes, especially concerning complex models with cumbersome mathematical derivations.
A.1 Derivation of the Consumption Index in the case of Unitary
Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign Goods
Here the aim is to compute the limit of the Consumption Index for η → 1:
lim
η→1
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(A.1)
Substituting η = 1 yields an expression of the form 1∞, which is indeterminate. To solve it, the expression
must be transformed in one of the form 00 or
∞
∞ to be able to apply l’Hoˆpital’s rule.
= lim
η→1
e
ln
[
(1−α)
1
η (CH,t)
η−1
η +α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(A.2)
= lim
η→1
e
η
η−1 ln
[
(1−α)
1
η (CH,t)
η−1
η +α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
]
(A.3)
= lim
η→1
e
ln
(1−α) 1η (CH,t) η−1η +α 1η (CF,t) η−1η

η−1
η (A.4)
This is an expression with a fraction of the form 00 for which l’Hoˆpital’s rule can be applied. The rule
says that if
lim
x→c
f(x)
g(x)
=
0
0
=⇒ lim
x→c
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
x→c
f ′(x)
g′(x)
(A.5)
So now, computing the two derivatives yields:
∂ ln
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
]
∂η
= (A.6)
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=
− 1
η2
(1−α)
1
η (CH,t)
η−1
η ln(1−α)+ 1
η2
(1−α)
1
η (CH,t)
η−1
η lnCH,t− 1η2 α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η lnα+ 1
η2
α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η lnCF,t(1−α) 1η (CH,t) η−1η +α 1η (CF,t) η−1η
 (A.7)
=
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η (lnCH,t − ln(1− α)) + α 1η (CF,t)
η−1
η (lnCF,t − lnα)
η2
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] (A.8)
∂
[
η−1
η
]
∂η
=
η − η + 1
η2
=
1
η2
(A.9)
Now the two derivatives can be substituted in expression A.4 to compute the limit.
lim
η→1
e
(1−α)
1
η (CH,t)
η−1
η [lnCH,t−ln(1−α)]+α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η [lnCF,t−lnα]
η2
(1−α) 1η (CH,t) η−1η +α 1η (CF,t) η−1η

1
η2 = (A.10)
= e
(1−α)[lnCH,t−ln(1−α)]+α[lnCF,t−lnα]
[(1−α)+α] = (A.11)
= e
(1−α) ln
(
CH,t
1−α
)
+α ln
(
CF,t
α
)
= (A.12)
= e
ln
(
CH,t
1−α
)1−α
e
ln
(
CF,t
α
)α
= (A.13)
=
(
CH,t
1− α
)1−α(
CF,t
α
)α
(A.14)
A.2 Derivation of the Utility function in the case of Unitary
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Here the aim is to compute the limit of the utility function U(Ct) for σ → 1:
lim
σ→1
C1−σt − 1
1− σ (A.15)
Substituting σ = 1 yields an expression of the form 00 , so l’Hoˆpital’s rule can be applied. The rule says
that if
lim
x→c
f(x)
g(x)
=
0
0
=⇒ lim
x→c
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
x→c
f ′(x)
g′(x)
(A.16)
Applying the rule by taking the ratio of derivatives with respect to σ yields:
lim
σ→1
C1−σt − 1
1− σ = limσ→1
−C1−σt lnCt
−1 = lnCt (A.17)
A.3 Derivation of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is defined as the percent change in consumption growth
divided by the percent change in the gross real interest rate:
∂
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
∂(1+rt)
(1+rt)
≡
∂
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
∂(1 + rt)
(1 + rt)(
Ct+1
Ct
) (A.18)
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Assume consumers maximize present-value utility U ≡∑∞t=0 βtU(Ct, Nt), where U(Ct, Nt) ≡ C1−σt −11−σ −
N1+ϕt
1+ϕ subject to a simple budget constraint of the kind:
Ct +Dt+1 ≤ Dt(1 + rt−1) +WtNt (A.19)
where all variables are in real values and Dt are risk-free assets held at the beginning of period t, Wt is
nominal wage in period t, and Nt is labour supplied in period t. Then the first order conditions, with
respect to Ct, Ct+1, and Dt+1, respectively, are:
βtU ′(Ct) = λt (A.20)
βt+1U ′(Ct+1) = λt+1 (A.21)
λt = λt+1(1 + rt) (A.22)
Then, dividing the first by the second and substituting into the third yields:
U ′(Ct)
βU ′(Ct+1)
= (1 + rt) (A.23)
which is the standard Euler Equation. Computing marginal utilities yields:
C−σt
βC−σt+1
= (1 + rt) (A.24)
Expressing consumption growth as a function of the interest rate, and making the simplifying assumption
β = 1, to isolate the role of the interest rate, yields:(
Ct+1
Ct
)σ
= (1 + rt) =⇒ Ct+1
Ct
= (1 + rt)
1
σ (A.25)
Taking the derivative with respect to (1 + rt) yields:
∂
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
∂(1 + rt)
=
1
σ
(1 + rt)
1
σ−1 (A.26)
Then, substituting the derivative in expression A.18 yields the elasticity of intertemporal substitution:
∂
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
∂(1 + rt)
(1 + rt)(
Ct+1
Ct
) = 1
σ
(1 + rt)
1
σ−1 1 + rt
(1 + rt)
1
σ
=
1
σ
(1 + rt)
−1(1 + rt) =
1
σ
(A.27)
A.4 Derivation of the Frisch Elasticity of labour Supply
The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is defined as the percent change in the supply of labour divided
by the percent change in the nominal wage:
∂Nt
Nt
∂Wt
Wt
≡ ∂Nt
∂Wt
Wt
Nt
(A.28)
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Assume consumers maximize present-value utility U ≡∑∞t=0 βtU(Ct, Nt), where U(Ct, Nt) ≡ C1−σt −11−σ −
N1+ϕt
1+ϕ subject to a simple budget constraint of the kind:
Ct +Dt+1 ≤ Dt(1 + rt−1) +WtNt (A.29)
where all variables are in real values and Dt are risk-free assets held at the beginning of period t, Wt is
nominal wage in period t, and Nt is labour supplied in period t. Then the first order conditions, with
respect to Ct and Nt, respectively, are:
βtU ′(Ct) = λt (A.30)
βtU ′(Nt) = λtWt (A.31)
Then, dividing the second by the first yields:
U ′(Nt)
U ′(Ct)
= Wt (A.32)
Computing marginal utilities and expressing Nt as a function of Wt yields:
−Nϕt
C−σt
= Wt =⇒ Nϕt = −WtC−σt =⇒ Nt = (−WtC−σt )
1
ϕ (A.33)
Taking the derivative with respect to Wt yields:
∂Nt
∂Wt
=
1
ϕ
(−WtC−σt )
1
ϕ−1(−C−σt ) (A.34)
Then, substituting the derivative in expression A.28 yields the Frisch elasticity of labour supply:
∂Nt
∂Wt
Wt
Nt
=
1
ϕ
(−WtC−σt )
1
ϕ−1(−C−σt )
Wt
(−WtC−σt )
1
ϕ
=
1
ϕ
(−WtC−σt )−1(−C−σt Wt) =
1
ϕ
(A.35)
A.5 Derivation of the Optimal Allocation of Consumption Ex-
penditures on Domestic and Foreign Goods by Category of
Goods
The demand functions for the different varieties of goods produced in countries H and F can be de-
rived, both in the same way, by maximizing consumption CH,t (respectively CF,t) for any given level of
expenditure defined by: ∫ h
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j) dj ≡ ZH,t (A.36)
respectively, ∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)CF,t(j) dj ≡ ZF,t (A.37)
for households in country H, and by maximizing consumption C∗H,t (respectively C
∗
F,t) for any given level
of expenditure defined by: ∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j) dj ≡ Z∗H,t (A.38)
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respectively, ∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)C
∗
F,t(j) dj ≡ Z∗F,t (A.39)
for households in country F , where ZH,t and ZF,t are consumption expenditures by households in country
H on Home and Foreign goods, respectively, while Z∗H,t and Z
∗
F,t are consumption expenditures by
households in country F on domestic and foreign goods, respectively.
I derive here the demand functions for households in country H. The demand functions for households
in country F are derived in a specular way.
Maximization can be formalized by means of the Lagrangeans:
LH =
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
− λH
(∫ h
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j) dj − ZH,t
)
(A.40)
LF =
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
CF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
− λF
(∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)CF,t(j) dj − ZF,t
)
(A.41)
The derivatives of the Lagrangeans with respect to CH,t(j) and CF,t(j) yield:
∂LH
∂CH,t(j)
=
ε
ε− 1
ε− 1
ε
(
1
h
) 1
ε−1
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε −1
(∫ h
0
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1−1
− λHPH,t(j) = 0 (A.42)
∂LF
∂CF,t(j)
=
ε
ε− 1
ε− 1
ε
(
1
1− h
) 1
ε−1
CF,t(j)
ε−1
ε −1
(∫ 1
h
CF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1−1
− λFPF,t(j) = 0 (A.43)
which simplify to:
CH,t(j)
− 1ε
((
1
h
)∫ h
0
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) 1
ε−1
= λHPH,t(j) (A.44)
CF,t(j)
− 1ε
((
1
1− h
)∫ 1
h
CF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) 1
ε−1
= λFPF,t(j) (A.45)
which, from the definitions of CH,t and CF,t, equations 2.5 and 2.7, become:
CH,t(j)
− 1ε
(
CH,t
h
) 1
ε
= λHPH,t(j) (A.46)
CF,t(j)
− 1ε
(
CF,t
1− h
) 1
ε
= λFPF,t(j) (A.47)
This holds for all Home goods j ∈ [0, h] and all Foreign Goods j ∈ [h, 1], so taking the expression for
any two goods j and l, and dividing one by the other yields:
CH,t(j)
− 1ε
CH,t(l)−
1
ε
=
PH,t(j)
PH,t(l)
(A.48)
CF,t(j)
− 1ε
CF,t(l)−
1
ε
=
PF,t(j)
PF,t(l)
(A.49)
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from which expressions for CH,t(j) and CF,t(j) can be derived, given by:
CH,t(j) = CH,t(l)
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t(l)
)−ε
(A.50)
CF,t(j) = CF,t(l)
(
PF,t(j)
PF,t(l)
)−ε
(A.51)
which substituted into the expression for consumption expenditures on Home and Foreign goods, respec-
tively, yield: ∫ h
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(l)
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t(l)
)−ε
dj = ZH,t (A.52)
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)CF,t(l)
(
PF,t(j)
PF,t(l)
)−ε
dj = ZF,t (A.53)
which, from the definitions of the price indices PH,t and PF,t, equations 2.33 and 2.34, become:
h(PH,t)
1−εCH,t(l) = PH,t(l)−εZH,t (A.54)
(1− h)(PF,t)1−εCF,t(l) = PF,t(l)−εZF,t (A.55)
which simplify to:
CH,t(l) =
(
PH,t(l)
PH,t
)−ε
ZH,t
hPH,t
(A.56)
CF,t(l) =
(
PF,t(l)
PF,t
)−ε
ZF,t
(1− h)PF,t (A.57)
for all Home goods l ∈ [0, h) and all Foreign goods l ∈ [h, 1]. Then, substituting them into the definitions
of CH,t and CF,t, equations 2.5 and 2.7, yields:
CH,t =
( 1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
[(
PH,t(l)
PH,t
)−ε
ZH,t
hPH,t
] ε−1
ε
dl

ε
ε−1
=
(
1
h
∫ h
0
PH,t(l)
1−ε dl
) ε
ε−1
ZH,t(PH,t)
ε−1
(A.58)
CF,t =
( 1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
[(
PF,t(l)
PF,t
)−ε
ZF,t
(1− h)PF,t
] ε−1
ε
dl

ε
ε−1
=
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
PF,t(l)
1−ε dl
) ε
ε−1
ZF,t(PF,t)
ε−1
(A.59)
Substituting the definitions of the price indices PH,t and PF,t, equations 2.33 and 2.34, in the previous
expressions yields:
CH,t = (PH,t)
−εZH,t(PH,t)ε−1 =⇒ PH,tCH,t = ZH,t =
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j) dj (A.60)
CF,t = (PF,t)
−εZF,t(PF,t)ε−1 =⇒ PF,tCF,t = ZF,t =
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)CF,t(j) dj (A.61)
In the end, combining the last equations with equations A.56 and A.57 yields the demand functions:
CH,t(l) =
(
PH,t(l)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t
h
(A.62)
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CF,t(l) =
(
PF,t(l)
PF,t
)−ε
CF,t
1− h (A.63)
for all l ∈ [0, h) for country H and all l ∈ [h, 1] for country F . These equations for households in country
H are true for any l, j ∈ [0, 1].
A specular derivation brings to similar results for households in country F , where consumption expen-
ditures on domestic and foreign goods are given respectively by:
P ∗H,tC
∗
H,t = Z
∗
H,t =
∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j) dj (A.64)
P ∗F,tC
∗
F,t = Z
∗
F,t =
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)C
∗
F,t(j) dj (A.65)
while the demand functions for different varieties of domestic and foreign goods are given respectively
by:
C∗H,t(l) =
(
P ∗H,t(l)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
C∗H,t
1− h (A.66)
C∗F,t(l) =
(
P ∗F,t(l)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗F,t
h
(A.67)
for all domestic goods l ∈ [h, 1] and all foreign goods l ∈ [0, h). These equations for households in country
F are true for any l, j ∈ [0, 1].
A.6 Derivation of the Optimal Allocation of Consumption Ex-
penditures between Domestic and Foreign Goods by Coun-
try of Origin
The demand functions for domestic and foreign goods can be derived by maximizing consumption Ct for
any given level of expenditure defined by:
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t ≡ Zt (A.68)
for households in country H and by maximizing consumption C∗t for any given level of expenditure
defined by:
P ∗H,tC
∗
H,t + P
∗
F,tC
∗
F,t ≡ Z∗t (A.69)
for households in country F , where Zt and Z
∗
t are total consumption expenditures on both domestic and
foreign goods for households in countries H and F , respectively.
I derive here the demand functions for households in country H. The demand functions for households
in country F are derived in a specular way.
Maximization can be formalized by means of the Lagrangean:
L =
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1 − λ(PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t − Zt) (A.70)
The derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to CH,t yields:
∂L
∂CH,t
=
η
η − 1
η − 1
η
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)− 1η
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] 1
η−1 − λPH,t = 0 (A.71)
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which simplifies to:
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)− 1ηC
1
η
t = λPH,t (A.72)
The derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to CF,t, instead, yields:
∂L
∂CF,t
=
η
η − 1
η − 1
η
α
1
η (CF,t)
− 1η
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] 1
η−1 − λPF,t = 0 (A.73)
which simplifies to:
α
1
η (CF,t)
− 1ηC
1
η
t = λPF,t (A.74)
Dividing one first order condition by the other yields:
(
1− α
α
) 1
η
(
CF,t
CH,t
) 1
η
=
PH,t
PF,t
(A.75)
from which we can express foreign consumption as a function of domestic consumption and viceversa as:
CF,t =
α
1− α
(
PH,t
PF,t
)η
CH,t (A.76)
respectively,
CH,t =
1− α
α
(
PF,t
PH,t
)η
CF,t (A.77)
Substituting the expression for foreign consumption in the expression for consumption expenditures,
equation A.69, yields:
PH,tCH,t + PF,t
α
1− α
(
PH,t
PF,t
)η
CH,t = Zt (A.78)
which becomes:
CH,t
(
PH,t +
α
1− α (PF,t)
1−η(PH,t)η
)
= Zt (A.79)
simplifying to:
CH,t =
(1− α)(PH,t)−ηZt
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η (A.80)
Substituting the definition of the CPI, equation 2.31, in the previous equation yields:
CH,t =
(1− α)(PH,t)−ηZt
P 1−ηt
= (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Zt
Pt
(A.81)
Substituting the expression for domestic consumption, instead, in the expression for consumption expen-
ditures, equation A.69, yields:
PH,t
1− α
α
(
PF,t
PH,t
)η
CF,t + PF,tCF,t = Zt (A.82)
which becomes:
CF,t
(
1− α
α
(PH,t)
1−η(PF,t)η + PF,t
)
= Zt (A.83)
simplifying to:
CF,t =
α(PF,t)
−ηZt
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η (A.84)
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Substituting the definition of the CPI, equation 2.31, in the previous equation yields:
CF,t =
α(PF,t)
−ηZt
P 1−ηt
= α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Zt
Pt
(A.85)
Now, substituting both equations A.81 and A.85 in the consumption index, equation 2.3, yields:
Ct =
(1− α) 1η [(PH,t
Pt
)−η
(1− α)Zt
Pt
] η−1
η
+ α
1
η
[(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
α
Zt
Pt
] η−1
η

η
η−1
(A.86)
which becomes:
Ct =
[
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)1−η
+ α
(
PF,t
Pt
)1−η] ηη−1
Zt
Pt
(A.87)
simplifying to:
Ct = [(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η]
η
η−1
Zt
P 1−ηt
(A.88)
Substituting the definition of the CPI, equation 2.31, in the previous equation yields:
Ct = P
−η
t
Zt
P 1−ηt
=
Zt
Pt
=⇒ PtCt = Zt = PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t (A.89)
Substituting the new expression for Zt in the demand functions, equations A.81 and A.85, yields the
final demand functions for domestic and foreign goods, respectively:
CH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (A.90)
CF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (A.91)
A specular derivation brings to similar results for households in country F , where consumption expen-
ditures on both domestic and foreign goods are given by:
P ∗t C
∗
t = Z
∗
t = P
∗
H,tC
∗
H,t + P
∗
F,tC
∗
F,t (A.92)
while the final demand functions for domestic and foreign goods are given respectively by:
C∗H,t = (1− α)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t (A.93)
C∗F,t = α
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t (A.94)
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A.7 Derivation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the case
of Unitary Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign
Goods
Here the aim is to compute the limit of the CPI for η → 1:
lim
η→1
[(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η] 11−η (A.95)
Substituting η = 1 yields an expression of the form 1∞, which is indeterminate. To solve it, the expression
must be transformed in one of the form 00 or
∞
∞ to be able to apply l’Hoˆpital’s rule.
= lim
η→1
eln[(1−α)(PH,t)
1−η+α(PF,t)1−η ]
1
1−η
(A.96)
= lim
η→1
e
1
1−η ln[(1−α)(PH,t)1−η+α(PF,t)1−η ] (A.97)
= lim
η→1
e
ln[(1−α)(PH,t)1−η+α(PF,t)1−η ]
1−η (A.98)
This is an expression with a fraction of the form 00 for which l’Hoˆpital’s rule can be applied. The rule
says that if
lim
x→c
f(x)
g(x)
=
0
0
=⇒ lim
x→c
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
x→c
f ′(x)
g′(x)
(A.99)
So now, computing the two derivatives yields:
∂ ln[(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η]
∂η
= − (1− α)(PH,t)
1−η lnPH,t + α(PF,t)1−η lnPF,t
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η (A.100)
∂(1− η)
∂η
= −1 (A.101)
Now the two derivatives can be substituted in expression A.98 to compute the limit.
= lim
η→1
e
− (1−α)(PH,t)
1−η lnPH,t+α(PF,t)1−η lnPF,t
(1−α)(PH,t)1−η+α(PF,t)1−η
−1 (A.102)
= e
(1−α) lnPH,t+α lnPF,t
(1−α)+α = e(1−α) lnPH,t+α lnPF,t (A.103)
= eln(PH,t)
1−α+ln(PF,t)α = (PH,t)
1−α(PF,t)α (A.104)
A.8 Derivations for Households
The optimal allocation of any given consumption expenditure on Home and Foreign goods, respectively,
within each category of goods produced in each country yields the following demand functions1:
CiH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε CiH,t
h
(A.105)
1See Appendix A.5 for a derivation.
118
CiF,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PF,t
)−ε CiF,t
1− h (A.106)
for households in country H and for all domestic goods j ∈ [0, h) and all foreign goods j ∈ [h, 1], while
the optimal allocation of any given consumption expenditure on domestic and foreign goods, respectively,
within each category of goods produced in each country yields the following demand functions:
C∗iH,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
C∗iH,t
1− h (A.107)
C∗iF,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗iF,t
h
(A.108)
for households in country F and for all domestic goods j ∈ [h, 1] and all foreign goods j ∈ [0, h), where
PH,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country H and PF,t is a price index
for goods imported from country F , respectively defined by2:
PH,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(A.111)
PF,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(A.112)
while P ∗H,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country F and P
∗
F,t is a price
index for goods imported from country H, respectively defined by:
P ∗H,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(A.113)
P ∗F,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(A.114)
Consumption expenditures on Home and Foreign goods, respectively simplify to3:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)C
i
H,t(j) dj = PH,tC
i
H,t (A.115)
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)C
i
F,t(j) dj = PF,tC
i
F,t (A.116)
2Both domestic and foreign price indices for country H, PH,t and PF,t can be derived by minimizing a given expenditure
on domestic and foreign goods under the constraint that equations 2.5 and 2.7 equal to one, respectively:
min
Ci
H,t
(j)
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)C
i
H,t(j) s.t.
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
CiH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
= 1 (A.109)
min
Ci
F,t
(j)
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)C
i
F,t(j) s.t.
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
CiF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
= 1 (A.110)
The same applies to the respective domestic and foreign price indices for country F , P ∗H,t and P
∗
F,t.
3See Appendix A.5 for a derivation.
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for households in country H, while for households in country F consumption expenditures on domestic
and foreign goods respectively simplify to:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)C
∗i
H,t(j) dj = P
∗
H,tC
∗i
H,t (A.117)
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)C
∗i
F,t(j) dj = P
∗
F,tC
∗i
F,t (A.118)
Finally, the optimal allocation of consumption expenditures between domestic and imported goods is
given respectively by4:
CiH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Cit (A.119)
CiF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Cit (A.120)
for households in country H, while for households in country F the optimal allocation of consumption
expenditures between domestic and imported goods is given respectively by:
C∗iH,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗it (A.121)
C∗iF,t = α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗it (A.122)
where Pt is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country H, given by
5:
Pt ≡
[
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (A.123)
while P ∗t is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country F , given by:
P ∗t ≡
[
(1− α∗)(P ∗H,t)1−η + α∗(P ∗F,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (A.124)
Total consumption expenditures by households in country H are then given by6:
PH,tC
i
H,t + PF,tC
i
F,t = PtC
i
t (A.125)
while total consumption expenditures by households in country F are given by:
P ∗H,tC
∗i
H,t + P
∗
F,tC
∗i
F,t = P
∗
t C
∗i
t (A.126)
4See Appendix A.6 for a derivation
5The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country H, Pt, can be found by minimizing a given expenditure on both domestic
and foreign goods under the constraint that equation 2.3 equals one:
min
Ci
H,t
,Ci
F,t
PH,tC
i
H,t + PF,tC
i
F,t s.t.
[
(1− α) 1η (CiH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CiF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
= 1
The same applies to the respective Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country F , P ∗t . In the particular case in which
η = 1, the CPI in country H takes the form Pt = (PH,t)
1−α(PF,t)α, while the CPI in country F takes the form P ∗t =
(P ∗H,t)
1−α∗ (P ∗F,t)
α∗ . For a derivation see Appendix A.7.
6See Appendix A.6 for a derivation
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Finally, the period budget constraint for households in country H can then be rewritten as:
PtC
i
t +D
i
t +B
i
t ≤
Dit−1
Qt−1,t +B
i
t−1(1 + it−1) + (1− τwt )WtN it + T it + Γit (A.127)
while the period budget constraint for households in country F can be rewritten as:
P ∗t C
∗i
t +D
∗i
t +B
∗i
t ≤
D∗it−1
Qt−1,t +B
∗i
t−1(1 + it−1) + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗it + T ∗it + Γ∗it (A.128)
Aggregating the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, within each category of goods
produced in each country, for households in country H, equations A.105 and A.106, yields:
CH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t
h
(A.129)
respectively,
CF,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PF,t
)−ε
CF,t
1− h (A.130)
where CH,t and CF,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in
country H, respectively defined by:
CH,t ≡
∫ h
0
CiH,t di = hC
i
H,t and CF,t ≡
∫ h
0
CiF,t di = hC
i
F,t (A.131)
while, aggregating the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, within each category of goods,
for households in country F , equations A.107 and A.108, yields:
C∗H,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
C∗H,t
1− h (A.132)
respectively,
C∗F,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗F,t
h
(A.133)
where C∗H,t and C
∗
F,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in
country F , respectively defined by:
C∗H,t ≡
∫ 1
h
C∗iH,t di = (1− h)C∗iH,t and C∗F,t ≡
∫ 1
h
C∗iF,t di = (1− h)C∗iF,t (A.134)
Aggregating instead the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, by country of origin, for
households in country H, equations A.119 and A.120, yields:
CH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (A.135)
respectively,
CF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (A.136)
121
where Ct is aggregate consumption for households in country H, defined by:
Ct ≡
∫ h
0
Cit di = hC
i
t (A.137)
and CH,t and CF,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in country
H, as previously defined. Aggregating the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, by
country of origin, for households in country F , equations A.121 and A.122, yields:
C∗H,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t (A.138)
respectively,
C∗F,t = α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t (A.139)
where C∗t is aggregate consumption for households in country F , defined by:
C∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
Cit di = (1− h)C∗it (A.140)
and C∗H,t and C
∗
F,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in country
F , as previously defined.
The first order conditions for the household problem in country H are derived by maximizing present-
value utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξt
[
(Cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(A.141)
subject to the budget constraint given by:
PtC
i
t +D
i
t +B
i
t ≤
Dit−1
Qt−1,t +B
i
t−1(1 + it−1) + (1− τwt )WtN it + T it + Γit (A.142)
I derive here the first order conditions for households in country H. The first order conditions for
households in country F are derived in a specular way.
The problem for households in country H can be formalized by means of the following Lagrangean:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtξt
[
(Cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
−
∞∑
t=0
λtβ
t
[
PtC
i
t +D
i
t +B
i
t −
Dit−1
Qt−1,t −B
i
t−1(1 + it−1)− (1− τwt )WtN it − T it − Γit
]
(A.143)
where λt is the multiplier on the budget constraint.
Taking derivatives yields:
∂L
∂Cit
= βtξt(C
i
t)
−σ − λtβtPt = 0 =⇒ ξt(Cit)−σ = λtPt (A.144)
∂L
∂N it
= −βtξt(N it )ϕ + λtβt(1− τwt )Wt = 0 =⇒ ξt(N it )ϕ = λt(1− τwt )Wt (A.145)
∂L
∂Dit
= −λtβt + λt+1β
t+1
Qt,t+1 = 0 =⇒ Qt,t+1 = β
λt+1
λt
(A.146)
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∂L
∂Bit
= −λtβt + λt+1βt+1(1 + it) = 0 =⇒ 1
1 + it
= β
λt+1
λt
(A.147)
Combining the first two derivatives yields the intratemporal optimality condition:
(Cit)
−σ
Pt
=
(N it )
ϕ
(1− τwt )Wt
=⇒ (Cit)σ(N it )ϕ = (1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
(A.148)
Combining the first and the third derivative yields the intertemporal optimality condition:
Qt,t+1 = β
ξt+1(C
i
t+1)
−σ
Pt+1
Pt
ξt(Cit)
−σ =⇒ Qt,t+1 = β
ξt+1
ξt
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(A.149)
which is the household’s Euler Equation. Combining the third and fourth derivatives and using the fact
that it is known in period t, while Qt,t+1 is not, yields the no-arbitrage condition:
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} (A.150)
A.9 Derivations for International Risk-Sharing
Given the Euler Equations of households in countries H and F , equations 2.14 and 2.20, respectively:
Qt,t+1 = β ξt+1
ξt
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(A.151)
Qt,t+1 = β
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗it+1
C∗it
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(A.152)
one can equate the two prices of the state-contingent bonds, Qt,t+1, which are the same, to yield:
β
ξt+1
ξt
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
= β
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗it+1
C∗it
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(A.153)
Simplifying and rearranging yields:(
Cit+1
Cit
C∗it
C∗it+1
)−σ
=
ξt
ξt+1
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
Pt+1
Pt
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(A.154)
Substituting in the real exchange rate Qt and rearranging the equation to express consumption in country
H as a function of consumption in country F yields:
Cit+1 =
(
ξt+1
ξt
ξ∗t
ξ∗t+1
Qt+1
Qt
) 1
σ Cit
C∗it
C∗it+1 (A.155)
By repeated substitution of Home consumption backward in time and moving backwards one period, the
previous equation reduces to one linking the consumption of savers in the two countries as a function of
initial conditions, the real exchange rate and preference shocks:
Cit =
(
ξ∗0
ξ0
1
Q0
) 1
σ
(
Ci0
C∗i0
)(
ξt
ξ∗t
Qt
) 1
σ
C∗it (A.156)
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By assuming symmetric initial conditions for households in countries H and F , the previous expression
reduces to:
Cit =
(
ξt
ξ∗t
Qt
) 1
σ
C∗it (A.157)
A.10 Derivation of the Demand Constraint for Firms
The demand constraint that firms face in country H can be derived by maximizing domestic output Yt,
defined as:
Yt ≡
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(A.158)
for any given level of expenditure on domestic goods, defined by:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Yt(j) dj ≡ Zt (A.159)
where Zt is total expenditure on domestic goods in country H.
The demand constraint that firms face in country F can be derived by maximizing domestic output Y ∗t ,
defined as:
Y ∗t ≡
((
1
1− h
) 1
ε
∫ 1
h
Y ∗t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(A.160)
for any given level of expenditure on domestic goods, defined by:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)Y
∗
t (j) dj ≡ Z∗t (A.161)
where Z∗t is total expenditure on domestic goods in country F .
We derive here the demand constraint for country H. The demand constraint for country F is derived
in a specular way.
Maximization can be formalized by means of the Lagrangean:
L =
((
1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
− λ
(∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Yt(j) dj − Zt
)
(A.162)
The derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to Yt(j) yields:
∂L
∂Yt(j)
=
ε
ε− 1
ε− 1
ε
(
1
h
) 1
ε−1
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε −1
(∫ h
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1−1
− λPH,t(j) = 0 (A.163)
which simplifies to:
Yt(j)
− 1ε
(
1
h
∫ h
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) 1
ε−1
= λPH,t(j) (A.164)
which, from the definition of Yt, equation A.158, becomes:
Yt(j)
− 1ε
(
Yt
h
) 1
ε
= λPH,t(j) (A.165)
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This holds for all j ∈ [0, h], so taking the expression for any two goods j and l, and dividing one by the
other yields:
Yt(j)
− 1ε
Yt(l)−
1
ε
=
PH,t(j)
PH,t(l)
(A.166)
from which an expression for Yt(j) can be derived, given by:
Yt(j) = Yt(l)
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t(l)
)−ε
(A.167)
which substituted into the expression for domestic expenditure yields:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)Yt(l)
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t(l)
)−ε
dj = Zt (A.168)
which, from the definition of the price index PH,t, equation 2.33, becomes:
h(PH,t)
1−εYt(l) = PH,t(l)−εZt (A.169)
which simplifies to:
Yt(l) =
(
PH,t(l)
PH,t
)−ε
Zt
hPH,t
(A.170)
for all l ∈ [0, h). Then, substituting it into the definition of Yt, equation A.158, yields:
Yt =
∫ h
0
[(
PH,t(l)
PH,t
)−ε
Zt
hPH,t
] ε−1
ε
dl

ε
ε−1
=
(
1
h
∫ h
0
PH,t(l)
1−ε dl
) ε
ε−1
Zt(PH,t)
ε−1 (A.171)
Substituting the definition of the price index PH,t, equation 2.33, in the previous expression yields:
Yt = (PH,t)
−εZt(PH,t)ε−1 =⇒ PH,tYt = Zt =
∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)Yt(j) dj (A.172)
In the end, combining the last equation with equation A.170 yields the demand function:
Yt(l) =
(
PH,t(l)
PH,t
)−ε
Yt
h
(A.173)
for all l ∈ [0, h). This equation is true not only for l, but for any l, j ∈ [0, h). At the same time it is true
not only for time t, but for any time t+ k, so that we can rewrite it as:
Yt+k(j) =
(
PH,t+k(j)
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
(A.174)
but since PH,t+k(j) is the price chosen by firm j in period t, denoted P¯H,t(j), which lasts until period
t + k with probability θk for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and since all firms resetting prices in a given period will
choose the same price, we can drop the j subscript on the price and rewrite the demand constraint as:
Yt+k|t(j) =
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
(A.175)
where Yt+k|t(j) is the demand for firm j’s output in period t+k conditional on the firm having last reset
its price in period t.
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The demand function for goods produced in country F is instead given by:
Y ∗t (l) =
(
P ∗H,t(l)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
Y ∗t
1− h (A.176)
for all l ∈ [h, 1]. This equation is true not only for l, but for any l, j ∈ [h, 1]. Instead, the specific demand
constraint faced by firms in country F is given by:
Y ∗t+k|t(j) =
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t+k
)−ε
Y ∗t+k
1− h (A.177)
where P¯ ∗H,t(j) is the price chosen by firm j in period t and Y
∗
t+k|t(j) is the demand for firm j’s output in
period t+ k conditional on the firm having last reset its price in period t, all for firms in country F .
A.11 Derivations for Firms
The firm’s problem in country H can be solved by first substituting the stochastic discount factor and
the demand constraint into the objective function:
max
P¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
βk
ξt+k
ξt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
[
(1− τst+k)P¯H,t −MCnt+k
]}
(A.178)
Then, taking the derivative with respect to P¯H,t and equating it to zero yields:
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
{
ξt+k
ξt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
[
(1− τst+k)(1− ε) + ε
MCnt+k
P¯H,t
]}
= 0 (A.179)
Multiplying all by
ξtC
−σ
t h
(1−ε)PtP¯−εH,t
and rearranging yields:
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
(
(1− τst+k)P¯H,t −
ε
(ε− 1)MC
n
t+k
)}
= 0 (A.180)
which is the first order condition of the firm’s problem. Rearranging the previous equation one can
express the optimal price chosen by the firm as a function of only aggregate variables:
P¯H,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
MCnt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
(1− τst+k)
} (A.181)
Substituting nominal marginal cost with the expression for real marginal cost and dividing both sides
by PH,t yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
(PH,t+k)
ε+1
PH,t
Yt+kMCt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ
Pt+k
(PH,t+k)εYt+k(1− τst+k)
} (A.182)
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Multiplying numerator and denominator on the right hand side of the previous equation by PtP εH,t
yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ Pt
Pt+k
(
PH,t+k
PH,t
)ε+1
Yt+kMCt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ PtPt+k
(
PH,t+k
PH,t
)ε
Yt+k(1− τst+k)
} (A.183)
Rewriting the previous equation in terms of inflation yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σYt+kMCt+k
[∏k
s=1
(ΠH,t+s)
ε+1
Πt+s
]}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σYt+k(1− τst+k)
[∏k
s=1
(ΠH,t+s)ε
Πt+s
]} (A.184)
Rewriting the previous equation in recursive form yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
Kt
Ft
(A.185)
where Kt and Ft are defined by:
Kt = ξt(Ct)
−σYtMCt + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε+1
Πt+1
Kt+1
}
(A.186)
Ft = ξt(Ct)
−σYt(1− τst ) + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε
Πt+1
Ft+1
}
(A.187)
The optimal relative price in country F is given by:
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
(P∗H,t+k)
ε+1
P∗H,t
Y ∗t+kMC
∗
t+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
(P ∗H,t+k)εY
∗
t+k(1− τ∗st+k)
} (A.188)
Rewriting the previous equation in terms of inflation rates yields:
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σY ∗t+kMC
∗
t+k
[∏k
s=1
(Π∗H,t+s)
ε+1
Π∗t+s
]}
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σY ∗t+k(1− τ∗st+k)
[∏k
s=1
(Π∗H,t+s)
ε
Π∗t+s
]} (A.189)
Rewriting again the previous equation in recursive form yields:
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
ε
ε− 1
K∗t
F ∗t
(A.190)
for the optimal relative price in country F , where K∗t and F
∗
t are respectively defined recursively by:
K∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t MC
∗
t + βθ
∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε+1
Π∗t+1
K∗t+1
}
(A.191)
F ∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t (1− τ∗st ) + βθ∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε
Π∗t+1
F ∗t+1
}
(A.192)
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A.12 Aggregate Supply
Under the assumption of staggered prices following Calvo (1983), since in country H each period only
a fraction 1 − θ of firms change their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged, from the
definition of the domestic price index, equation 2.33:
PH,t =
[
1
θh
∫ θh
0
PH,t−1(j)1−ε dj +
1
(1− θ)h
∫ h
θh
P¯H,t(j)
1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
=
[
θ(PH,t−1)1−ε + (1− θ)(P¯H,t)1−ε
] 1
1−ε
(A.193)
which shows the evolution of prices over time. Dividing both sides by PH,t yields:
1 =
[
θ
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)1−ε
+ (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t
)1−ε] 11−ε
(A.194)
which can be rewritten to yield a relationship between gross PPI inflation and the optimal relative price:
(
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
=
P¯H,t
PH,t
(A.195)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 is gross PPI inflation in country H. Combining the last equation with the equation
for the optimal relative price set by firms yields:
(
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
Kt
Ft
(A.196)
which is an equation linking the evolution of PPI inflation to real marginal cost dynamics in country H,
through the recursive functions Kt and Ft, defined above.
Specular price dynamics apply to country F , where each period only a fraction 1 − θ∗ of firms change
their prices, while a fraction θ∗ keep their prices unchanged. From the definition of the domestic price
index for country F , equation 2.35, the following expression can be derived:
P ∗H,t =
[
θ∗(P ∗H,t−1)
1−ε + (1− θ∗)(P¯ ∗H,t)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (A.197)
Dividing both sides by P ∗H,t yields:
1 =
θ∗(P ∗H,t−1
P ∗H,t
)1−ε
+ (1− θ∗)
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
)1−ε 11−ε (A.198)
which can be rewritten to yield a relationship between gross PPI inflation and the optimal relative price:
(
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ε
=
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
(A.199)
where Π∗H,t ≡
P∗H,t
P∗H,t−1
is gross PPI inflation in country F . Combining the last equation with the equation
for the optimal relative price set by firms yields:
(
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
K∗t
F ∗t
(A.200)
128
which is an equation linking the evolution of PPI inflation to real marginal cost dynamics in country F ,
through the recursive functions K∗t and F
∗
t , defined above.
Combining price dispersions, equations 2.66, with aggregate price dynamics, equations A.194 and A.198,
yields two equations showing the evolution over time of price dispersion in countries H and F respectively:
dt = θdt−1(ΠH,t)ε + (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t
)−ε
(A.201)
Combining price dispersion, equation 2.66, with aggregate price dynamics, equations A.194, yields an
equation showing the evolution over time of price dispersion in country H:
dt =
1
h
∫ h
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj =
1
θh
∫ θh
0
(
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj +
1
(1− θ)h
∫ h
θh
(
P¯H,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj (A.202)
which multiplying and dividing the first term by P−εH,t−1 yields:
dt =
1
θh
∫ θh
0
(
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t−1
)−ε(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)−ε
dj +
1
(1− θ)h
∫ h
θh
(
P¯H,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj (A.203)
dt = θdt−1ΠεH,t + (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t
)−ε
(A.204)
for country H and:
d∗t = θ
∗d∗t−1(Π
∗
H,t)
ε + (1− θ∗)
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
)−ε
(A.205)
for country F , which, substituting the optimal relative price with the function of inflation derived above,
yields two equations showing the evolution of price dispersion over time depending on PPI inflation in
countries H and F respectively:
dt = θdt−1(ΠH,t)ε + (1− θ)
[
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
] ε
ε−1
(A.206)
d∗t = θ
∗d∗t−1(Π
∗
H,t)
ε + (1− θ∗)
[
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
] ε
ε−1
(A.207)
Clearing of the labour market in country H implies that aggregate labour supply, equation 2.16, must
equal aggregate labour demand, equation 2.63, to yield:
h1+
σ
ϕC
− σϕ
t
[
(1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
] 1
ϕ
=
Yt
At
dt (A.208)
Expressing the real wage as a function of everything else yields:
Wt
Pt
=
[
YtdtC
σ
ϕ
t
At(1− τwt )
1
ϕh1+
σ
ϕ
]ϕ
(A.209)
To derive a relationship between nominal marginal cost and output, one can start from deriving a
relationship between real marginal cost and real wage:
MCt =
Wt
AtPH,t
=
Wt
Pt
Pt
PH,t
1
At
(A.210)
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Then, by substituting the real wage implied by labour market clearing and the price ratio as a function
of the terms of trade, yields a relationship between real marginal cost and output through the terms of
trade:
MCt =
[
YtdtC
σ
ϕ
t
At(1− τwt )
1
ϕh1+
σ
ϕ
]ϕ [
1− α+ αS1−ηt
] 1
1−η 1
At
(A.211)
MCt =
Y ϕt d
ϕ
t C
σ
t
(1− τwt )A1+ϕt hϕ+σ
[
1− α+ αS1−ηt
] 1
1−η
(A.212)
Following the same procedure for the Foreign country, real marginal cost in country F will be given by:
MC∗t =
(Y ∗t )
ϕ(d∗t )
ϕ(C∗t )
σ
(1− τ∗wt )(A∗t )1+ϕ(1− h)ϕ+σ
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (A.213)
The previous equations together with the price setting equations constitute the aggregate supply equa-
tions for countries H and F linking inflation in each country to output and consumption in each country.
A.13 Aggregate Demand
Clearing of the goods market implies the following condition for all goods j ∈ [0, h) produced in country
H:
Yt(j) =
∫ h
0
CiH,t(j) di+
∫ 1
h
C∗iF,t(j) di+Gt(j) (A.214)
Substituting the derived aggregate demand functions for private domestic consumption, equation A.129,
for foreign consumption of domestic goods, equation A.132, and for public consumption, equation 2.100,
into the market clearing condition for good j, yields:
Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t
h
+
(
P ∗F,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗F,t
h
+
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
Gt
h
(A.215)
while substituting in equations A.135 and A.139, and using the law of one price (P ∗F,t(j) = PH,t(j) and
P ∗F,t = PH,t), yields:
Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε [
1− α
h
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
α∗
h
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +
Gt
h
]
(A.216)
Substituting the previous equation into the definition of aggregate domestic output, equation 2.65, yields:
Yt =
( 1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
[(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε [
1− α
h
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
α∗
h
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +
Gt
h
]] ε−1
ε
dj

ε
ε−1
(A.217)
Since only the first fraction depends on j the previous equation can be rewritten in the following way:
Yt =
( 1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
[(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε] ε−1ε
dj

ε
ε−1
1
h
[
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +Gt
]
(A.218)
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Simplifying exponents yields:
Yt =
(
1
h
∫ h
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)1−ε
dj
) ε
ε−1
[
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +Gt
]
(A.219)
Substituting in the definition of PH,t, equation 2.33, simplifies the first term and yields:
Yt = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +Gt (A.220)
Making use of the law of one price, equation 2.41, and the definition of the real exchange rate Qt, defined
by equation 2.51, yields:
Yt = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
PH,t
PtQt
)−η
C∗t +Gt (A.221)
Collecting terms in the previous expression yields:
Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
[(1− α)Ct + α∗(Qt)ηC∗t ] +Gt (A.222)
By assuming symmetric initial conditions in countries H and F , foreign consumption in the previous
equation can be substituted through the international risk sharing condition, equation 2.56, to yield:
Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η [
1− α+ α∗ 1− h
h
(
ξ∗t
ξt
) 1
σ
(Qt)
η− 1σ
]
Ct +Gt (A.223)
Substituting the price ratio and the real exchange rate with expressions of the terms of trade yields:
Yt =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] η
1−η
[
1− α+ α∗ 1− h
h
(
ξ∗t
ξt
) 1
σ
(St)η− 1σ
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) η
1−η+
1
ησ−σ
]
Ct+Gt
(A.224)
which rearranging, finally yields:
Yt =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] η
1−η
[
1− α+ α∗ 1− h
h
(
ξ∗t
ξt
) 1
σ
(St)η− 1σ
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) 1−ησ
σ(η−1)
]
Ct +Gt
(A.225)
The same procedure can be applied to the goods market clearing condition for all goods j ∈ [0, 1]
produced in country F :
Y ∗t (j) =
∫ 1
h
C∗iH,t(j) di+
∫ h
0
CiF,t(j) di+G
∗
t (j) (A.226)
Substituting the derived demand functions for private domestic consumption, equations A.132 and A.138,
for foreign consumption of domestic goods, equations A.129 and A.136, and for public consumption,
equation 2.112, yields:
Y ∗t (j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε [
1− α∗
1− h
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +
α
1− h
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
G∗t
1− h
]
(A.227)
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Plugging the market clearing condition into the definition of aggregate domestic output in country F ,
equation 2.65, yields:
Y ∗t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t + α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +G
∗
t (A.228)
Making use of the law of one price, equation 2.41, and the definition of the real exchange rate Qt, defined
by equation 2.51, yields:
Y ∗t =
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η [
(1− α∗)C∗t + α(Qt)−ηCt
]
+G∗t (A.229)
By assuming symmetric initial conditions in countries H and F , foreign consumption in the previous
equation can be substituted through the international risk sharing condition, equation 2.56, to yield:
Y ∗t =
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η [
1− α∗ + α h
1− h
(
ξt
ξ∗t
) 1
σ
(Qt)
1
σ−η
]
C∗t +G
∗
t (A.230)
Substituting the price ratio and the real exchange rate with expressions of the terms of trade and
rearranging yields the aggregate demand equation for country F :
Y ∗t =
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] η
1−η
[
1− α∗ + α h
1− h
(
ξt
ξ∗t
) 1
σ
(St) 1σ−η
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) 1−ησ
σ(1−η)
]
C∗t +G
∗
t
(A.231)
Demand for output in both countries depends on private consumption in the two countries, through the
terms of trade, relative degree of openness and relative size of the two countries, other than relative
preference shocks. Government consumption, instead, affects aggregate demand directly because of
complete home bias in public consumption.
A.14 Equilibrium Conditions
Here we collect all the equilibrium conditions of the full model, differentiating between a pure Currency
Union, a Coordinated Currency Union and a Full Fiscal Union and between different policy rules.
The equilibrium conditions of the model are grouped into the following blocks:
Aggregate Demand Block
The aggregate demand block is composed of aggregate demand in both countries H:
Yt =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] η
1−η
[
1− α+ α∗ 1− h
h
(
ξ∗t
ξt
) 1
σ
(St)η− 1σ
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) 1−ησ
σ(η−1)
]
Ct +Gt
(A.232)
and F :
Y ∗t =
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] η
1−η
[
1− α∗ + α h
1− h
(
ξt
ξ∗t
) 1
σ
(St) 1σ−η
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) 1−ησ
σ(1−η)
]
C∗t +G
∗
t
(A.233)
while the evolution of private consumption is given by the households’ Euler Equation in country F :
1
1 + it
= βEt
{
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
1
Π∗t+1
}
(A.234)
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and by the international risk-sharing condition in country H:
Ct =
h
1− h
[
ξt
ξ∗t
St
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) 1
1−η
] 1
σ
C∗t (A.235)
while the relationship between CPI inflation and PPI inflation is given by:
Πt = ΠH,t
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
1− α+ α(St−1)1−η
] 1
1−η
(A.236)
in country H and:
Π∗t = Π
∗
H,t
[
1− α∗ + α∗Sη−1t
1− α∗ + α∗(St−1)η−1
] 1
1−η
(A.237)
in country F , and the evolution of the terms of trade is given by:
St =
Π∗H,t
ΠH,t
St−1 (A.238)
while the exogenous demand shocks evolve according to:
ξt = (ξt−1)ρξeεt (A.239)
ξ∗t = (ξ
∗
t−1)
ρ∗ξeεt (A.240)
Aggregate Supply Block
The aggregate supply block is composed of the aggregate supply equation for country H:
(
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
Kt
Ft
(A.241)
where:
Kt = ξt(Ct)
−σYtMCt + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε+1
Πt+1
Kt+1
}
(A.242)
Ft = ξt(Ct)
−σYt(1− τst ) + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε
Πt+1
Ft+1
}
(A.243)
and marginal cost in country H is given by:
MCt =
(Yt)
ϕ(dt)
ϕ(Ct)
σ
(1− τwt )(At)1+ϕ(h)ϕ+σ
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η (A.244)
and the aggregate supply equation for country F :
(
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
K∗t
F ∗t
(A.245)
where:
K∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t MC
∗
t + βθ
∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε+1
Π∗t+1
K∗t+1
}
(A.246)
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F ∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t (1− τ∗st ) + βθ∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε
Π∗t+1
F ∗t+1
}
(A.247)
and marginal cost in country F is given by:
MC∗t =
(Y ∗t )
ϕ(d∗t )
ϕ(C∗t )
σ
(1− τ∗wt )(A∗t )1+ϕ(1− h)ϕ+σ
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (A.248)
while the evolution of price dispersion is given by:
dt = θdt−1(ΠH,t)ε + (1− θ)
[
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
] ε
ε−1
(A.249)
for country H, and:
d∗t = θ
∗d∗t−1(Π
∗
H,t)
ε + (1− θ∗)
[
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
] ε
ε−1
(A.250)
for country F , while the levels of technology evolve exogenously according to:
At = (At−1)ρaeεt (A.251)
A∗t = (A
∗
t−1)
ρ∗aeεt (A.252)
Net Exports, Net Foreign Assets and the Balance of Payments
Real Net Exports for country H are given by:
N˜Xt = Yt −
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η Ct −Gt (A.253)
Real Net Foreign Assets for country H are given by:
N˜FAt = D˜t + B˜t − B˜Gt (A.254)
The real Balance of Payments for country H is given by:
B˜P t ≡ N˜Xt + it−1
ΠH,t
N˜FAt−1 (A.255)
so that real Net Foreign Assets for country H evolve according to:
N˜FAt =
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ B˜P t (A.256)
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate following the rule:
β(1 + it) =
(
ΠUt
ΠU
)φpi(1−ρi)
[β(1 + it−1)]
ρi (A.257)
where union-wide CPI inflation is defined by:
ΠUt ≡ (Πt)h(Π∗t )1−h (A.258)
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Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union - Consumption Scenario
Fiscal policy, in the consumption scenario of the Pure Currency Union setting, sets government con-
sumption following the rule:
Gt
G
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρg)(Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (A.259)
for country H, and:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗g)(G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (A.260)
for country F , while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the budget:
T˜t = T˜ B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
and T˜ ∗t = T˜
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.261)
so financing fiscal policy by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm sales from their
steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] (γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] for country F ) and 1 − γ (1 − γ∗ for
country F ) through the following tax rules:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (A.262)
γ∗(τ∗st − τ∗s) = (1− γ∗)(τ∗wt − τ∗w) (A.263)
with the following budget constraints:
Gt + T˜t + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= τst Yt + τ
w
t MCtdtYt + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(A.264)
G∗t + T˜
∗
t + it−1
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
= τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t + B˜
∗G
t −
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.265)
Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union - Transfer Scenario
In the transfer scenario of the Pure Currency Union setting, fiscal policy sets real transfers following the
rule:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρt)( T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (A.266)
for country H, and:
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗t )( T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (A.267)
for country F , while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the budget:
Gt = G B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
and G∗t = G
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.268)
Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union - Consumption Scenario
Fiscal policy, in the consumption scenario of the Coordinated Currency Union setting, sets government
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consumption following the rule:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (A.269)
for country H, and:
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (A.270)
for country F , while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the budget:
T˜t = T˜ B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
and T˜ ∗t = T˜
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.271)
so financing fiscal policy by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm sales from their
steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] (γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] for country F ) and 1 − γ (1 − γ∗ for
country F ) through the following tax rules:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (A.272)
γ∗(τ∗st − τ∗s) = (1− γ∗)(τ∗wt − τ∗w) (A.273)
with the following budget constraints:
Gt + T˜t + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= τst Yt + τ
w
t MCtdtYt + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(A.274)
G∗t + T˜
∗
t + it−1
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
= τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t + B˜
∗G
t −
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.275)
Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union - Transfer Scenario
In the transfer scenario of the Coordinated Currency Union setting, fiscal policy sets real transfers
following the rule:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (A.276)
for country H, and:
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (A.277)
for country F , while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the budget:
Gt = G B˜
G
t =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
and G∗t = G
∗ B˜∗Gt =
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.278)
Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union - Consumption Scenario
Fiscal policy, in the consumption scenario of the Full Fiscal Union setting, sets government consumption
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following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (A.279)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (A.280)
while keeping real transfers constant and balancing the overall budget:
T˜t = T˜ T˜
∗
t = T˜
∗ and B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
=⇒ B˜Gt + StB˜∗Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+ St
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.281)
so financing fiscal policy by the variation of the tax rates on labour income and firm sales from their
steady state levels respectively by a share γ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− γ, while distributing equally among the two
countries the cost of fiscal policy, through the following tax rules:
γ(τst − τs) = (1− γ)(τwt − τw) (A.282)
(τst − τs) = (τ∗st − τ∗s) (A.283)
(τwt − τw) = (τ∗wt − τ∗w) (A.284)
with the following consolidated budget constraint:
Gt+ T˜t+St(G
∗
t + T˜
∗
t ) + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= (τst + τ
w
t MCtdt)Yt+ (τ
∗s
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
t )StY
∗
t + B˜Gt −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(A.285)
Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union - Transfer Scenario
In the transfer scenario of the Full Fiscal Union setting, fiscal policy sets real transfers following the
rules:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (A.286)
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (A.287)
while keeping government consumption constant and balancing the overall budget:
Gt = G G
∗
t = G
∗ and B˜Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
=⇒ B˜Gt + StB˜∗Gt =
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+ St
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(A.288)
We can now define an equilibrium for the Currency Union.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An Imperfectly competitive equilibrium is a sequence of stochastic processes:
Xt ≡ {Yt, Y ∗t , Ct, C∗t ,ΠH,t,Π∗H,t,Πt,Π∗t ,ΠUt , St,Kt,K∗t , Ft, F ∗t ,MCt,MC∗t , dt, d∗t , N˜Xt, N˜FAt, C˜At}
and exogenous disturbances:
Zt ≡ {ξt, ξ∗t , At, A∗t }
satisfying equations A.232 through A.256 and the definition of union-wide inflation A.258, given initial
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conditions:
I−1 ≡ {C−1, C∗−1,ΠH,−1,Π∗H,−1, S−1, d−1, d∗−1, N˜FA−1}
plus monetary and fiscal policies:
Pt ≡ {it, Gt, G∗t , T˜t, T˜ ∗t , τst , τ∗st , τwt , τ∗wt , B˜Gt , B˜∗Gt }
specified in equation A.257 for monetary policy and in equations A.259 through A.288 for the various
specifications of fiscal policy, for t ≥ 0.
A.15 The Steady State
We describe the symmetric (in terms of per capita consumption and prices) non-stochastic steady state
with constant government debt and zero inflation, which will be the starting point of our simulations.
We focus on the perfect foresight steady state and equilibrium deviations from it, given by different
shocks. Perfect Foresight is a viable assumption because, despite the uncertainty to which price-setters
are subject, it disappears in the aggregate due to the further assumption that there is a large number
(more accurately, a continuum) of firms, as explained in Calvo (1983).
The symmetric non-stochastic steady state with constant government debt and zero inflation, which will
be the starting point of our simulations, is defined by the following assumptions and equations.
All shocks are constant at their long-run levels of 1:
ξ = ξ∗ = A = A∗ = 1 (A.289)
There is no inflation and no price dispersion:
ΠH = Π
∗
H = Π = Π
∗ = ΠU = 1 =⇒ d = d∗ = 1 (A.290)
The terms of trade and the real exchange rate are equal to 1:
S = 1 =⇒ Q = 1 (A.291)
Per-capita consumption is equal across countries:
C
h
=
C∗
1− h (A.292)
Aggregate demand in each country is given by:
Y =
(
1− α+ α∗ 1− h
h
)
C +G (A.293)
Y ∗ =
(
1− α∗ + α h
1− h
)
C∗ +G∗ (A.294)
Combining the previous equations we can derive per-capita consumption in each country as a function of
output and government spending and equate the two to derive an equation linking output and government
spending in the two countries:
Y =
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh [Y
∗ −G∗] +G (A.295)
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From the Euler Equations:
1
1 + i
= β =⇒ i = 1
β
− 1 (A.296)
Recalling marginal costs in steady state from price-setting:
MC =
ε− 1
ε
(1− τs) (A.297)
MC∗ =
ε− 1
ε
(1− τ∗s) (A.298)
Marginal costs are also given by labour market equilibrium:
MC =
(Y )ϕ(C)σ
(1− τw)(h)ϕ+σ (A.299)
MC∗ =
(Y ∗)ϕ(C∗)σ
(1− τ∗w)(1− h)ϕ+σ (A.300)
Equating the two marginal cost expressions for each country yields consumption in terms of output:
C =
[
ε− 1
ε
(1− τs)(1− τw)(h)ϕ+σ
(Y )ϕ
] 1
σ
(A.301)
C∗ =
[
ε− 1
ε
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)(1− h)ϕ+σ
(Y ∗)ϕ
] 1
σ
(A.302)
Deriving per-capita consumption in the two countries and equating the two yields an equation linking
output in the two countries:
Y ∗ =
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
Y (A.303)
Substituting foreign output from the supply equation A.303 into the demand equation A.295 yields a
relationship linking domestic output to government consumption in both countries7:
Y =
[
1− (1− α)h+ α
∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
]−1 [
G− (1− α)h+ α
∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αhG
∗
]
(A.304)
Fiscal policy multipliers and spillovers in steady state for country H can be found from the previous
equation by computing the effect on domestic output of variations of G and G∗ respectively:
∂Y
∂G
=
[
1− (1− α)h+ α
∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
]−1
(A.305)
∂Y
∂G∗
= −
[
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
] [
1− (1− α)h+ α
∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
]−1
(A.306)
which shows how fiscal multipliers and spillovers depend on the parameters of the model, other than the
tax rates in both countries.
We can see from the previous equations that a necessary and sufficient condition for fiscal multipliers to
7A specular equation can be derived linking foreign output to government consumption in both countries. This would
allow to derive foreign fiscal multipliers and spillovers. The results and analysis would be symmetric with respect to the
counterpart variables of the other country.
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be positive and greater than 1 and at the same time for fiscal spillovers to be negative is:
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
< 1 (A.307)
From the previous condition, sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for fiscal multipliers to be positive
and greater than 1 and at the same time for fiscal spillovers to be negative are:
α∗
α
<
h
1− h (A.308)
τ∗s + τ∗w − τ∗sτ∗w > τs + τw − τsτw (A.309)
while, by changing the sign of all the inequalities, we get alternative conditions for fiscal multipliers to
be negative and at the same time for fiscal spillovers to be positive and greater than 1. This tells us that
when fiscal multipliers are positive and greater than 1, fiscal spillovers are negative, and viceversa.
Under the condition given by Equation A.307, fiscal multipliers in country H are positive and increasing
with the openness to trade of the foreign country α∗, with the relative size of the foreign country 1−hh
and with the steady state values of the domestic tax rates on firm sales τs and labour income τw, while
they are positive and decreasing with the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply ϕ, with the
openness to trade of the domestic country α and with the steady state values of the foreign tax rates
on firm sales τ∗s and labour income τ∗w. Under the same conditions, fiscal spillovers in country H are
negative and increasing in absolute terms with the openness to trade of the foreign country α∗, with the
relative size of the foreign country 1−hh and with the steady state values of the domestic tax rates on
firm sales τs and labour income τw, while they are negative and decreasing in absolute terms with the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply ϕ, with the openness to trade of the domestic country
α and with the steady state values of the foreign tax rates on firm sales τ∗s and labour income τ∗w. In
steady state real net exports are given by:
N˜X = Y − C −G (A.310)
while real net foreign assets are:
N˜FA = D˜ + B˜ − B˜G (A.311)
The real balance of payments is given by:
B˜P = N˜X +
(
1
β
− 1
)
N˜FA (A.312)
while from the budget constraints of households and governments, or equivalently from the evolution of
net foreign assets:
N˜FA = N˜FA+ B˜P (A.313)
which implies that in steady state the balance of payments must be zero and so net exports pin down
net foreign assets:
B˜P = 0 =⇒ N˜X = −
(
1
β
− 1
)
N˜FA (A.314)
These relations yield an equation linking output, government consumption and household consumption
in the two countries in steady state, which mainly comes from the fact that net exports are in zero
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international net supply in steady state:
Y + Y ∗ = C + C∗ +G+G∗ (A.315)
The household budget constraints in steady state for countries H and F are given by:
C =
(
1
β
− 1
)
(D˜ + B˜) + T˜ + Y (1− τs − τwMC ) (A.316)
C∗ =
(
1
β
− 1
)
(D˜∗ + B˜∗) + T˜ ∗ + Y ∗(1− τ∗s − τ∗wMC∗ ) (A.317)
Instead the government budget constraints of the two countries in steady state read:
G+ T˜ +
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜G = Y (τs + τwMC) (A.318)
G∗ + T˜ ∗ +
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜∗G = Y ∗(τ∗s + τ∗wMC∗) (A.319)
A.16 Derivations for Calibration
The relationship that links the two parameters of openness α and α∗, equation 2.154, which is used to
calibrate α∗ is derived in the following way.
From the relationship linking demand for consumption, equation A.295, dividing all by Y and rearranging
yields:
1− G
Y
=
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
[
1− G
∗
Y ∗
]
Y ∗
Y
(A.320)
From the relationship linking supply of consumption goods, equation A.303, dividing all by Y yields:
Y ∗
Y
=
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
(A.321)
Substituting the second equation into the first yields:
1− G
Y
=
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
[
1− G
∗
Y ∗
]
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
(A.322)
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh =
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
(A.323)
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h) = [(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh] h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
(A.324)
dividing all by 1− h and rearranging to explicit α∗ yields:
α∗
[
1 +
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
]
=
α
h
1− h
[
1 +
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
]
+
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
− h
1− h
(A.325)
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then finally dividing all by what multiplies α∗ yields:
α∗ = α
h
1− h +
h
1− h
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
[
(1−τs)(1−τw)
(1−τ∗s)(1−τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ − 1
1 + h1−h
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
[
(1−τs)(1−τw)
(1−τ∗s)(1−τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
(A.326)
which is the final equation linking the two parameters of openness through the shares government con-
sumption in output and the tax rates.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
As a tool for students and researchers studying models of this kind for the first time, I provide as many
mathematical derivations of the model as possible here in the Appendix. This is meant for learning
purposes, especially concerning complex models with cumbersome mathematical derivations.
B.1 Derivations for Households
The optimal allocation of any given consumption expenditure on Home and Foreign goods, respectively,
within each category of goods produced in each country yields the following demand functions:
CiH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε CiH,t
h
(B.1)
CiF,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PF,t
)−ε CiF,t
1− h (B.2)
for households in country H and for all domestic goods j ∈ [0, h) and all foreign goods j ∈ [h, 1], while
the optimal allocation of any given consumption expenditure on domestic and foreign goods, respectively,
within each category of goods produced in each country yields the following demand functions:
C∗iH,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
C∗iH,t
1− h (B.3)
C∗iF,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗iF,t
h
(B.4)
for households in country F and for all domestic goods j ∈ [h, 1] and all foreign goods j ∈ [0, h), where
PH,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country H and PF,t is a price index
for goods imported from country F , respectively defined by:
PH,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
PH,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(B.5)
PF,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(B.6)
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while P ∗H,t is the domestic price index or Producer Price Index (PPI) in country F and P
∗
F,t is a price
index for goods imported from country H, respectively defined by:
P ∗H,t ≡
(
1
1− h
∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(B.7)
P ∗F,t ≡
(
1
h
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(B.8)
Consumption expenditures on Home and Foreign goods, respectively simplify to:∫ h
0
PH,t(j)C
i
H,t(j) dj = PH,tC
i
H,t (B.9)
∫ 1
h
PF,t(j)C
i
F,t(j) dj = PF,tC
i
F,t (B.10)
for households in country H, while for households in country F consumption expenditures on domestic
and foreign goods respectively simplify to:∫ 1
h
P ∗H,t(j)C
∗i
H,t(j) dj = P
∗
H,tC
∗i
H,t (B.11)
∫ h
0
P ∗F,t(j)C
∗i
F,t(j) dj = P
∗
F,tC
∗i
F,t (B.12)
Finally, the optimal allocation of consumption expenditures between domestic and imported goods is
given respectively by:
CiH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Cit (B.13)
CiF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Cit (B.14)
for households in country H, while for households in country F the optimal allocation of consumption
expenditures between domestic and imported goods is given respectively by:
C∗iH,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗it (B.15)
C∗iF,t = α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗it (B.16)
where Pt is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country H, given by:
Pt ≡
[
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (B.17)
while P ∗t is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for country F , given by:
P ∗t ≡
[
(1− α∗)(P ∗H,t)1−η + α∗(P ∗F,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (B.18)
Total consumption expenditures by households in country H are then given by:
PH,tC
i
H,t + PF,tC
i
F,t = PtC
i
t (B.19)
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while total consumption expenditures by households in country F are given by:
P ∗H,tC
∗i
H,t + P
∗
F,tC
∗i
F,t = P
∗
t C
∗i
t (B.20)
Finally, the period budget constraint for households in country H can then be rewritten as:
PtC
i
t +D
i
t +B
i
H,t +B
i
F,t
≤ D
i
t−1
Qt−1,t +B
i
H,t−1(1 + it−1) +B
i
F,t−1(1 + i
∗
t−1)(1− δt−1) + (1− τwt )WtN it + T it + Γit + It (B.21)
while the period budget constraint for households in country F can be rewritten as:
P ∗t C
∗i
t +D
∗i
t +B
∗i
F,t ≤
D∗it−1
Qt−1,t +B
∗i
F,t−1(1 + i
∗
t−1) + (1− τ∗wt )W ∗t N∗it + T ∗it + Γ∗it (B.22)
Aggregating the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, within each category of goods
produced in each country, for households in country H, equations B.1 and B.2, yields:
CH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t
h
(B.23)
respectively,
CF,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PF,t
)−ε
CF,t
1− h (B.24)
where CH,t and CF,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in
country H, respectively defined by:
CH,t ≡
∫ h
0
CiH,t di = hC
i
H,t and CF,t ≡
∫ h
0
CiF,t di = hC
i
F,t (B.25)
while, aggregating the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, within each category of goods,
for households in country F , equations B.3 and B.4, yields:
C∗H,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
C∗H,t
1− h (B.26)
respectively,
C∗F,t(j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗F,t
h
(B.27)
where C∗H,t and C
∗
F,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in
country F , respectively defined by:
C∗H,t ≡
∫ 1
h
C∗iH,t di = (1− h)C∗iH,t and C∗F,t ≡
∫ 1
h
C∗iF,t di = (1− h)C∗iF,t (B.28)
Aggregating instead the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, by country of origin, for
households in country H, equations B.13 and B.14, yields:
CH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (B.29)
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respectively,
CF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (B.30)
where Ct is aggregate consumption for households in country H, defined by:
Ct ≡
∫ h
0
Cit di = hC
i
t (B.31)
and CH,t and CF,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in country
H, as previously defined. Aggregating the demand functions for domestic and imported goods, by
country of origin, for households in country F , equations B.15 and B.16, yields:
C∗H,t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t (B.32)
respectively,
C∗F,t = α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t (B.33)
where C∗t is aggregate consumption for households in country F , defined by:
C∗t ≡
∫ 1
h
Cit di = (1− h)C∗it (B.34)
and C∗H,t and C
∗
F,t are aggregate consumption of domestic and imported goods for households in country
F , as previously defined.
The first order conditions for the household problem in country H are derived by maximizing present-
value utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξt
[
(Cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(B.35)
subject to the budget constraint given by:
PtC
i
t +D
i
t +B
i
H,t +B
i
F,t
≤ D
i
t−1
Qt−1,t +B
i
H,t−1(1 + it−1) +B
i
F,t−1(1 + i
∗
t−1)(1− δt−1) + (1− τwt )WtN it + T it + Γit + It (B.36)
I derive here the first order conditions for households in country H. The first order conditions for
households in country F are derived in a specular way.
The problem for households in country H can be formalized by means of the following Lagrangean:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtξt
[
(Cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
−
∞∑
t=0
λtβ
t
[
PtC
i
t +D
i
t +B
i
H,t +B
i
F,t
]
−
∞∑
t=0
λtβ
t
[
− D
i
t−1
Qt−1,t −B
i
H,t−1(1 + it−1)−BiF,t−1(1 + i∗t−1)(1− δt−1)− (1− τwt )WtN it − T it − Γit − It
]
(B.37)
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where λt is the multiplier on the budget constraint.
Taking derivatives yields:
∂L
∂Cit
= βtξt(C
i
t)
−σ − λtβtPt = 0 =⇒ ξt(Cit)−σ = λtPt (B.38)
∂L
∂N it
= −βtξt(N it )ϕ + λtβt(1− τwt )Wt = 0 =⇒ ξt(N it )ϕ = λt(1− τwt )Wt (B.39)
∂L
∂Dit
= −λtβt + λt+1β
t+1
Qt,t+1 = 0 =⇒ Qt,t+1 = β
λt+1
λt
(B.40)
∂L
∂BiH,t
= −λtβt + λt+1βt+1(1 + it) = 0 =⇒ 1
1 + it
= β
λt+1
λt
(B.41)
∂L
∂BiF,t
= −λtβt + λt+1βt+1(1 + i∗t )(1− δt) = 0 =⇒
1
(1 + i∗t )(1− δt)
= β
λt+1
λt
(B.42)
Combining the first two derivatives yields the intratemporal optimality condition:
(Cit)
−σ
Pt
=
(N it )
ϕ
(1− τwt )Wt
=⇒ (Cit)σ(N it )ϕ = (1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
(B.43)
Combining the first and the third derivative yields the intertemporal optimality condition:
Qt,t+1 = β
ξt+1(C
i
t+1)
−σ
Pt+1
Pt
ξt(Cit)
−σ =⇒ Qt,t+1 = β
ξt+1
ξt
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(B.44)
which is the household’s Euler Equation. Combining the third, fourth and fifth derivatives and using
the fact that it, i
∗
t and δt are known in period t, while Qt,t+1 is not, yields the no-arbitrage condition:
1
(1 + i∗t )(1− δt)
=
1
1 + it
= Et{Qt,t+1} (B.45)
B.2 Derivations for Firms
The firm’s problem in country H can be solved by first substituting the stochastic discount factor and
the demand constraint into the objective function:
max
P¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
βk
ξt+k
ξt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
[
(1− τst+k)P¯H,t −MCnt+k
]}
(B.46)
Then, taking the derivative with respect to P¯H,t and equating it to zero yields:
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
{
ξt+k
ξt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−ε
Yt+k
h
[
(1− τst+k)(1− ε) + ε
MCnt+k
P¯H,t
]}
= 0 (B.47)
Multiplying all by
ξtC
−σ
t h
(1−ε)PtP¯−εH,t
and rearranging yields:
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
(
(1− τst+k)P¯H,t −
ε
(ε− 1)MC
n
t+k
)}
= 0 (B.48)
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which is the first order condition of the firm’s problem. Rearranging the previous equation one can
express the optimal price chosen by the firm as a function of only aggregate variables:
P¯H,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
MCnt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ
Pt+k
Yt+k
(PH,t+k)−ε
(1− τst+k)
} (B.49)
Substituting nominal marginal cost with the expression for real marginal cost and dividing both sides
by PH,t yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
(PH,t+k)
ε+1
PH,t
Yt+kMCt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ
Pt+k
(PH,t+k)εYt+k(1− τst+k)
} (B.50)
Multiplying numerator and denominator on the right hand side of the previous equation by PtP εH,t
yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σ Pt
Pt+k
(
PH,t+k
PH,t
)ε+1
Yt+kMCt+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σ PtPt+k
(
PH,t+k
PH,t
)ε
Yt+k(1− τst+k)
} (B.51)
Rewriting the previous equation in terms of inflation yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)
−σYt+kMCt+k
[∏k
s=1
(ΠH,t+s)
ε+1
Πt+s
]}
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
kEt
{
ξt+k(Ct+k)−σYt+k(1− τst+k)
[∏k
s=1
(ΠH,t+s)ε
Πt+s
]} (B.52)
Rewriting the previous equation in recursive form yields:
P¯H,t
PH,t
=
ε
ε− 1
Kt
Ft
(B.53)
where Kt and Ft are defined by:
Kt = ξt(Ct)
−σYtMCt + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε+1
Πt+1
Kt+1
}
(B.54)
Ft = ξt(Ct)
−σYt(1− τst ) + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε
Πt+1
Ft+1
}
(B.55)
The optimal relative price in country F is given by:
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
(P∗H,t+k)
ε+1
P∗H,t
Y ∗t+kMC
∗
t+k
}
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σ
P∗t+k
(P ∗H,t+k)εY
∗
t+k(1− τ∗st+k)
} (B.56)
Rewriting the previous equation in terms of inflation rates yields:
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σY ∗t+kMC
∗
t+k
[∏k
s=1
(Π∗H,t+s)
ε+1
Π∗t+s
]}
∑∞
k=0(βθ
∗)kEt
{
ξ∗t+k(C
∗
t+k)
−σY ∗t+k(1− τ∗st+k)
[∏k
s=1
(Π∗H,t+s)
ε
Π∗t+s
]} (B.57)
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Rewriting again the previous equation in recursive form yields:
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
ε
ε− 1
K∗t
F ∗t
(B.58)
for the optimal relative price in country F , where K∗t and F
∗
t are respectively defined recursively by:
K∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t MC
∗
t + βθ
∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε+1
Π∗t+1
K∗t+1
}
(B.59)
F ∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t (1− τ∗st ) + βθ∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε
Π∗t+1
F ∗t+1
}
(B.60)
B.3 Aggregate Supply
Under the assumption of staggered prices following Calvo (1983), since in country H each period only
a fraction 1 − θ of firms change their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged, from the
definition of the domestic price index, equation 3.37:
PH,t =
[
1
θh
∫ θh
0
PH,t−1(j)1−ε dj +
1
(1− θ)h
∫ h
θh
P¯H,t(j)
1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
=
[
θ(PH,t−1)1−ε + (1− θ)(P¯H,t)1−ε
] 1
1−ε
(B.61)
which shows the evolution of prices over time. Dividing both sides by PH,t yields:
1 =
[
θ
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)1−ε
+ (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t
)1−ε] 11−ε
(B.62)
which can be rewritten to yield a relationship between gross PPI inflation and the optimal relative price:
(
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
=
P¯H,t
PH,t
(B.63)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 is gross PPI inflation in country H. Combining the last equation with the equation
for the optimal relative price set by firms yields:
(
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
Kt
Ft
(B.64)
which is an equation linking the evolution of PPI inflation to real marginal cost dynamics in country H,
through the recursive functions Kt and Ft, defined above.
Specular price dynamics apply to country F , where each period only a fraction 1 − θ∗ of firms change
their prices, while a fraction θ∗ keep their prices unchanged. From the definition of the domestic price
index for country F , equation 3.39, the following expression can be derived:
P ∗H,t =
[
θ∗(P ∗H,t−1)
1−ε + (1− θ∗)(P¯ ∗H,t)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (B.65)
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Dividing both sides by P ∗H,t yields:
1 =
θ∗(P ∗H,t−1
P ∗H,t
)1−ε
+ (1− θ∗)
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
)1−ε 11−ε (B.66)
which can be rewritten to yield a relationship between gross PPI inflation and the optimal relative price:
(
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ε
=
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
(B.67)
where Π∗H,t ≡
P∗H,t
P∗H,t−1
is gross PPI inflation in country F . Combining the last equation with the equation
for the optimal relative price set by firms yields:
(
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
K∗t
F ∗t
(B.68)
which is an equation linking the evolution of PPI inflation to real marginal cost dynamics in country F ,
through the recursive functions K∗t and F
∗
t , defined above.
Combining price dispersions, equations 3.66, with aggregate price dynamics, equations B.62 and B.66,
yields two equations showing the evolution over time of price dispersion in countries H and F respectively:
dt = θdt−1(ΠH,t)ε + (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t
)−ε
(B.69)
Combining price dispersion, equation 3.66, with aggregate price dynamics, equations B.62, yields an
equation showing the evolution over time of price dispersion in country H:
dt =
1
h
∫ h
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj =
1
θh
∫ θh
0
(
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj +
1
(1− θ)h
∫ h
θh
(
P¯H,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj (B.70)
which multiplying and dividing the first term by P−εH,t−1 yields:
dt =
1
θh
∫ θh
0
(
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t−1
)−ε(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)−ε
dj +
1
(1− θ)h
∫ h
θh
(
P¯H,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj (B.71)
dt = θdt−1ΠεH,t + (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t
)−ε
(B.72)
for country H and:
d∗t = θ
∗d∗t−1(Π
∗
H,t)
ε + (1− θ∗)
(
P¯ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
)−ε
(B.73)
for country F , which, substituting the optimal relative price with the function of inflation derived above,
yields two equations showing the evolution of price dispersion over time depending on PPI inflation in
countries H and F respectively:
dt = θdt−1(ΠH,t)ε + (1− θ)
[
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
] ε
ε−1
(B.74)
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d∗t = θ
∗d∗t−1(Π
∗
H,t)
ε + (1− θ∗)
[
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
] ε
ε−1
(B.75)
Clearing of the labour market in country H implies that aggregate labour supply, equation 3.18, must
equal aggregate labour demand, equation 3.63, to yield:
h1+
σ
ϕC
− σϕ
t
[
(1− τwt )
Wt
Pt
] 1
ϕ
=
Yt
At
dt (B.76)
Expressing the real wage as a function of everything else yields:
Wt
Pt
=
[
YtdtC
σ
ϕ
t
At(1− τwt )
1
ϕh1+
σ
ϕ
]ϕ
(B.77)
To derive a relationship between nominal marginal cost and output, one can start from deriving a
relationship between real marginal cost and real wage:
MCt =
Wt
AtPH,t
=
Wt
Pt
Pt
PH,t
1
At
(B.78)
Then, by substituting the real wage implied by labour market clearing and the price ratio as a function
of the terms of trade, yields a relationship between real marginal cost and output through the terms of
trade:
MCt =
[
YtdtC
σ
ϕ
t
At(1− τwt )
1
ϕh1+
σ
ϕ
]ϕ [
1− α+ αS1−ηt
] 1
1−η 1
At
(B.79)
MCt =
Y ϕt d
ϕ
t C
σ
t
(1− τwt )A1+ϕt hϕ+σ
[
1− α+ αS1−ηt
] 1
1−η
(B.80)
Following the same procedure for the Foreign country, real marginal cost in country F will be given by:
MC∗t =
(Y ∗t )
ϕ(d∗t )
ϕ(C∗t )
σ
(1− τ∗wt )(A∗t )1+ϕ(1− h)ϕ+σ
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (B.81)
The previous equations together with the price setting equations constitute the aggregate supply equa-
tions for countries H and F linking inflation in each country to output and consumption in each country.
B.4 Aggregate Demand
Clearing of the goods market implies the following condition for all goods j ∈ [0, h) produced in country
H:
Yt(j) =
∫ h
0
CiH,t(j) di+
∫ 1
h
C∗iF,t(j) di+Gt(j) (B.82)
Substituting the derived aggregate demand functions for private domestic consumption, equation B.23,
for foreign consumption of domestic goods, equation B.26, and for public consumption, equation 3.101,
into the market clearing condition for good j, yields:
Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t
h
+
(
P ∗F,t(j)
P ∗F,t
)−ε
C∗F,t
h
+
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
Gt
h
(B.83)
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while substituting in equations B.29 and B.33, and using the law of one price (P ∗F,t(j) = PH,t(j) and
P ∗F,t = PH,t), yields:
Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε [
1− α
h
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
α∗
h
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +
Gt
h
]
(B.84)
Substituting the previous equation into the definition of aggregate domestic output, equation 3.65, yields:
Yt =
( 1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
[(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε [
1− α
h
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
α∗
h
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +
Gt
h
]] ε−1
ε
dj

ε
ε−1
(B.85)
Since only the first fraction depends on j the previous equation can be rewritten in the following way:
Yt =
( 1
h
) 1
ε
∫ h
0
[(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε] ε−1ε
dj

ε
ε−1
1
h
[
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +Gt
]
(B.86)
Simplifying exponents yields:
Yt =
(
1
h
∫ h
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)1−ε
dj
) ε
ε−1
[
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +Gt
]
(B.87)
Substituting in the definition of PH,t, equation 3.37, simplifies the first term and yields:
Yt = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +Gt (B.88)
Making use of the law of one price, equation 3.46, and the definition of the real exchange rate Qt, defined
by equation 3.56, yields:
Yt = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
∗
(
PH,t
PtQt
)−η
C∗t +Gt (B.89)
Collecting terms in the previous expression yields:
Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
[(1− α)Ct + α∗(Qt)ηC∗t ] +Gt (B.90)
Substituting the price ratio and the real exchange rate with expressions of the terms of trade yields:
Yt =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] η
1−η
[
(1− α)Ct + α∗(St)η
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) η
1−η
C∗t
]
+Gt (B.91)
The same procedure can be applied to the goods market clearing condition for all goods j ∈ [0, 1]
produced in country F :
Y ∗t (j) =
∫ 1
h
C∗iH,t(j) di+
∫ h
0
CiF,t(j) di+G
∗
t (j) (B.92)
Substituting the derived demand functions for private domestic consumption, equations B.26 and B.32,
for foreign consumption of domestic goods, equations B.23 and B.30, and for public consumption, equa-
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tion 3.116, yields:
Y ∗t (j) =
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε [
1− α∗
1− h
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t +
α
1− h
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
G∗t
1− h
]
(B.93)
Plugging the market clearing condition into the definition of aggregate domestic output in country F ,
equation 3.65, yields:
Y ∗t = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t + α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +G
∗
t (B.94)
Making use of the law of one price, equation 3.46, and the definition of the real exchange rate Qt, defined
by equation 3.56, yields:
Y ∗t =
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η [
(1− α∗)C∗t + α(Qt)−ηCt
]
+G∗t (B.95)
Substituting the price ratio and the real exchange rate with expressions of the terms of trade and
rearranging yields the aggregate demand equation for country F :
Y ∗t =
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] η
1−η
[
(1− α∗)C∗t + α(St)−η
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) η
η−1
Ct
]
+G∗t (B.96)
Demand for output in both countries depends on private consumption in the two countries, through
the terms of trade and relative degree of openness. Government consumption, instead, affects aggregate
demand directly because of complete home bias in public consumption.
B.5 Equilibrium Conditions
Here we collect all the equilibrium conditions of the full model, differentiating between a pure Currency
Union, a Coordinated Currency Union and a Full Fiscal Union and between different policy rules.
The equilibrium conditions of the model are grouped into the following blocks:
Aggregate Demand Block
The aggregate demand block is composed of aggregate demand in both countries H:
Yt =
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] η
1−η
[
(1− α)Ct + α∗(St)η
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) η
1−η
C∗t
]
+Gt (B.97)
and F :
Y ∗t =
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] η
1−η
[
(1− α∗)C∗t + α(St)−η
(
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
1− α+ α(St)1−η
) η
η−1
Ct
]
+G∗t (B.98)
while the evolution of private consumption is given by the households’ Euler Equation in countries H:
1
1 + it
= βEt
{
ξt+1
ξt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
1
Πt+1
}
(B.99)
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and F :
1− δt
1 + it
= βEt
{
ξ∗t+1
ξ∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
1
Π∗t+1
}
(B.100)
while the relationship between CPI inflation and PPI inflation is given by:
Πt = ΠH,t
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
1− α+ α(St−1)1−η
] 1
1−η
(B.101)
in country H and:
Π∗t = Π
∗
H,t
[
1− α∗ + α∗Sη−1t
1− α∗ + α∗(St−1)η−1
] 1
1−η
(B.102)
in country F , and the evolution of the terms of trade is given by:
St =
Π∗H,t
ΠH,t
St−1 (B.103)
while the exogenous demand shocks evolve according to:
ξt = (ξt−1)ρξeεt (B.104)
ξ∗t = (ξ
∗
t−1)
ρ∗ξeεt (B.105)
Aggregate Supply Block
The aggregate supply block is composed of the aggregate supply equation for country H:
(
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
Kt
Ft
(B.106)
where:
Kt = ξt(Ct)
−σYtMCt + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε+1
Πt+1
Kt+1
}
(B.107)
Ft = ξt(Ct)
−σYt(1− τst ) + βθEt
{
(ΠH,t+1)
ε
Πt+1
Ft+1
}
(B.108)
and marginal cost in country H is given by:
MCt =
(Yt)
ϕ(dt)
ϕ(Ct)
σ
(1− τwt )(At)1+ϕ(h)ϕ+σ
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η (B.109)
and the aggregate supply equation for country F :
(
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ε
=
ε
ε− 1
K∗t
F ∗t
(B.110)
where:
K∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t MC
∗
t + βθ
∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε+1
Π∗t+1
K∗t+1
}
(B.111)
F ∗t = ξ
∗
t (C
∗
t )
−σY ∗t (1− τ∗st ) + βθ∗Et
{
(Π∗H,t+1)
ε
Π∗t+1
F ∗t+1
}
(B.112)
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and marginal cost in country F is given by:
MC∗t =
(Y ∗t )
ϕ(d∗t )
ϕ(C∗t )
σ
(1− τ∗wt )(A∗t )1+ϕ(1− h)ϕ+σ
[
1− α∗ + α∗(St)η−1
] 1
1−η (B.113)
while the evolution of price dispersion is given by:
dt = θdt−1(ΠH,t)ε + (1− θ)
[
1− θ(ΠH,t)ε−1
1− θ
] ε
ε−1
(B.114)
for country H, and:
d∗t = θ
∗d∗t−1(Π
∗
H,t)
ε + (1− θ∗)
[
1− θ∗(Π∗H,t)ε−1
1− θ∗
] ε
ε−1
(B.115)
for country F , while the levels of technology evolve exogenously according to:
At = (At−1)ρaeεt (B.116)
A∗t = (A
∗
t−1)
ρ∗aeεt (B.117)
Net Exports, Net Foreign Assets and the Balance of Payments
Real Net Exports for country H are given by:
N˜Xt = Yt −
[
1− α+ α(St)1−η
] 1
1−η Ct −Gt (B.118)
Real Net Foreign Assets for country H are given by:
N˜FAt = B˜F,t (B.119)
The real Balance of Payments for country H is given by:
B˜P t = N˜Xt +
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
(B.120)
so that real Net Foreign Assets for country H evolve according to:
N˜FAt =
N˜FAt−1
ΠH,t
+ B˜P t (B.121)
while the transaction cost is given by:
δt ≡ (1− ρδ)δB
(
B∗Gt−1
P ∗H,t−1Y
∗
t−1
− B
∗G
P ∗HY ∗
)
+ ρδδt−1 + εt (B.122)
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate following the rule:
β(1 + it) =
(
ΠUt
ΠU
)φpi(1−ρi)
[β(1 + it−1)]
ρi (B.123)
155
where union-wide CPI inflation is defined by:
ΠUt ≡ (Πt)h(Π∗t )1−h (B.124)
Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union - Transfer Scenario
Fiscal policy, in the transfer scenario of the Pure Currency Union setting, sets government consumption
following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρg)(Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (B.125)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗g)(G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (B.126)
while using real transfers to deleverage government debt, through the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.127)
and keeping the tax rates on labour income and firm sales constant:
τwt = τ
w τst = τ
s τ∗wt = τ
∗w τ∗st = τ
∗s (B.128)
with the following budget constraints:
Gt + T˜t + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= τst Yt + τ
w
t MCtdtYt + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(B.129)
G∗t + T˜
∗
t +
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
= τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t + B˜
∗G
t −
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(B.130)
Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union - Consumption Scenario
In the consumption scenario of the Pure Currency Union setting, fiscal policy sets real transfers following
the rules:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρt)( T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (B.131)
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗t )( T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (B.132)
while using government consumption to deleverage government debt, through the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.133)
and keeping the tax rates on labour income and firm sales constant:
τwt = τ
w τst = τ
s τ∗wt = τ
∗w τ∗st = τ
∗s (B.134)
Fiscal Policy in a Pure Currency Union - Distortionary Tax Scenario
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In the distortionary tax scenario of the Pure Currency Union setting, fiscal policy sets government
consumption following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
Yt
Y
)−ψy(1−ρg)(Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (B.135)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
Y ∗t
Y ∗
)−ψ∗y(1−ρ∗g)(G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (B.136)
while using equally taxes on labour income and on firm sales to deleverage government debt, through
the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.137)
and keeping real transfers constant:
τwt − τw = τst − τs T˜t = T˜ τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s T˜ ∗t = T˜ ∗ (B.138)
Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union - Transfer Scenario
Fiscal policy, in the transfer scenario of the Coordinated Currency Union setting, sets government con-
sumption following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (B.139)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (B.140)
while using real transfers to deleverage government debt, through the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.141)
and keeping the tax rates on labour income and firm sales constant:
τwt = τ
w τst = τ
s τ∗wt = τ
∗w τ∗st = τ
∗s (B.142)
with the following budget constraints:
Gt + T˜t + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
= τst Yt + τ
w
t MCtdtYt + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
(B.143)
G∗t + T˜
∗
t +
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
= τ∗st Y
∗
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
tY
∗
t + B˜
∗G
t −
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
(B.144)
Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union - Consumption Scenario
In the consumption scenario of the Coordinated Currency Union setting, fiscal policy sets real transfers
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following the rules:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (B.145)
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (B.146)
while using government consumption to deleverage government debt, through the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.147)
and keeping the tax rates on labour income and firm sales constant:
τwt = τ
w τst = τ
s τ∗wt = τ
∗w τ∗st = τ
∗s (B.148)
Fiscal Policy in a Coordinated Currency Union - Distortionary Tax Scenario
In the distortionary tax scenario of the Coordinated Currency Union setting, fiscal policy sets government
consumption following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (B.149)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (B.150)
while using equally taxes on labour income and on firm sales to deleverage government debt, through
the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.151)
and keeping real transfers constant:
τwt − τw = τst − τs T˜t = T˜ τ∗wt − τ∗w = τ∗st − τ∗s T˜ ∗t = T˜ ∗ (B.152)
Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union - Transfer Scenario
Fiscal policy, in the transfer scenario of the Full Fiscal Union setting, sets government consumption
following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (B.153)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (B.154)
while using real transfers equally in both countries to deleverage government debt, through the debt
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rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.155)
and keeping the tax rates on labour income and firm sales constant:
T˜t − T˜ = T˜ ∗t − T˜ ∗ τwt = τw τ∗wt = τ∗w τst = τs τ∗st = τ∗s (B.156)
with the following consolidated budget constraint:
Gt + T˜t + St(G
∗
t + T˜
∗
t ) + it−1
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+
it−1 + δt−1
1− δt−1
St−1B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
=
(τst + τ
w
t MCtdt)Yt + (τ
∗s
t + τ
∗w
t MC
∗
t d
∗
t )StY
∗
t + B˜
G
t −
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
+ StB˜t
∗G − St−1B˜
∗G
t−1
Π∗H,t
(B.157)
Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union - Consumption Scenario
In the consumption scenario of the Full Fiscal Union setting, fiscal policy sets real transfers following
the rules:
T˜t
T˜
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρt)(
T˜t−1
T˜
)ρt
eεt (B.158)
T˜ ∗t
T˜ ∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗t )(
T˜ ∗t−1
T˜ ∗
)ρ∗t
eεt (B.159)
while using government consumption equally in both countries to deleverage government debt, through
the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.160)
and keeping the tax rates on labour income and firm sales constant:
Gt −G = G∗t −G∗ τwt = τw τ∗wt = τ∗w τst = τs τ∗st = τ∗s (B.161)
Fiscal Policy in a Full Fiscal Union - Distortionary Tax Scenario
In the tax on income scenario of the Full Fiscal Union setting, fiscal policy sets government consumption
following the rules:
Gt
G
=
(
N˜Xt
N˜X
)ψnx(1−ρg)(
Gt−1
G
)ρg
eεt (B.162)
G∗t
G∗
=
(
S N˜Xt
St N˜X
)−ψ∗nx(1−ρ∗g)(
G∗t−1
G∗
)ρ∗g
eεt (B.163)
while using the tax rates on labour income and firm sales equally across tax rates and across countries
to deleverage government debt, through the debt rules:
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜Gt = γt
(
B˜Gt−1
ΠH,t
− B˜G
)
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗Gt = γ∗t
(
B˜∗Gt−1
Π∗H,t
− B˜∗G
)
(B.164)
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and keeping real transfers constant:
τwt − τw = τst − τs τ∗wt − τ∗w = τwt − τw τ∗st − τ∗s = τst − τs T˜t = T˜ T˜ ∗t = T˜ ∗ (B.165)
We can now define an equilibrium for the Currency Union.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium). An Imperfectly competitive equilibrium is a sequence of stochastic processes:
Xt ≡ {Yt, Y ∗t , Ct, C∗t ,ΠH,t,Π∗H,t,Πt,Π∗t ,ΠUt , St,Kt,K∗t , Ft, F ∗t ,MCt,MC∗t , dt, d∗t , N˜Xt, N˜FAt, C˜At}
and exogenous disturbances:
Zt ≡ {ξt, ξ∗t , At, A∗t }
satisfying equations B.97 through B.121 and the definition of union-wide inflation B.124, given initial
conditions:
I−1 ≡ {C−1, C∗−1,ΠH,−1,Π∗H,−1, S−1, d−1, d∗−1, N˜FA−1}
plus monetary and fiscal policies:
Pt ≡ {it, Gt, G∗t , T˜t, T˜ ∗t , τst , τ∗st , τwt , τ∗wt , B˜Gt , B˜∗Gt }
specified in equation B.123 for monetary policy and in equations B.125 through B.165 for the various
specifications of fiscal policy, for t ≥ 0.
B.6 The Steady State
We describe its symmetric (in terms of per capita consumption and prices) non-stochastic steady state
with constant government debt and zero inflation. We focus on the perfect foresight steady state and
equilibrium deviations from it, given by different shocks. Perfect Foresight is a viable assumption because,
despite the uncertainty to which price-setters are subject, it disappears in the aggregate due to the further
assumption that there is a large number (more accurately, a continuum) of firms, as explained in Calvo
(1983).
The symmetric non-stochastic steady state with constant government debt and zero inflation is defined
by the following assumptions and equations.
All shocks are constant at their long-run levels of 1:
ξ = ξ∗ = A = A∗ = 1 (B.166)
There is no inflation and no price dispersion:
ΠH = Π
∗
H = Π = Π
∗ = ΠU = 1 =⇒ d = d∗ = 1 (B.167)
The terms of trade and the real exchange rate are equal to 1:
S = 1 =⇒ Q = 1 (B.168)
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Per-capita consumption is equal across countries:
C
h
=
C∗
1− h (B.169)
Aggregate demand in each country is given by:
Y = (1− α)C + α∗C∗ +G (B.170)
Y ∗ = (1− α∗)C∗ + αC +G∗ (B.171)
Combining the previous equations we can derive per-capita consumption in each country as a function of
output and government spending and equate the two to derive an equation linking output and government
spending in the two countries:
Y =
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh [Y
∗ −G∗] +G (B.172)
From the Euler Equations:
1
1 + i
= β =⇒ i = 1
β
− 1 (B.173)
Recalling marginal costs in steady state from price-setting:
MC =
ε− 1
ε
(1− τs) (B.174)
MC∗ =
ε− 1
ε
(1− τ∗s) (B.175)
Marginal costs are also given by labour market equilibrium:
MC =
(Y )ϕ(C)σ
(1− τw)(h)ϕ+σ (B.176)
MC∗ =
(Y ∗)ϕ(C∗)σ
(1− τ∗w)(1− h)ϕ+σ (B.177)
Equating the two marginal cost expressions for each country yields consumption in terms of output:
C =
[
ε− 1
ε
(1− τs)(1− τw)(h)ϕ+σ
(Y )ϕ
] 1
σ
(B.178)
C∗ =
[
ε− 1
ε
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)(1− h)ϕ+σ
(Y ∗)ϕ
] 1
σ
(B.179)
Deriving per-capita consumption in the two countries and equating the two yields an equation linking
output in the two countries:
Y ∗ =
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
Y (B.180)
In steady state real net exports are given by:
N˜X = Y − C −G (B.181)
while real net foreign assets are:
N˜FA = B˜F (B.182)
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The real balance of payments is given by:
B˜P = N˜X +
(
1
β
− 1
)
N˜FA (B.183)
while from the budget constraints of households and governments, or equivalently from the evolution of
net foreign assets:
N˜FA = N˜FA+ B˜P (B.184)
which implies that in steady state the balance of payments must be zero and so net exports pin down
net foreign assets:
B˜P = 0 =⇒ N˜X = −
(
1
β
− 1
)
N˜FA (B.185)
while the transaction cost in steady state is zero, because debt is constant at steady state level and there
are no shocks:
δ = 0 (B.186)
These relations yield an equation linking output, government consumption and household consumption
in the two countries in steady state, which mainly comes from the fact that net exports are in zero
international net supply in steady state:
Y + Y ∗ = C + C∗ +G+G∗ (B.187)
The household budget constraints in steady state for countries H and F are given by:
C =
(
1
β
− 1
)
(B˜H + B˜F ) + T˜ + Y (1− τs − τwMC ) (B.188)
C∗ =
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜∗F + T˜
∗ + Y ∗(1− τ∗s − τ∗wMC∗ ) (B.189)
Instead the government budget constraints of the two countries in steady state read:
G+ T˜ +
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜G = Y (τs + τwMC) (B.190)
G∗ + T˜ ∗ +
(
1
β
− 1
)
B˜∗G = Y ∗(τ∗s + τ∗wMC∗) (B.191)
B.7 Derivations for Calibration
The relationship that links the two parameters of openness α and α∗, equation 3.165, which is used to
calibrate α∗ is derived in the following way.
From the relationship linking demand for consumption, equation B.172, dividing all by Y and rearranging
yields:
1− G
Y
=
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
[
1− G
∗
Y ∗
]
Y ∗
Y
(B.192)
From the relationship linking supply of consumption goods, equation B.180, dividing all by Y yields:
Y ∗
Y
=
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
(B.193)
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Substituting the second equation into the first yields:
1− G
Y
=
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh
[
1− G
∗
Y ∗
]
1− h
h
[
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
(1− τs)(1− τw)
] 1
ϕ
(B.194)
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h)
(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh =
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
(B.195)
(1− α)h+ α∗(1− h) = [(1− α∗)(1− h) + αh] h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
(B.196)
dividing all by 1− h and rearranging to explicit α∗ yields:
α∗
[
1 +
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
]
=
α
h
1− h
[
1 +
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
]
+
h
1− h
1− GY
1− G∗Y ∗
[
(1− τs)(1− τw)
(1− τ∗s)(1− τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
− h
1− h
(B.197)
then finally dividing all by what multiplies α∗ yields:
α∗ = α
h
1− h +
h
1− h
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
[
(1−τs)(1−τw)
(1−τ∗s)(1−τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ − 1
1 + h1−h
1−GY
1−G∗
Y ∗
[
(1−τs)(1−τw)
(1−τ∗s)(1−τ∗w)
] 1
ϕ
(B.198)
which is the final equation linking the two parameters of openness through the shares government con-
sumption in output and the tax rates.
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